CROUCH MEMORIAL
LIBRARY FUND

EX LIBRIS

Accession No. _____

Date _____

KANT ON THE MORAL LIFE

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

SYNDICALISM AND
PHILOSOPHICAL REALISM

Demy 8vo., cloth

PRICE 10/- net
(By post 10/6)

A BOOK DEALING WITH THE RELATIONS
OF PHILOSOPHY AND LABOUR

KARL MARX ON VALUE

A CRITICISM

Demy 8vo., cloth

PRICE 3/6 net
(By post 3/9)

A. & C. BLACK, LTD., 4, SOHO SQ., W. 1

AGENTS

America . . . . THE MACMILLAN COMPANY
64 & 66 Fifth Avenue, NEW YORK

Australasia . . . OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
205 Flinders Lane, MELBOURNE

Canada . . . . . THE MACMILLAN COMPANY OF CANADA, LTD
St. Martin's House, 70 Bond Street, TORONTO

India . . . . . MACMILLAN AND COMPANY, LTD
Macmillan Building, BOMBAY
309 Bow Bazaar Street, CALCUTTA
Indian Bank Buildings, MADRAS

KANT
ON THE MORAL LIFE

AN EXPOSITION OF KANT'S "GRUNDLEGUNG"

BY

J. W. SCOTT

PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY COLLEGE OF SOUTH WALES AND MONMOUTHSHIRE

AUTHOR OF "SYNDICALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL REALISM," "KARL MARX ON VALUE," ETC.

Property of
CDSD
Please return to
Graduate Theological
Union Library

A. & C. BLACK, LTD.
4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W 1
1924

GRADUATE THEOLOGICAL UNION LIBRARY

B
2769
.S3
1924

QJ 65
S08

BERKELEY BAPTIST
DIVINITY SCHOOL
LIBRARY

Printed in Great Britain by
BILLING AND SONS, LTD., GUILDFORD AND ESHER

TO MY STUDENTS
OF 1921-22
IN THE UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA



The following exposition is intended as a companion volume to any good translation of Kant's "Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals"—say, e.g., Abbott's small edition published by Messrs. Longmans and Co., London. The student is expected to keep the two volumes open before him at the same place and to read them together.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER I

PAGE

INTRODUCTION: KANT'S FINDINGS IN THE FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE - - - - - - - - 1

CHAPTER II

KANT'S PREFACE TO THE *GRUNDLEGUNG* - - - - 28

CHAPTER III

GRUNDLEGUNG: FIRST SECTION - - - - - 43

CHAPTER IV

GRUNDLEGUNG: SECOND SECTION - - - - - 71

CHAPTER V

GRUNDLEGUNG: THIRD SECTION - - - - - 106

CHAPTER VI

REVIEW OF KANT'S POSITION - - - - - 144

INDEX - - - - - - - - - - 178

KANT ON THE MORAL LIFE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: KANT'S FINDINGS IN THE FIELD OF KNOWLEDGE

KANT'S *Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics* is a short book, consisting of three Sections and a somewhat lengthy Preface, conveniently dividing the whole into four parts. We shall make use of this division for purposes of our study. If the student will take a pencil and run down each of these parts separately in his copy, numbering the paragraphs, he will have before him the text to which all the references here correspond.

He might then turn to the Preface and read it through carefully, noting especially the survey of the field of human knowledge with which it opens. He will then be in a position to try out the analyses given in Chapter II. below, against his own understanding of the text. Presuming that Kant's Preface is to be thus read, we proceed meanwhile with a few words of Introduction.

The *Metaphysic of Ethics*, as the name implies, is a treatise in which Kant offers an interpretation of the moral life. More accurately, he

shows here how a certain interpretation of the moral life, which he takes to be the true one, is to be defended. But behind it he has a theory of knowledge, already elaborated in *The Critique of Pure Reason;* and a reading of the Preface will be enough to reveal how indispensable it is, before advancing to the ethical theory, to take account of his findings in this preliminary sphere.

For we cannot properly understand what Kant means by the good will, the kingdom of ends, the categorical imperative or any other of the characteristic phrases of his ethics until we are, to some degree at least, acquainted with his other great works, especially the three critiques —of Pure Reason, of Practical Reason, and of Judgment—in which he treats respectively of knowledge, of conduct, and of æsthetic appreciation. We have also to be familiar with some of the governing distinctions which pervade all his works, such as that between analytic and synthetic judgments and between apriori and aposteriori knowledge. Within the first, or theoretical critique, too, the great divisions, called respectively the Æsthetic, the Analytic, and the Dialectic, must be mastered, at least as regards the general drift of their teaching; the Æsthetic, with its doctrine of space and time and its reading of mathematical knowledge; the Analytic, with its treatment of conceptions such as cause and effect, which are fundamental to physics; and the Dialectic, with its epoch-making polemics against the possibility of metaphysics. It will

be something, however, if we can here and now gain some idea of the general place in Kant's thought of space and time on the one hand, and the categories of the understanding on the other. The double account given of the former in the Æsthetic, and the parallel double account of the latter in the Analytic, may be regarded as the centre from which most of Kant's important positions regarding knowledge flow; and they may be kept in view as the central matter in the following brief account of his general theoretical position.

Kant's inquiries in the field of knowledge are closely connected with the beginnings of his philosophy. The impulse which drives him to speculation at all, according to his own profession, is a desire to settle the limits to which human knowledge extends; to see what can be known and what cannot, and to understand why.

He wishes to come to a decision particularly as to our powers of knowing apriori truth. The reason for his special interest in this is not far to seek. As he construes the situation, there has been great abuse of so-called apriori knowledge. People have attempted to use it in ways contrary to its nature. The result, in his opinion, is on our hands in those contemporary systems, gathered under the title of metaphysic, which, while they deal with the most important of all subjects, are entirely unsatisfactory in their handling of them. Kant's theory of knowledge,

as developed in the first of his three critiques, is an attempt to clear up some things which he conceives have to be made clear before we can think of attempting metaphysics at all. The purpose of *The Critique of Pure Reason* is to defend such apriori knowledge as Kant holds to be possible, and to expose what he regards as not possible.

In considering *The Critique of Pure Reason* we must note first quite generally what sort of knowledge, in Kant's view, admits of doubt and thus requires defence, and what does not. Knowledge, he explains, is of two sorts. One consists of what we pick up from experience. Here, our procedure is to note particular facts, that this snow is white, this body is heavy, etc. Such knowledge is not in any need of defence. We do not question it. Experience is our warrant for it. This body is heavy because I feel it to be so. On the other hand, we think we know some truths which apply far beyond the point to which experience can reach and test them. We seem to know certain things apriori. The latter is the kind of knowledge which Kant feels the need to inquire about.

There is, indeed, such a thing as apriori knowledge which does not call for inquiry, since of it too we can say that it is never in doubt. We do not doubt, for instance, that bodies are extended, although that is an apriori assertion. The reason is that "extended" is partly what we mean by "body." The statement thus asserts no more

than that bodies are bodily, and we may safely mortgage our future experience to bear out that. We cannot but reflect, however, that such truths are very empty. They do not widen our knowledge at all. We knew already that bodies were bodily. This is an analytic statement, in which the predicate merely analyses out part of the meaning of the subject. If statements are to have any interest they must be synthetic. They must add to our knowledge of the subject. Are there no statements, then, capable of being regarded as valid apriori, except those somewhat empty analytic ones? In Kant's words, "How are *synthetic* apriori judgments possible?" It is the possibility of these that is really important. It is these judgments that the current metaphysic really requires to be possible. For these are the kind of judgments it makes. Necessarily so; for these statements and these alone could constitute (to adopt the language of paragraph 4 of the Preface) a pure philosophy which was not formal only but had to do with objects. Now the old metaphysic did think that it had to do with objects.

And are such judgments possible? Kant's ultimate finding is that they are, up to a point; but not far enough for the current metaphysic to make any use of them. There are statements apriori certain which are yet "material" statements. But they give us knowledge of this world only. They do not extend our knowledge to any other.

This is their disability so far as metaphysic is concerned. The knowledge which the current metaphysic habitually dealt in was a knowledge purporting to be about objects beyond the common sphere of experience. It was interested in such matters as God, Freedom, and Immortality; conceptions manifestly vital, as we may note, to man as a social being, and therefore perhaps the most important of all subjects. But it could not be content with less than knowledge of these things. It professed to be able to subject them to analysis, to demonstrate them and so forth. To all of which Kant replies that it is too presumptuous. While we may make assumptions in these matters, while we may even need to make such assumptions, our apriori *knowledge* does not extend to any sphere beyond the sphere of experience. On the other hand, however, there is valid apriori knowledge within the latter sphere. And once we get to understand the true nature of such knowledge by studying it there, we learn how the other conceptions, Ideas of Reason as Kant calls them, are to be properly handled, and what kind of a justification or defence they admit of. Kant has thus a positive side to his theory of knowledge. And he derives from it something which he still calls metaphysic, although he repudiates the old metaphysic.

How does Kant endeavour to make out that we have valid apriori knowledge within the

world of experience, and what valid apriori knowledge does he think we have there?

The outline of an answer would have to consist in an outline of the main positions arrived at in the course of, roughly, the first half of *The Critique of Pure Reason.* Here Kant is virtually giving an exposition of what he calls transcendental philosophy. It consists largely of his positive findings about knowledge, and provides the groundwork of what he would call a metaphysic of nature. We may attempt, however roughly and briefly, to sketch this part of his work.

Asking what of apriori—meaning what of valid and significant apriori—is to be found in our knowledge of the ordinary world of experience, Kant has no difficulty in finding at least some. It is a fact that in our ordinary knowledge we are always anticipating experience. And we are sometimes plainly justified. There are judgments of a material kind (synthetic judgments) which go beyond our actual experience, and which yet are such that we do not doubt them, since no future experience is in the least danger of upsetting them.

Instances are mathematical judgments. When I say that the sum of the three angles of a triangle is equal to two right angles, I make an apriori statement. I assert something which I take to be true far beyond the particular triangles which I have found experimentally to possess this property. When I say seven and five are

twelve I mean that where and when soever seven things are added to five things, there will be twelve found in the result. And yet these sure statements are not empty. We are not merely saying that seven and five are seven and five, or that a triangle is a triangle. So far, then, Kant answers his questions as to the possibility of synthetic apriori judgments by pointing to a *fait accompli*. His procedure is first to find how such judgments are possible in those cases where they clearly are possible, and then go on to the further cases where the possibility is in doubt. On the strength of having found the rationale in a sure case, he adjudicates in favour of the use made of the apriori in certain departments of knowledge and against that made of it in others. He decides in favour of the apriori made use of in physics, but against that made use of in the current Wolffian metaphysics.

The question to which Kant must first give attention, then, is that of the rationale of such cases of apriori synthetic judgment as are sure. How does it come that we can be so certain about triangles which we have never seen and twelves which we have never tested, as in the above statements concerning them we seem to be?

In asking a question of the form "On what rests our assurance that such and such a piece of our knowledge will always be found experimentally correct?" we are clearly raising a question

as to what kind of experience our minds are sure always to have on certain occasions. It is of the nature "*What experience must* the mind have?" Kant therefore inquires, What structure of the mind makes it able to have experience at all? or, more articulately, What functions must the mind be exercising inasmuch as it is having experience? The genuine and valid apriori in knowledge will be whatever of apriori is inseparably bound up with these necessary functions. What these functions say must characterise all that we can have experience of—that and nothing else will be the valid apriori. That will mark out the area of what we know by pure reason, independently of experience.

Hence *The Critique of Pure Reason*, embarking upon the inquiry as to what knowledge pure reason can guarantee us, begins with a doctrine of the two elements of pure reason.[1] The doctrine of the one is Transcendental Æsthetic, and of the other Transcendental Logic, the elements dealt with being respectively (*a*) sensing, and (*b*) conceiving or thinking. The Æsthetic and the Logic form the two main divisions—highly unequal in length—of the work, or at least of the main body of it.

And the division is of course natural. The governing question is as to what structure in the mind enables it to have intelligent experience; and these two, sensing and thinking, are the two main elements involved. When an intelligent

[1] See the table of contents in Meiklejohn's translation.

mind encounters an object in the outer world, there is a sensing of it. Without that there could plainly be no perception. Equally plainly sense is not enough. The mere vague sense-content is not yet the apprehended object. The mere sense of smell is not yet the intelligent apprehension of the rose. The mere sense of a darkening all around is not yet knowledge of the approaching shower. Having sensed the aroma we must understand this as coming from a rose. Having sensed the darkness we must be able to read it as referring to a shower. The problem, therefore, is (*a*) What are the conditions necessary of sensibility, and (*b*) What are the conditions necessary of understanding, if the mind is to be able to have the intelligent experience? The bringing out of these yields us Transcendental Philosophy. It is the positive part of *The Critique of Pure Reason*, and involves all of the work so far as to the end of the treatment of the understanding, or about half the total.[1]

The conditions necessary of sensibility, if we are to have an intelligent experience, is the theme of Transcendental Æsthetic.[2] To Kant there is that which we sense apriori as well as that which we understand apriori; and it is because we sense space and time apriori—because space and time are forms of our sense-intuition—that the apriori synthetic judgments of mathematics are possible.

[1] Down to p. 208 in Meiklejohn's translation.

[2] Meiklejohn, pp. 21-44.

The establishment of this point involves two expositions of space and time, named respectively the metaphysical and the transcendental. The business of the former is to show that our apprehension of space and time is both apriori and a form of sense or intuition. The aim of the latter is to show that those mental constructions in space and time which we call mathematical judgments must have objective validity or must hold throughout the world of experience. Only when the reason for the latter has been perceived is the possibility of the apriori syntheses of mathematics properly understood. The reason Kant offers is that since space and time are forms of our sense, all that we can have experience of must be subject to these forms and their laws, the laws of mathematics.

And this is simply one application of the fundamental insight of the *Critique*. The world which exists in space and time exists under the laws of what is at bottom a form of our sense. We can rely on these laws holding, because we can rely upon always being in our own world; at any rate, a world which is our own thus far, that its objects bear out the necessary laws of our apprehension. Hence the famous statement of Kant, that having found it impossible to proceed upon the assumption that our minds must conform to objects, he tried the other hypothesis, namely, that objects must conform to our minds. The world with which our knowledge has to do is a world of phenomena. What we

know is how things affect us, not what they are in themselves. And these affections must take certain shapes, of which one set is expressed in the constructions of mathematics.

We pass now to Transcendental Logic, the sphere of those apriori synthetic judgments of which we wish to find out whether they are genuinely possible or not. They are divided into those of physics and those of metaphysics. To the former is devoted the Transcendental Analytic, dealing with the understanding. To the latter is devoted the Transcendental Dialectic, dealing with reason. The Analytic works out as a justification of the principles of physics, and the Dialectic as a destructive criticism of the use of those principles in metaphysics.

In entering this sphere, the sphere of the apriori knowledge specially connected with the mind's thinking faculty, we have entered the place where, *par excellence*, the mind stumbles. It is here that, in the language of the famous preface to *The Critique of Pure Reason*, the human mind, flying away into regions where it had no business, produces all that barren speculation which had passed for metaphysic hitherto; and it is to the necessity for his uttering something calculated to put a check upon this particular habit of the mind that Kant is referring when he comes to write the preface to his *Grundlegung*. He refers to it in paragraph 11

there, as a need which he had already tried to meet in his *Critique of Pure Reason;* a need which, he says, had appealed to him as far more instant and pressing than the corresponding need to be met by the second of the three *Kritiken*, his *Critique of Practical Reason*, which at the time of the publication of the *Grundlegung* remained still unwritten.

The existence of valid apriori synthetic judgments in mathematics is unquestioned. We have seen how they are possible. They are possible because our world is a world in space and time, and therefore the laws of space and time, necessarily accessible to us since space and time are forms of our own sense, must apply to all of it. Can we go forward now and find any further features which necessarily must characterise this world of ours in such a way as would perhaps justify at least some of that further apriori knowledge which men at various times have thought themselves possessed of? One would hardly think it possible but that there should be some of it which is not astray—such fundamental dicta, let us say, as that one of pure physics which states that every change must have a cause.

Kant ventures an answer in the affirmative. His surmise is that just as there are, among the conditions which make the mind capable of having intelligent experience at all, certain conditions of sensibility which make mathematical

judgments possible, so there may be, connected with that understanding which is also involved in all intelligent experience, conditions which will similarly guarantee the fundamental judgments of pure physics. It is clear that in knowing, we do not only sense. We also understand. May there not be, then, necessary ways of understanding which are law-giving for our world of objects, just as there are ways of sensing which are? Kant thinks so. And as to what these ways are he is not without a clue. For what is formal logic except the systematised record of the products of the ways in which we necessarily conceive, understand, or think? Why should there not be a logic of understanding, which moulds our world to the thought-structure of the mind which is to know it, just as there are conditions of the mind's sensing which mould it to the sense-structure? Kant finds for this view, with only one qualification. The logic which thus imposes its form on the world of experience will not, *qua* thus imposing itself, be exactly formal. That is why Kant adopts the term Transcendental Logic for this division of his *Critique*.

What, then, is the logic which is necessarily involved in the having of intelligent experience? Can we say how, in all such experience, the understanding necessarily comports itself, how it necessarily *conceives* and how it necessarily *judges*, and thus discover some further moulds

into which the world of experience must necessarily shape itself? Kant divides his Analytic,[1] in accordance with these two halves of his problem, into an *Analytic of Conceptions*[2] and an *Analytic of Principles*,[3] the latter giving his transcendental doctrine of judgment. When he has elaborated the pure or necessary conceptions of the understanding and has also given the system of the principles of the pure understanding, he is satisfied that he has shown the general conditions to which all possible objects of knowledge must conform, and so has laid the foundations of a metaphysic of nature.

In order that the necessary logic involved in intelligent experience may be laid bare, there must first be discovered the conceptions which the understanding necessarily uses in such experience. This is attempted in a *Metaphysical Deduction of the Categories* forming the first chapter of *The Analytic of Conceptions*.[4] There follows immediately the central undertaking of the *Critique*, the *Transcendental Deduction of the Categories*,[5] in which Kant seeks to show that these necessary conceptions of the understanding must be valid for the whole of the world with which our senses have to do. After that, in *The Analytic of Principles*, Kant elaborates the principles which must be true of our world, the world disclosed in our systems

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 54–208.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 55 ff.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 103 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, pp. 56–71.
[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 71-103.

of physics or natural science, naming them respectively Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, and Postulates of Empirical Thought in general.[1] Before he closes this discussion, Kant proceeds to refute as best he can the charge that having admitted that all he has said is only true of *our* world, he has therefore simply shut each of us up to the world of his own private mind, like Berkeley.[2] Kant does not in the least think he has done this. He insists that all we have to do with in knowledge is a phenomenal world; but it is none the less, for him, a genuinely public world, one genuinely common to all of us.

We must glance now very briefly on the one hand at his handling of the conceptions and on the other hand at how he obtains from them those principles which are the valid apriori, underlying physics or natural science.

Of the two deductions of the categories or pure conceptions of the understanding, the metaphysical seeks to determine what they are, and the transcendental to vindicate their validity in the world. To find what they are is to find what and how the understanding necessarily conceives. From formal logic we find that in the ordinary discursive use of the understanding we proceed in four chief ways, each of which differentiates itself into three subordinate moments.

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 107-177.
[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 166-174.

These constitute the twelve ways of judging or the twelve forms of judgment. We make judgments:[1]

(*a*) Universal, Particular, Singular—in *Quantity.*

(*b*) Affirmative, Negative, Infinite—in *Quality.*

(*c*) Categorical, Hypothetical, Disjunctive—in *Relation.*

(*d*) Problematic, Assertoric, Apodeictic—in *Modality.*

These are the essential differentiations of our judging-activity. Each of these ways of judging exhibits the operation of a certain conception. The operative conceptions of the three judgments of *Quantity* are Unity, Plurality, Totality. Those of the judgments of *Quality* are Reality, Negation, Limitation. Those of *Relation* are Inherence and Subsistence, Causality and Dependence, Community or Reciprocity. Those of *Modality* are Possibility-impossibility, Existence-non-existence, Necessity-contingency. These conceptions are the categories of the understanding.[2]

Now Kant holds that these twelve necessary ways of conceiving, when exercised in conjunction with the ways in which we sense apriori, give to the manifold of sense the form of experience; and so from them we may derive certain apriori principles which must necessarily hold regarding the whole of the universe with which our senses are in touch. This is because the

[1] Meiklejohn, p. 58. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 64.

necessary ways in which the understanding judges, as set out by formal logic and gathered by Kant into his table of judgments, are for him only the formal side of a concrete or constitutive function; a function by which the understanding actively sustains the order of the universe of our experience, and that along logically necessary lines.

There is for Kant a constitutive or synthetic logic which is still logic—that is to say, which proceeds with as genuine a necessity as the formal logic of the abstract judgment. In fact, the judgment of which formal logic exhibits the necessary laws is not abstract. The judgment is, in its true nature, a much wider thing than formal logic itself has suspected. For formal logic, the judgment has to do with the connection or relation of conceptions. "Bodies are heavy," "A is B." But Kant observes that what we have in the judgment is more than a passive finding of such relation. Prior to that, it is a setting-up of relationships. It is an active putting of such a relation there. In understanding or thought, for Kant, there is synthesis involved, an active setting of things together, essentially like what is done by the imagination; only with this difference, that in the construction of the understanding things are put together, not arbitrarily, but as they objectively are. It is still, however, a putting of representations together. It is a gathering of them into a unity of apperception, to use Kant's term; although

the unity is the unity of an objective and not merely a subjective order.

"I could never satisfy myself," says Kant in an autobiographical passage inserted in the second edition of *The Critique of Pure Reason*,

"with the definition which logicians give of the judgment. It is, according to them, the representation of a relation between two conceptions. I shall not dwell here on the faultiness of this definition in that it suits only for categorical judgments, and not for hypothetical or disjunctive . . . It is more important for our present purpose to observe that this definition does not determine in what the said relation consists.

"[But] if I investigate the relation of given cognitions in every judgment more closely, and distinguish the relation as belonging to the understanding . . . I find that a judgment is nothing but a mode of bringing given cognitions under the Objective Unity of Apperception."[1]

And he goes on to instance the bringing of "bodies" and "heavy" together in the judgment "bodies are heavy," and to distinguish this "bringing" as objective and necessary, from one which should be only subjective and associative, or a product of the imagination. The main point to observe is that even the statement of objective fact is still, for him, a synthesis, a "bringing together."

This act of synthesising the data of sense into unity is the core of the understanding. The twelve kinds of unity into which it synthesises its data are the twelve categories. And the *Deduction of the Categories* is simply Kant's

[1] Article 15 of Transcendental Logic, First Division. See Meiklejohn, pp. 86-7.

proof that this synthetic function is constitutive of that entire objectivity with which science does and alone can concern itself.

To exercise the understanding in conjunction with the ways in which we sense apriori, yields certain general judgments expressing principles valid of all that can form part of a world open to our human experience. These—virtually the apriori principles of pure physics—are elaborated in the second part of the *Analytic*, called *The Analytic of Principles.*

There are what Kant called schemata;[1] schemes, as we might say, according to which our faculty of imagination, "a blind but necessary function of the soul," effects a kind of preliminary synthesis among the raw data of sense. These schemata or outline sketches, effected by imagination, of the order which the world of objects assumes, consist of "transcendental determinations of time." Roughly speaking, they are what we should get by thinking of the categories—substance, causality, necessity, or the like—as general forms of construction, restricted in their operation to the function of construing time, or data *qua* appearing in time; time being a form of sense in which all sense data without exception appear. Thus Kant says:

> "The pure schema of quantity is number, a representation which comprehends the successive addition of one to one."

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 107-113.

"The schema of substance is the permanence of the real in time."

"The schema of cause . . . is the real which when posited is always followed by something else."

"The schema of reality is existence of an object in all time."[1]

And so on, it is to the data of sense as already synthesised into these schemata that the categories primarily apply. And as applied to them they issue in the system of principles of the pure understanding, which are the apriori presupposed in physics, and make a foundation for a true metaphysic of nature—those principles which are summarised by Kant as the Axioms of Intuition, Anticipations of Perception, Analogies of Experience, and Postulates of Empirical Thought, noted above. Without waiting to discuss them, we may merely indicate, in Kant's words, what they are.

The principle of the first is that "all intuitions are extensive quantities";[2] of the second, that "in all phenomena the real, that which is an object of sensation, has an intensive quantity, that is, has a degree";[3] of the third, that "experience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connexion of perceptions."[4] Lastly, the Postulates of Empirical Thought are the following:

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 110 ff.
[2] *Ibid.*, p. 122.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 125.
[4] *Ibid.* p. 132.

(*a*) that "that which agrees with the formal conditions . . . of perception is *possible*";

(*b*) that "that which coheres with the material conditions of experience . . . is *real*"; and

(*c*) that "that whose coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is *necessary*."[1]

Thus does Kant by an elaborate study of our faculties of both apriori sensing and apriori understanding arrive at some conclusion as to what principles we may safely regard as apriori valid of our universe—*i.e.*, of any universe with which our human experience can have to do. But as to any universe—or any part of *the* universe—which is not capable of being known by way of our ordinary human experience, but is transcendent, these principles will not yield us any apriori knowledge of that. Those principles which Kant has elucidated are, he believes, all that we have; and they do not extend there. The old metaphysic is the futile attempt so to extend them. There is indeed, Kant admits and asserts, that in us which tempts us to apply the principles of our knowledge beyond their legitimate sphere, in the hope of subjecting the transcendent to demonstration. But such attempts necessarily end in illusion. The various pseudo-sciences grouped as metaphysics are the happy

[1] Meiklejohn, p. 161.

hunting-ground of such illusions; and in the Dialectic Kant brings home the charge to each of them severally. Thus, he explains, it is a perfectly legitimate procedure when our knowledge traces an event to its cause and then traces the cause of *its* cause and so on, going as far as it can go; but it is an illusion when a science calling itself Rational Cosmology imagines that it can achieve knowledge of a real beginning, a cause which was not the effect of anything prior, a first or free cause.[1] Similarly, it is legitimate to study the various phenomena of our own inner life, just as we would the phenomena of the outer world; but it is an illusion when a Rational Psychology would persuade us that it knows the reality behind those phenomena, the ultimate ground of them, that self or soul of which they are the manifestations, and that it can demonstrate points about it, its simplicity, indestructibility, immortality, or what not.[2] And it is a delusion no less on the part of Rational Theology when it professes to know the *ens realissimum* or God, and advances this or that demonstrative proof of His existence.[3] There is that in us which impels us to try to extend our knowledge to these objects; but it is not the nature of knowledge to be able to deal with anything which transcends the world of experience. And yet the existence of this impulse is not something that Kant only admits.

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 255–350. [2] *Ibid.*, pp. 237-254.
[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 350-393.

It is rather something he is concerned to assert. It is not to be regretted. It has a function to perform. It need not lead us into illusion. The real position is that while reason is out for a satisfaction which, through knowledge, it can never attain, yet the very fact that it continues to seek in knowledge for such, is just what keeps knowledge growing continually deeper and wider. The impulse to leap beyond the world of experience is but the mistaken form of an impulse to know that world as thoroughly as possible. Thus the three Ideas of Reason, as Kant calls them, the World, and Self, and God, which, if knowledge could ever reach them whilst keeping on its own proper track, would yield finality and satisfaction, are in truth only ideals which our knowledge moves towards. Taken as realities which it encounters, they are misunderstood. The Ideas of Reason, to use another distinction of Kant's, are only regulative of knowledge, not constitutive of its object.

The current metaphysic, then, is little else than an unsuccessful bid, on the part of reason, for finality and satisfactoriness in the sphere of knowledge. The answer to its claims is that beyond the field of experience, where alone such finality lies, knowledge is incompetent. Reason in its search for knowledge is inclined to roam. Kant would have it keep its appointed limits. "*The Critique of Pure Reason*," in words which he himself once used, "is a preservative against a malady which has its roots in

our rational nature. This malady is the opposite of the love of home, the home-sickness, which binds us to our fatherland. It is a longing to pass out beyond our immediate confines, and relate ourselves to other worlds."

But what, then, is the truth about those "transcendent" matters? We have to note, in reply, the presupposition of all this argument. It is a position from which Kant never moves. Beyond the sphere of experience and knowledge something does and must exist. The distinction between the phenomenal which we know and the noumenal or real which we think, holds. Sense, it is plain, yields us only the phenomenal. Through sense we become aware not of how objects are, but only of how they affect us. How or what they are in themselves remains dark to us, so far as sense can guide us. And all the principles of our knowledge have an inevitable reference to sense. Bare conceptions by themselves are a mere vacancy and yield no knowledge. "The principles of the pure understanding," as Kant says in summarising the results of the *Analytic*, "relate only to the general conditions of a possible experience, to objects of the senses, and never to things in general, apart from the mode in which we intuite them."[1]

A consequence, however, of our being thus shut off from the sphere beyond experience is that our knowledge cannot argue about what is *not* there, any more than it can by dialectical argu-

[1] Meiklejohn, pp. 183 ff.

ment excogitate information about what is there. This is why Kant, by destroying unwarranted knowledge, thought he had left room for faith.[1] Our beliefs about supersensible objects are necessarily left standing, so far as knowledge is concerned, if there is any warrant in our nature for having faith in them, as distinct from knowing and demonstrating them. Now, there is a certain warrant in our nature for having faith in them. Here is where the moral life becomes a metaphysical consideration. We are so made as to be compelled to regard the moral life as worthy of us. And without the practical validity of the ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality, a moral life is unmeaning.

Thus the moral life is our point of contact with ultimate reality. There we enter the sphere from which knowledge is cut off, and are part of it. One aspect of this central fact is important for the study of the *Metaphysic of Ethics*. One of the ways in which, as we have seen, knowledge reaches out after finality and pretends to have seized it, is in its professing to have found a first, uncaused or free cause. Kant's exposure of this consisted in showing that the principle of causality is only applicable within the field of experience, and that within that field every cause is an effect of some prior cause. But the faith that in reality there is such a thing as freedom is not necessarily upset thereby. If we find ourselves compelled to

[1] Preface to the Second Edition, see Meiklejohn, p. xxxv.

assume, otherwise than as an article of theoretical knowledge, that we ourselves have freedom; if, for instance, we can only be moral by assuming responsibilities which mean that we act in the conscious capacity of free beings; then we cannot proceed, upon the basis of anything we may pretend to know about ultimate reality, to argue against this freedom, and say of him who acts *as* free, that he cannot *be* free. This would be arguing that the category of causality applies beyond the sphere of experience as it does within that sphere, which is to use the category emptily; it is to apply it in a sphere where *ex hypothesi* there is no sense-filling for it. A freedom in the world with which science deals would indeed be impossible. But the world with which science deals is the world of appearances. Though there be no freedom there, there may yet be freedom in reality. We, *qua* real, may be free.

Our business at present is not to attempt to examine or criticise this steep doctrine—that we reserve for a later chapter—but to push forward and see how Kant's view of the moral life is related to it.

CHAPTER II

KANT'S PREFACE TO THE *GRUNDLEGUNG*

Commentary.

It is not easy to paraphrase Kant's writings, especially his later ones. And to translate them is still harder. In the following pages we are attempting neither of these things. We have a much easier task before us. We are simply to go through this work of his systematically, taking each successive section of convenient size, and, either by expanding its argument or condensing it or illustrating it, by all means to yield an impression which, while not untrue to him or to what he wanted to argue, will be of assistance in grasping what essentially Kant meant to hold in the field of Ethics.

There is an inconvenience in the method. The student will be apt to lose sight of the aim, especially if, as recommended, he keeps Abbott's translation of the text also open before him as he reads. He will be apt to find himself looking in the present volume for what he would expect in a true paraphrase, and thus constantly discovering things in Kant's text which are not in the representation here given of his argument, and vice versa. All of which, however, will only be to the good, so long as the reader occa-

sionally does recall to himself (because then it will be with a vivid impression of the text in his mind) what the real aim is here—namely, just to bring out *what Kant thought about the moral life*, and to use all available means thereto. This warning given, we may plunge at once in *medias res*. Commentary.

Paragraph 1.—Logic, Physics, Ethics; thus, says Kant, did the Ancients divide the whole field of human knowledge; and I, after all, have not altered so very much of that. Virtually, I have but shown why the field should have been divided precisely thus. Argument.

Such is the free, careless opening manner of the Preface. It suggests assurance on Kant's part, even a touch of exultation. He is very full, really, of his great new rendering of philosophic truth, very confident about it, very satisfied with it. You can see the truth of it, he seems to say, from any angle; you can reach it from any quarter. All roads lead to Rome. The Ancients themselves almost saw it. In fact, without being aware of what they had done, they had seized the essentials of the very idea. Only, not being sufficiently clearly conscious of the principle they were following, in their survey of human knowledge, they "omitted some necessary subdivisions." There were departments of thought which they did not recognise. Commentary.

The date of this publication is 1786. Kant is writing in his maturest years, when, intellectually

Commentary.

speaking, he had fairly come into his kingdom. And it is perhaps not altogether fanciful to think that the suggestion of a sense of this is even in his opening tone.

But what is the bearing of his remarks? What are the Ancients here supposed to have done? What precisely is the principle which they are said to have followed? And by making what "further subdivisions" does Kant think to carry it out better? We may further reconstruct a good deal of the situation with which Kant conceives himself to be dealing, if we read the first five paragraphs of the Preface carefully together. It will be seen at once that Kant is engaged in disposing the various departments of human knowledge upon the general map of the whole field, which he has in his mind's eye. It is easy, moreover, to see in which departments his own real interest lies. They are clearly those embraced in the "pure philosophy" of paragraph 4.

Argument.

Paragraphs 2-5.—There are two kinds of rational knowledge. There is material rational knowledge and there is the rational knowledge which is only formal. The latter is called logic (paragraph 2).

Of the rational knowledge which is material, some delivers its doctrines from apriori principles alone. It is called metaphysic. Metaphysic is thus pure, although material, philosophy. Some, on the other hand, is based on grounds of experience. It is empirical philosophy (paragraph 4).

Commentary.

We have here a likeness and yet a ground of distinction between metaphysic and logic.

Metaphysic, equally with logic, is pure philosophy, since, like logic, it works from apriori principles. But metaphysic is material, while logic is formal.

Commentary.

Kant is speaking here of metaphysic as properly understood. There need be no doubt that he recognises the possibility of such a discipline. One of the advantages of studying Kant in his ethical works is that it saves us from one-sided views of his teaching. He is one of the thinkers who are peculiarly liable to be so taken. He marks a nodal point in the history of Western thought. Many streams converge in him. In consequence, he has been much commented upon—few philosophers so much. And none perhaps has formed the fountain-head of so many subsequent streams of thought, or had so many contending parties claiming to represent the true line of descent from him. It is most natural that as the critic of metaphysic he should be claimed by, amongst others, the school who have constituted themselves the enemy of all metaphysic, the positivists. But it is also, as is clear, most mistaken. He certainly spoke at sufficient length of the futility of metaphysic. But he clearly did not intend to confine all legitimate human reflection to the pursuit of positive sciences. Disbeliever as he was in the old metaphysic, he still gave the name metaphysic to what he did believe in; and he clearly contemplated that something in the nature of a metaphysical discipline was possible.

Commentary.

It ought not to pass without remark, either, that this procedure, of first attacking the possibility of metaphysic at all, and then adopting the term straightway into his vocabulary, to designate something legitimate and important, is characteristic of Kant. He is for ever pouring new wine into the old skins. An instance is his treatment of judgment, noted above (p. 19). He takes the judgment and says, in effect, "here is what is *really* involved in it"; and immediately what had been hard and dry becomes original, creative, and almost literally filled with new wine. If it is clear that this is often an illegitimate thing to do, it is equally clear that there must be some sense in which it is not illegitimate. And if criticism of Kant is to be based on the assumption that in philosophy the pouring of old wine into new bottles is never a proper thing to do at all, the critic must shoulder the burden of proving that assumption. In any case, if there is to be no way whatever of legitimately doing this kind of thing, Kant's occupation's gone. He does it, and does little else. His retention of the term metaphysic is a case in point. It is a way of saying, regarding what he brings to light, "This is the real metaphysic. This is that which the generations of metaphysicians have been hungering and thirsting after, without being able to come at." It is part, we might say, of his healing-power. Kant is a fulfiller of the past. He registers this in his adoption of the language of the past. His

terminology, however cumbrous and however forbidding to the student, is a genuine part of his greatness. Commentary.

Paragraphs 2-5 (*continued*).—Of the rational knowledge which is material—and this equally whether it delivers its doctrines from apriori principles alone or not—there are two fields for exercise. It may spend itself upon either the realm of nature or the realm of freedom. In the former case it is called physics. In the latter case it may be called ethics (paragraph 2), although (paragraph 5) the designation is not very appropriate. Argument.

In the case of physics or natural philosophy, however, and again in the case of ethics or moral philosophy, there will be a distinction according as our rational knowledge does attack its subject from an apriori point of view, or has regard to the evidence of experience. There will be a pure physics and an empirical, and also a pure ethics and an empirical; although it would be more appropriate to give to the empirical side of ethics the name of practical anthropology, reserving the name morality for the pure or apriori side (paragraph 5).

We have now got to the underlying principle of the Ancients' procedure. We can see the sense of their dividing the field of knowledge as they did. They said Logic, Physics, Ethics; thereby distinguishing the one formal discipline from two material disciplines. They only did not see that in physics there is a pure or apriori side which yet yields material knowledge; and similarly in ethics. These subdivisions have to be recognised. The pure or apriori part of physics is metaphysic of nature. The pure or apriori part of ethics is metaphysic of ethics.

It will be noticed how cumbrous is the term "rational knowledge," repeating itself in the above summary. It is the term Kant sets out with at the beginning of paragraph 2. It is a Commentary.

Commentary.

different "rational," in the original, from what he uses just below. It is best regarded simply as an inheritance from previous philosophic diction. The fact is, Kant is writing a preface. He is addressing his contemporary philosophic audience. He is telling them what he is offering. And he does so in terms with which they are familiar. "Rational knowledge" is what writers of the Leibnitzian school—Wolff, for example—were always talking of. It is connected with the old distinction between the truths of revelation and the knowledge a man derives from his own reason. But the term had gone quite colourless. As Kant uses it in paragraph 2, it is best read as simply equivalent to "knowledge." The usage is different in paragraphs 5 and 6 and elsewhere. There the word "rational" carries its usual meaning, implying a contrast with the empirical.

It is also clear from these paragraphs that Kant is not especially concerned about formal pure philosophy or logic. This must not blind us to the fact that there is a brand of pure philosophy which is for him in the literal sense material—important. This, of course, is his own transcendental philosophy, or pure metaphysic. So far as it concerns nature he would find the foundations of it in the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic* of *The Critique of Pure Reason*. So far as it concerns ethics, he is laying the foundations for it now. More accurately, he is commencing to. The real foundations, as one gathers below, are to be looked for in *The Critique of*

Practical Reason, if once that work should get itself completed. Commentary.

We only now need to hold fast to the general idea, that in ethics as in physics there are two parts, an apriori or metaphysical and another; and the remainder of the Preface should rapidly open up to us. Read paragraphs 6 and 7, with a view to the following.

Paragraph 6.—A division of labour is required. It seems necessary in view of the two parts, just mentioned, of ethics or moral philosophy. We shall not press the question whether the business of philosophy might not profit, as other human enterprises have profited, by putting actually different individuals to its different tasks. But we must insist upon the difference of the tasks; upon empirical physics being distinguished from the metaphysic of nature, and empirical ethics from the metaphysic of ethics. We might even suggest a special name, in the case of ethics, for the non-metaphysical part and call it practical anthropology. Argument.

Paragraph 7.—At any rate, the making of some such distinction is of crucial importance in the case of ethics or moral philosophy, whatever may be said about the case of physics. For without it, moral laws are so represented as to be virtually robbed of their moral force.

Kant holds that only as having the metaphysical aspect of them accentuated, only as metaphysically grounded, do moral laws have the necessity which attaches to them duly expressed. Otherwise they would appear out of character. The utmost that moral philosophy could then hope to show would be that man has happened to be constituted in a certain way; in such a way that having moral laws and paying heed to Commentary.

Commentary.

them are what suit him; but that it has only so happened. In these circumstances it might be shown, regarding moral laws, that they are rules adherence to which has turned out good for man so far as experience has gone, as yet. But as for any necessity beyond that, any necessary universality of moral laws, any applicability to all beings who are rational, whether they are human or not, or to man if he had happened to be—rational, indeed, but—quite different in other respects to what he is; of anything of this sort nothing can be said. The next few paragraphs show that contemporary ethical treatises suffer, in Kant's opinion, from this kind of defect.

Argument.

Paragraph 8.—The whole virtue of moral philosophy, regarded as a representation of a way of life, lies precisely in its throwing the necessity-aspect of the moral law into clear relief. "All moral philosophy rests wholly on its pure part." It addresses man as a rational being. It does not encourage him to treat himself as a creature of desire. It does not encourage him to consult his wants or wishes or preferences or even his needs. It does not appeal to anything in man's observable make-up. It expresses what rationally ought to be, independently of what the individual may want. It presents itself as "apriori necessary." All of which means that a work on ethics must disclose the latent metaphysic of ethics.

We need not, of course, shut out of ethics all reference to the concrete and sensible. Knowledge of man's actual wants and circumstances is essential for life. After all, it is in the concrete circumstances of the actual lives of men that the occasions lie of applying the moral law; and you must know them in order to see how the law applies. Knowledge of human nature is also desirable. It is necessary, with beings like men, affected as they are by

Argument.

desires and inclinations, to "procure" for the moral law "access to the will." But all of this is subsidiary, accessory; necessary, of course, but weakening to the moral life if represented as the principle of the same. Moral philosophy must not represent it so. Moral philosophy rests, in the long run, wholly on its pure part.

Paragraph 9.—A metaphysic of morals is therefore indispensably necessary, not only for speculative reasons, but in the interests of morals themselves. We find in ourselves certain apriori practical principles. In the interests of enlightenment, we wish to speculate on the source of these. But we have a practical as well as a speculative interest in achieving a metaphysic of them. For so long as we are without that clue and supreme canon of morals which such a metaphysic furnishes, "morals themselves are liable to all sorts of corruption."

Paragraph 10.—We must remember that this pure philosophy of morals is a new field. What Wolff offered, by way of metaphysical prolegomena to his treatment of the subject, will not do. We do not wish a desultory discussion of "the acts and conditions of human volition generally." We do not want general psychology. We are doing metaphysic which works from apriori principles. We wish an account of that which is "prescribed by reason alone, altogether apriori," and which is therefore "properly moral."

Commentary.

It becomes increasingly clear as we pursue these paragraphs that Kant binds together moral philosophy and the moral life. He gives no countenance to a view which should deny to the study of ethics any ethical function. A moral philosophy which had the effect of destroying morals would be for him *pro tanto* an absurdity. He assumes this as obvious.

We must here again, no doubt, remember that Kant is writing a preface; and most likely is

Commentary.

speaking to his prospective readers from the popular pedagogical point of view with which they are familiar and which they understand. Yet there is no reason to think but that, at bottom, he sympathises with that point of view.

He is as clear as anyone else that philosophy is under no obligations to come only to such findings as would help to strengthen the moral life. Moral philosophy is investigation. Its only proper aim is to come at the truth about its subject, whatever it be. Yet there is a limit to the degree of irrelevance which may obtain between morality and moral theory. Morality is a conscious attitude on the part of man. What it is, therefore, cannot be *unlimitedly* irrelevant to what it takes itself to be; except on the assumption that consciousness may be entirely irrelevant to what is; which is a very hard assumption to maintain. We may say, then, that when Kant declares that a moral philosophy which undoes the moral life cannot be true, the presupposition of his attitude is as follows: "If in course of working out a moral philosophy we come to conclusions which yield us a story of the moral consciousness wholly at variance with that consciousness's own story of itself, and which thus is subversive of the latter's characteristic aims, then there is a presumption that we have gone astray somewhere." If we are going to arrive at a theory of any conscious attitude, our first question must be, What is it *qua conscious?* What account does it naturally give of itself? And this, we

Commentary.

shall find as we proceed, is what the work before us, *The Metaphysic of Ethics*, is mostly concerned with. It is a preliminary work. It is preliminary, as indeed that prospective *Critique of Practical Reason* which Kant has in view would itself be, to the final thing—namely, an account of the moral life itself in which the metaphysical side should be duly presented. In the next two paragraphs Kant explains the relation of these three works to one another, and indicates why he is not undertaking the final work, or even his *Critique of Practical Reason* now, but is prefacing them with something preliminary to both.

Argument.

Paragraph 11.—I intend to publish such an account (a metaphysic of morals) shortly; and the present treatise is the groundwork for it. From a certain point of view, it is perhaps a *Critique of Practical Reason* which I should have been at present undertaking. There is no other proper foundation for a metaphysic of morals. And in the treatise on the latter subject which I have in contemplation, such a *Critique* will be presupposed. But there are two reasons for not getting at once to it, and for offering this meanwhile. Firstly, the *Critique*, in this instance, is relatively speaking not of urgent importance. True, a practical *Critique* must precede a proper metaphysic of morals, as the speculative *Critique* already published contains the necessary prolegomena to any future metaphysic of nature which is to command respect. But the current fallacies and intellectual dangers which the speculative *Critique* were intended to avert were instant and pressing. Those to be obviated by a *Critique of Practical Reason* are not so in the same way. And there is another matter. The latter, if attempted now, would have to knit itself up with the first *Critique* in ways which would be "perplexing to the reader."

Paragraph 12.—Also, there is a third circumstance

Argument. which bears on the point. There is this difference between a metaphysic of ethics and the groundwork here to be presented; viz., that a treatise giving the metaphysic of morals is really a very simple affair, despite its portentous title. I therefore find it profitable to separate the preparatory work of laying the foundations upon which, or upon part of which, I am here engaged, from the easier task of completing the superstructure; and I think I may hope, thereby, to obviate the need for bringing into the simpler, later book such "necessarily subtle" preliminary considerations as are brought forward here.

Paragraph 13.—But although this work is somewhat subtle and difficult, we must not confuse it with a full and proper introduction to a metaphysic of ethics. It is not a *Critique of Practical Reason*. "The present treatise is nothing more than the investigation and establishment of the supreme principle of morality." In other words, we are asking what the supreme principle of morality is, and how it is, or how it would be, established. Its actual establishment in a *Critique of Practical Reason*, within a whole system of reason embracing the speculative, is another matter. The main question here is not its establishment, but how it would be established; and still more, whether it is the supreme principle of morality at all. That is a preliminary study which should be kept apart from every other moral investigation. This issue as to what the principle of morality is, must be faced purely in and for itself, without reference to the rest of the system; "since the easy applicability of a principle and its apparent adequacy give no very certain proof of its soundness, but rather inspire a certain partiality which prevents us examining and estimating it strictly in itself and without regard to consequences."

Commentary. Such is the general purport of Kant's prefatory statement. There is a great deal in it that strikes us at first as meticulous, formal, schematic. So much pertains to the *Grundlegung*, so much to a *Critique of Practical Reason*, so much to Meta-

physic of Ethics proper. Thus is Kant ever. He has the schematic type of mind. He pigeon-holes and labels all his intellectual property. And he artificialises and strains a great deal of what he has to say, in order to fit it into his architectonic plan. But irritating and misleading as is this habit of his, it is neither scientific nor scholarly to complain too much about it. We have to master Kant's schematics. There is no help for it. We must want to recover his actual vision, if we think he is worth understanding at all. And if we do not restore those divisions and boundary-lines of his, and try to see what they were to him, and succeed, then we cannot get his actual vision. To him, after all, they were the frame of the whole picture. And to get at what he has to teach us surely requires that we should first sit down and try to see just what he thought he saw. Commentary.

The fact remains, of course, that the schematising is artificial; and Kant is not able, practically ever, to confine himself within his self-imposed boundary-lines. Having limned a definite and special sphere, he inevitably proceeds to fill it with considerations professedly belonging elsewhere. When he gets to the division where these considerations really belong he has to bring them in again. So that he repeats himself. This will show us what to expect in the *Grundlegung*. We shall expect to find more in the work as a whole than he strictly promises to put there. Similarly with each section. We shall expect to

Commentary.

find more in each section of the work than he proposes to put in that section. Nowhere can he confine himself rigidly to what he says is the business in hand.

Nevertheless there is a plan in the *Grundlegung;* and there is an argument. Our purpose here is to attempt to follow it through. The student should make particular note of the concluding paragraph of the Preface which we have not mentioned yet. We shall give the exposition of it as occasion arises in the course of our discussion.

CHAPTER III

GRUNDLEGUNG: FIRST SECTION

KANT'S aim in the *Grundlegung* is to show how a certain view of the moral life which he regards as the right one is to be defended. The first matter, therefore, is to indicate what that view is. Commentary.

Any just reading of morality must plainly bear some relation to the view which the moral consciousness takes of itself. This is the assumption on which Kant proceeds.[1] What, then, does the simple, unspoilt, moral mind of man take itself to be? What does it think it is out to seek? What is "good" to it? Kant's reply, speaking in behalf of common humanity, is clear and it is classic.

Paragraphs 1-3.—There are many things which in one sense or another may be called good: talents, such as understanding, wit, or judgment; temperamental gifts, such as courage, decision, resoluteness; gifts of fortune, such as power, honour, riches, health, happiness. But all of these are good only conditionally. They are good if they are used well, but not otherwise. Closely scrutinised, it is not they that are good: it is the will behind them. There is nothing either in the world or out of it which is good without qualification, except a good will. Argument.

It does, indeed, sometimes seem as if other qualities argued this inner worth. The mere possession, for example, of such temperamental gifts as a native moderation in the affections and passions, habits of self-control,

[1] Reread the "Commentary" beginning p. 37 above.

Argument.

of calm deliberateness and the like, may seem sufficient of itself to make a man good. Such qualities are of service to the good will, and may facilitate its action; and so they may appear to have intrinsic value, and constitute part of the inner worth of the person. But it is not so. A man is only good by the use he makes of his coolness and self-control. With a bad will, his self-control may only make him a cool villain; and in that case, from the point of view of the unspoilt moral consciousness, he will not be the better, but only the more hideous for his coolness. It is only in his will, ultimately, that a man can be either good or bad.

On the other hand, if he is good there, he is good. There is nothing further to be said in the matter. Nothing else in that case can make him bad. Want of power, want of opportunity, or any other misfortune may interfere with the accomplishment of a good man's designs. But it cannot qualify his goodness so long as his will is good. And a will is not good because of what it effects. Its goodness does not depend on its aptitude for carrying out what it happens to purpose. Its goodness or badness lies wholly in the purposing itself. If that be right, then it is a good will. "Even if it should so happen that owing to special disfavour of fortune, or the niggardly provision of a step-motherly Nature, this will should wholly lack power to accomplish its purpose, if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing, and there should remain only the good will (not, to be sure, a mere wish, but the summoning of all means in our power), then, like a jewel, it would still shine by its own light as a thing which has its whole value in itself."

Commentary.

Elucidation is hardly needed of an ethical view so unmistakable as this. Kant is interrogating the moral consciousness, and this is his first finding. From the moral standpoint, he says, a will is good because of what it inwardly is; not because of what it is able for.

Commentary.

Whatever else our moral consciousness contains, it clearly does contain this note; and in accentuating it, Kant's ethics stands to the modern world pretty much as the ethics of Stoicism stood to the ancient. Both in Kant and in the Stoics the emphasis laid on the sheer will has often been taken to betoken a harshness, an attitude of cold moral superiority; as though it implied a certain indifference to ordinary human nature, and set a standard beyond the common man. But it is easy to see from these passages what a very human motive there is beneath it all. It is of its essence to be a gospel for the poor. Some things in the world, it says, are doubtless destined to be enjoyed only by the gifted and the privileged. Whether we shall be happy, influential, successful, or what not, depends always to a great extent on matters beyond our control—on natural gifts, inherited temperament, congenial circumstances. But it is not so with every kind of good. There is a good which is as open to the poor, the disappointed, the miserable, nay, which is as open to the intellectually clouded—as it is to the child of genius and the darling of the gods. Only in certain circumstances can you be happy; but always you can be good. For to be good you only need to want so to be. If you wholly want to be good, then you are so. Because then you are good in your will; and goodness is nothing but that—gifts and graces have nothing to do with it.

There is a place, therefore, where men are esti-

Commentary.

mated apart altogether from the accidents of birth and fortune; where they are judged just by what they are; and withal, the tribunal before which they are so judged and before which everyone stands thus on an equal footing, is precisely the highest that there is. The good that is open to all is precisely the highest good. Such, at least, says Kant, is our natural assumption. Such is the native attitude of the ordinary human consciousness towards the moral life—until doubts and difficulties come in to disturb it.

We may now see the plan of the book before us. For such doubts as these do arise. There is no denying that this attitude is an attitude with difficulties in it, as one begins dimly to feel the moment it is stated thus nakedly. The difficulties of it gradually force themselves upon the ordinary mind, and drive it from point to point in its effort to maintain itself against them. A natural accompaniment of this process is that the ordinary consciousness, desperate to maintain itself, incidentally becomes clearer as to what it is that it wants to maintain. This circumstance provides a programme for Kant's work. Having sounded at the outset of his book the characteristic note with which he believes the moral consciousness begins, he devotes most of the remainder to showing what exactly, or what further, in saying the above, the moral consciousness wants also to be able to say. Thus comes it that the whole of the first two Sections of the *Grundlegung* may be described as little else than

Commentary.

an interrogation of the moral consciousness, an elaborate rendering to us of that account of itself to which the ordinary moral consciousness of man could be expected to accede. In the third Section Kant goes on to something else, to the question, namely, how the moral attitude is to be justified. The latter, however, is the proper task of a *Critique of Practical Reason;* and he professes not to go into it fully here.

If we turn now to the closing paragraph of the Preface, we can see something of the sense of it. Kant is telling us there about the tasks to which the various parts of the ensuing work are to be devoted. He speaks of two "transitions" that are to be made, and then of a "final step" which is to be taken. The first transition is said to be "from the common rational knowledge of morality to the philosophical." The "common rational knowledge of morality," here, is merely a cumbrous Leibnitzian phrase for the moral attitude we have just sketched. The "philosophical" is such a knowledge of morality as should be able to offer some defence of itself if challenged. The picture which is painted for us, therefore, in Section I., is that of a "transition" on the part of the ordinary consciousness, which (*a*) consists in its gradually awakening to the fact that it must try to have something to say in defence of its attitudes; and which (*b*) is the occasion of its gradually realising what these attitudes are, what all is involved in them, or, in other words, what it really wants *qua* moral con-

Commentary.

sciousness to be able to hold. As we follow the argument further we can see the articulation of the moral consciousness proceeding.

So far, the central position has been announced. For the moral consciousness, the one thing literally good is a good will.

The moral consciousness cannot but come to realise, however, that this must sometimes seem rather an extreme statement. Up to a point Kant combats this suggestion, after having made it. But, as we see if we read the whole section connectedly, the suggestion comes back upon him. It *is* a startling position after all. And the doubts it raises are not a matter to be settled out of hand. They are, in fact, the central doubts to which his whole ethical system is intended to be an answer. And they are parallel to a similar scepticism in regard to knowledge.

But we must first look at the position itself, at the surprising side of it, and at what Kant has to say in mitigation.

Argument.

Paragraph 4.—The unsophisticated moral mind holds that the will, when good, shines like a jewel by its own light; and all manner of adverse external circumstances are powerless to dim its lustre. It is still good, even though it can accomplish nothing. But is not the unsophisticated moral mind in something of a difficulty here? For surely its view is a trifle extravagant—that the mere will to do right should still be absolutely valuable, even though helpless! Is this a possible view of things? Is it not rather like as if the whole attitude were but "the product of mere high-flown fancy"?

Commentary.

This last sentence of course indicates the master doubt again, to which the only answer is Kant's whole philosophy. It repeats itself, with little variation of expression, from point to point all through the first two Sections—except once where it has a slightly different meaning, in paragraph 17. But we may neglect it just now. It concerns the possibility of defending the attitude of the moral consciousness; whereas at present we are interested in determining what that attitude is. To postpone philosophic defences in this way is quite just. The principle of this sort of interpretation is, first help the moral consciousness to a sense of what it itself means; and in doing that you may find that you are already defending it.

Kant is considering, then, the mere directing of our will towards what is right; and is saying, following as he believes the ordinary consciousness, that that of itself is enough to constitute goodness whether we have the power to carry it out or not. It seems a heroic, not to say quixotic, point of view to take up. And it occurs to him to note, in partial defence of the view, that in acting thus we are at least not acting, in any obvious way, against the intention of Nature. The question, however, is still one which may be raised. We are creatures endowed with reason. It is a possible question, therefore, whether it would not have been more appropriate to such creatures if they habitually schemed for their own happiness, rather than acted after this

Commentary.

heroic fashion? But the finding, at once, is that whatever the moral consciousness may be doing, it is not, in clinging to its attitude, clearly misinterpreting the ends of Nature in any such fashion.

Argument.

Paragraph 5.—It is to be presumed that the true end for any creature will be in some way foreshadowed in the equipment of that creature. The distinctive organ will be fitted for the creature's distinctive purpose. Now, if the true purpose and end of our human being had been happiness, there would have been no point in our having, for our distinctive gift, reason. Instinct would have served better. If we had had any use for reason at all, it would at the very best not have been practical reason. At most it would have been a reason which, in the whole elaborate process of choosing ends and adopting means, was a spectator only, not the chief actor in the drama.

Paragraph 6.—And as things are, we find in point of fact that to take a cultivated reason of the sort which we have, and set it to pursue and capture happiness, is to set it to a task to which it is not adapted, and in which it fails the more, the more it tries. Seeking happiness by way of the arts of common luxury it fails. And to attempt graver tasks with such an object ruins those tasks too. Even its pursuit of the sciences spells failure if it only seeks happiness therein. To recognise the inevitable failure of the search for happiness is not by any means to utter complaint about the way in which the world is governed. It is only to recognise the plain fact that we are equipped for the pursuit of other ends than happiness.

Paragraph 7.—So that the end of Nature must have been that for which reason is necessary, namely, the production of a will good in itself; and this goodness of will must be the supreme good, the condition on which alone every other good—even happiness—is entitled to the name. It is no argument against the wisdom of Nature, in these circumstances, that reason should not reap happi-

ness ; either through its failing to find happiness when it mistakenly searches therefor, or through its partly or wholly missing happiness when engaged towards its own proper ends. | Reason is clearly Nature's purpose in man. And reason recognises as its highest practical destination the establishment of a good will. Argument.

We have not, then, confronted the fundamental doubt. We have not settled, yet, that the notion of true good, as something constituted by the good will only, is a defensible idea. It may be fantastic. But it is, at any rate, the idea which the moral consciousness has of itself. And we now see that it is not, to say the least, one which laughs in the face of Nature. It does not leave Nature's gift of reason a pointless affair. In fact, it saves it from being so. The next task is to go on and try to see further into the nature of the goodness of this thing which alone the moral consciousness can reckon good—namely, a good will. Commentary.

Paragraph 8.—It will help to elucidate further what is involved in the notion of a will good in itself (a notion which exists in the sound natural understanding, and by no means needs to be put there), if we examine the notion of duty. You can see a good will in duty. It is working there. It is working, doubtless, at a disadvantage in some sense. In duty the good will is working against inward hindrances. These, however, far from concealing it, "rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth so much the brighter." What, then, is duty? Argument.

Paragraphs 9-10.—We shall find that when duty is really risen to, the act in which such rising to our duty is embodied is one which is done explicitly for duty's sake. That is why, in examining the notion, we clearly need pay no attention to cases in which the actions done are

Argument. recognised to be transgressions of duty. On the same grounds we may set aside dutiful actions performed against our immediate inclination, if it so happens that we have an interest in performing them, and so are impelled towards them by some other inclination. For we easily see in such a case that the action in opposition to inclination may yet be done from a selfish motive; and we easily distinguish between that and the case in which it is done from a sense of duty. Thus, when a shopman gives honest weight alike to the experienced buyer and the inexperienced, it is clear enough that this does not of itself necessarily prove that he acted from principles of duty. He had, it is true, no *direct* inclination to give full weight every time. But it was his remoter interest to do so. And even in the absence of direct inclination he may merely have acted from this interest.

It will reveal much better what is involved in the notion of duty if we take the more difficult case of dutiful actions performed not against but with our immediate inclination. There are cases of this kind. There are duties to which we have a direct inclination. Thus, it is a duty to preserve one's own life. But that is not to say that the sedulous care we often bestow upon this object has any moral value. If we are going to abide by the moral attitude, we must say that duty is only risen to, when *that which* duty requires is done *because duty requires it.* To apply the principle in the present instance, "if adversity and hopeless sorrow have completely taken away the relish for life; if the unfortunate one (strong in mind, indignant at his fate rather than desponding or dejected) wishes for death and yet preserves his life without loving it," then his maxim, namely, to preserve his life as long as may be, has a moral worth.

Paragraph 11.—The essence of duty will come still clearer if we take a case where the deed which truly exemplifies it and the one which does not come still closer to each other. Just as we may have a direct inclination to a relf-regarding duty, so we may have a direct inclination to duties which are other-regarding.

Even in this case, acting from mere inclination has no moral worth. Thus it is a duty to be kind when we can. But there are some who have a direct inclination that way. They find a pleasure in spreading joy around them. Apart from any motives of vanity or self-interest, they simply delight in seeing others happy so far as it is their own work. "I maintain," says Kant in one of his most daring passages, "that an action of this kind, however proper, however amiable it may be, has nevertheless no true moral worth, but is on a level with other inclinations . . . for the maxim lacks moral import—namely, that such actions be done *from duty* and not from inclination." Goodness, then, is not even a matter of amiable natural temperament. Goodness is a matter of willing to be good, with such temperament as you happen to possess. Such, at least, is the verdict of the unspoilt human conscience. Argument.

Paragraph 12.—The catering for one's own happiness is another case which comes under the same point of view. There is a duty to promote one's own happiness. (Under pressure of unsatisfied wants and wishes, much needless temptation to transgression of duty is occasioned.) But here again, some have a direct inclination that way. Nay, all men have. "Happiness" is but a way of naming the combined objects of the sum-total of all our inclinations. It is thus, in fact, essentially the same case as that of the temperamental benevolence mentioned above. The only thing that might seem to make a difference is that the maxim to act always so as really to promote my own happiness is one that obviously can involve many a self-denying ordinance. (And yet, it does not always actually involve it. The self-denial does not always get itself carried out. People do not live up to this maxim, selfish though it be. They fall through: as, for example, in the instance of the gouty patient who goes and indulges himself against his own interest. It would seem that a man cannot "form any definite and certain conception" of happiness; that is to say, he cannot form a conception of what exactly the sum-total of all the inclinations are after. And this is why it is so little to be wondered

Argument.

at that the idea of that sum-total exercises a very uncertain and feeble sort of censorship over the individual inclinations in the mind; so that the vague idea of his welfare-on-the-whole will habitually prove quite insufficient to induce the gouty person, if he be one who aims only at such welfare, to abstain from this or that specific indulgence, coming before him, as it does, armed with all the superior definiteness, nearness, and certainty which it naturally possesses.) But even in this case, though the will was not kept on the straight path, there yet remains, as in all other such cases, a law—namely, to further his happiness, not out of inclination, but from duty.

Commentary.

A phenomenon occurs in this last paragraph to which it is well to draw attention. One notices the lameness of the ending. It is one of the not infrequent instances in which it seems uncertain whether Kant has succeeded in expressing the meaning he intended—or should have intended—to express; or whether he has not, as he travelled through the involved passage, to a certain extent lost his thread.

"But even in this case," he says towards the end of the passage. What case? He obviously means the words to refer to the case just mentioned, where the poor *Podagrist* is said to succumb to temptation and indulge himself against the physician's orders. But surely he should have meant the earlier case, that of the man whose concern for his own welfare is sufficient to keep him outwardly right. He should have been referring not to the occasions on which Hedonism as a principle breaks down, but to the occasions on which it succeeds. It is cases

Commentary.

of this kind that Kant has under discussion; cases where something very like moral conduct is yet quite different—is, in fact, at bottom nothing else than a gratifying of inclination. So the sense surely is, "even when the having an eye to his own welfare does keep a man's conduct what it should be, such conduct is yet not done from duty; it is not done as an expression of the doer's standing sense of duty; and so is not properly moral." It would then help to clear up the notion of duty, and be on a par with the benevolence passage and the passage alluding to self-preservation, as one more instance of what the author is illustrating.

It is as well to draw attention to this, because the occasional surging up of a reference to something apparently a little way back in his mind is a thing which occurs in Kant, especially in his later writings. Thus, to take another instance, in the middle of paragraph 9[1] the words "For example" occur. What he is going to exemplify, however, is not the statement he has just given (indicating where the making of a certain distinction is specially hard), but the one before it. He is going on to quote the shopman. But the shopman is really an instance of the easy kind of case. The difficult one comes in for treatment farther down. The fact is that a new paragraph should really have commenced at "For example," and have ended at the end of paragraph 10. It serves the same purpose, however, if we lift

[1] In Abbott's text.

Commentary.

out the sentence referring to the difficult kind of case, and transfer it down beside its own illustrative material; which is what we have done above. This momentary getting of his threads tangled is not to be wondered at in Kant. He is very confident of his position; but he is really old. And—what is still more significant—he has very many threads in his hand. He is on the apex of his pyramid. He is drawing together and knitting up his whole philosophic case.

Before taking his next step, Kant has still one further illustrative point to make regarding the nature of the goodness which attaches to the good will.

Argument.

Paragraph 13.—We have seen that goodness does not consist in having a benevolent nature, but in willing to do benevolent deeds, whether your inclinations are that way or not. It is thus, undoubtedly, that we must have been intended to understand the Scriptural command which bids us love. It is a command to us to do the things that love would dictate. You cannot command the love itself. That is but a temperamental gift, and out of your power. What can alone be commanded is a *practical* love, a love which is seated in the will and not in the propensions of sense. Love as a mere affection or temperamental quality—*pathological* love—is clearly not in question.

Commentary.

In further pursuit of his purpose of elucidating the common moral attitude, Kant, in the next paragraph, begins a series of considerations occupying him practically to the end of Section I., which lead to the view that right acting consists in acting out of pure respect for the law.

Commentary.

This is a position which he wishes to make out is implicated in the moral attitude as we have already disclosed it. Right action can be nothing else than this, on account of the very fact that that attitude is what it is. Such is the general burden of his argument. But first he establishes that the motive of good action *is* respect—paragraphs 14-16. His contention here is that the good man is not actuated by desire for any kind of object; and respect (toward something such as can receive respect, something of the nature of law) is the only motive which remains.

It may be noted in passing that here again we are treated to a reference to something in the back of Kant's mind, which this time had not even found its way into his expression. "The second proposition is," he says at the opening of paragraph 14; and we had not heard of a first one! Really, of course, the first one is the first step he took in pursuance of his proposal, in paragraph 8, to analyse the notion of duty by way of articulating further the ordinary mind's conception of what is good. His first step in that analysis was to make clear that in rising to duty we do our deed not only as duty requires, but because duty requires it. It is duty for duty's sake that is good. The second fact which he has now to notice is that the worth of such an action is not a matter of what you intend to do, but of the maxim which leads you to attempt the thing. The question whether one

Commentary.

rises to one's duty is not at all a question as to what scheme one carries into effect or proposes to carry into effect; it is entirely a question of how one is actuated in the matter: why—with what motive—one tries such a thing as one does try at all. In these circumstances, Kant urges, it can be nothing else than respect for the law which actuates the good man. No other motive is conceivable.

Argument.

Paragraph 14.—The second proposition is: That an action done from duty does not derive its moral worth from *what is in view*. The actual design in view may be anything. The moral worth depends on the maxim in following which the will comes to have any such design. The question: Was I genuinely rising to my duty here? is entirely the question, What was the principle of my volition here? The will stands, as it were, between its material opportunities and its principle; between the actual changes which it sees it could effect in the world, and the formal principle of right by which it could elect to guide itself. In duty, the will is not ruled by any inclination to seize its material opportunities. It is not actuated by the mere attractiveness of any of the ends to be realised. Every material principle has been withdrawn from it. And so, since it must be determined somehow, what determines it must be the formal principle of volition.

Paragraph 15.—In duty, (*a*) the dutiful act is not merely done, it is done for the sake of duty. This, as we have now seen, means (*b*) that the worth of the act does not depend on what it either has accomplished or has in view to accomplish; it depends on the maxim's being right which guides the person to form such plans as he forms.

There follows from this as a third proposition that the motive of good action can only be respect for the law.

Argument.

If my will were directed solely upon the attainment of desirable objects, then I need not be, indeed I could not be, actuated by respect. It would be an abuse of language to say so. When about to do anything, I do not *respect* that which I am about to do; if I respect anything, it must be the law which bids me act so. There would be no meaning in saying that I respected the material object I was about to gain or the change I was about to make. I may desire these things. I may have an inclination for them. But I can respect, strictly speaking, only that ideal energising will which I, in acting thus, am seeking to be. It is only what is connected with my will as a principle that I can respect in the plain sense in which, *e.g.*, a command may be respected. Hence, in rising to our duty, there is, on our side of the situation—the subjective side—respect; while the objective fact towards which our respect is directed is the law or something of that nature.

Paragraph 16.—Without raising the question just yet as to what sort of a law this is that we respect, we may say that we have here arrived at the pre-eminent good called moral, and can see what it consists in. It can consist in nothing else than this: the sheer conception of law determining a will. Here at length we have that for which *reason* is necessary. For it certainly would not be possible except to a rational being. Here, too, we have something which, whenever it happens, is already good. Whether the will thus determined should be able successfully to carry out its purpose or not, the purposing itself was right. And we need no more. The moral consciousness does not think it needs to wait for the result before deciding that this is good. It is a matter which in no way depends on results. Not by the results which it has achieved or even schemed out is a will good—whatever results they may be, agreeableness of one's condition, *e.g.*, or even the happiness of others. Instinct could as easily have accomplished such results as reason had Nature shaped us that way. Our distinctive gift being reason, the true good must be where reason expresses herself; that

Argument. is, where the mere conception of law of itself determines the will.

Commentary. Such are what Kant regards as some of the deliverances of the unspoilt moral consciousness. They have their difficulties, which philosophy has to try to confront. They are not, in Kant's view, *prima facie* outrageous. They are heroic; yet it is quite a mistake to object that they necessarily fly in the face of Nature.

But we can unwind the implications of the moral consciousness still further, if we dwell further on this idea of the mere conception of law determining the will, and what is the same thing, pure respect determining the will.

Argument. *Paragraph* 17.—A question now arises as to what sort of a law it can be, that the moral consciousness is respecting when it acts. The governing fact of the situation is that to act out of regard for it is *ipso facto* to disregard all inclination, and all objects of inclination. This circumstance ought to enable us to determine something about it. If the moment I raise my eyes to the law above me and decide to act solely in view of it, I become necessarily blind to all *objects* upon which inclination could fasten; this must mean that there are no such objects in the law. What, then, can I be thinking of? Clearly, I can only be thinking of law itself, law as such. What I am respecting is that voice which says, "Let law be," and says nothing more. My maxim will be right, then, when in the following I am virtually saying, "Let law be." If I cannot follow it while saying that, if my following of it be not a way of saying that, then I should not follow it. "I am never to act otherwise than *so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.*" This is still, Kant implies, the procedure of the common reason of men. If you ask not merely whether it is prudent but

Argument.

whether it is right, say, to make a false promise, conscience at once sees that it is not right. I have the sense that I must only act along such lines as all others might follow. That is why we find it such an unerring test question if we simply ask, "Should I be content that my maxim, namely, to extricate myself from a difficulty by making a false promise, should hold good as a universal law?" I soon find that while I can will the lie, I can by no means will universal lying. For that would be to will my effect away, in the very act of willing the effect. If in willing a false promise I also willed the practice universal, I should thereby be willing the destruction of all promises, and thus willing the ineffectiveness of my own act of will.

Commentary.

We here encounter Kant's first statement in this work of a position which is central to his whole ethical philosophy. The aim of the *Grundlegung*, as we have already expressed it, is a double one. It will exhibit a certain view of the moral life which Kant accepts; and point forward to where its defences lie. He accepts the view because he considers that it is the only one compatible with the account the moral consciousness gives of itself. He has therefore two points to make, (*a*) that this view of his is the virtual deliverance of the moral consciousness, and (*b*) that it will be found defensible when we reflect in a certain direction.

Now he has here expressed, as the voice of the moral consciousness, the principle that "Duty is the necessity of acting from respect for the law." What this principle involves is developed in the second Section. How it is defended is indicated in the third. In the present place it is

Commentary.

given forth, apparently, as being very nearly what the ordinary mind would actually say—under a little Socratic interrogation. And Kant is probably not greatly over-estimating the capacities of the uneducated but good mind here, either. The view he is attributing to it is a simple one, and one to which it would probably assent. It practically comes to this. There are two opposite ways of conduct. The one is where you act as though there were no one in the world to consider but yourself. The other is where you look away from yourself altogether, and act always "as in the great Taskmaster's eye." Now, Kant would say that the ordinary mind regards the one of these ways of acting as wrong; but he would not straightway adopt the other one as an adequate statement of the ordinary mind's ideal of right. The reason is that where goodness is conceived simply as doing the will of the "Master" there always remains something of an implication that the Master's will is not yours. Now, Kant will never have that. There is, to him, something in the moral mind that rebels at that. To him, every time, the Master's will is also the good man's own. This is what he calls autonomy. He believes that it is an indefeasible right and claim of the moral nature of man. And it is the main thing which in his further investigation he brings out. Here he is only on the first tracks of it, showing that what the moral nature honours is the law. The law, he implies, is

Commentary.

something the moral nature honours. It is therefore no external law, imposed from without. It is not the voice of an external master. It is the good man's own will. Yet, while it is his will, it is no caprice. It *is* law. That, in fact, is the aspect of it of which the moral man is most conscious. And that is what Kant stresses here. But the other side, the autonomy side, is in the background, and scarcely hidden.

It is in this paragraph that Kant makes, for the moment, another use of the language which he usually reserves for alluding to the ultimate ethical problem, the defensibility of the moral attitude. If, while alluding to the defensibility of the moral attitude, Kant ever happens to become explicit enough to say what he means by morality being defensible, his usual meaning, as we saw, is that in that case the idea of duty can be shown not to be a "mere vain notion" or something similarly describable. He does not use this phrase, as a rule, except when referring to the philosophical problem of ethics: the question of the *Pratique of Practical Reason*, the question of the defensibility or otherwise of the moral consciousness' view of itself. In the paragraph we have just read, however, when he says about the simple conformity to law in general that it must serve the good will as its principle, "if duty is not to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion," the meaning is not "if duty is to be defensible," but "if duty is to be in the least like what the ordinary consciousness

Commentary.

takes it to be." His point here is that we must not make nonsense of the deliverances of the moral consciousness. To do this in beginning an ethical inquiry would, as we have seen, seem to Kant absurd.[1] He is therefore quite right in using his phrase in this context if he wishes to. But the context is not the one which is most usual with him.

Kant goes on now to extol the virtues of this simple criterion of moral rectitude which he has discovered to be in the hands of every single-minded honest man—namely, that he must act only as he could wish all others to act.

Argument.

Paragraph 18.—So that to be good one does not need to be clever. Of the very simplest is this rule, which yet unerringly guides us. "Inexperienced in the course of the world, incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself: Canst thou will that thy maxim should be a universal law? If not, then it must be rejected." I reject it, not because it would be a course disadvantageous to the world. I do not know enough about the world to be able to tell. Not because it would be disadvantageous to me—for all I know about myself and the play of circumstance, it might be very advantageous to me. I reject it because, the moment I cut loose from all inclination and let myself be wholly reason—what distinctively and as a human being I really am—I spontaneously honour law; and this maxim cannot enter into a possible universal legislation, a system in which law should wholly reign.

As an inexpert person I do not as yet discern on what this respect is based. This the philosopher may inquire. But I feel the respect. And I do understand this: that the worth of a will which rises to its duty is to the unsophisticated mind above all worth; and acting out

[1] Pp. 37-39 above.

of pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes rising to duty. Argument.

Paragraph 19.—Thus have we disclosed the principle beneath the common rational knowledge of morality. We only need, like Socrates, to bring out what is in the minds of common men, in order to disclose the standard which they really use, although they may not be able at once to recognise it when stated in its abstract form. Which is as we should have expected. For if the criterion of goodness had not been a common possession, how should we have required of all that they be good? And here we cannot but note with admiration what an advantage the moral reason has over the theoretical. In its theoretical exercise, the common reason of men is exceedingly liable to stumble and fall the moment it departs in the least from sense and ventures on speculation apart from experience. But on the practical side it is precisely when it departs from sense that reason shows to advantage. There is then an ability about it. It has a subtlety even when it is arguing away its own sense of duty. When it honestly seeks to determine the worth of alternative courses of action, it is equally subtle. And in this case, it can have as good a hope of coming to the proper finding as any philosopher whatever can promise himself. Nay, it may be even more sure of doing so, "because the philosopher cannot have any other principle" than the common man, while "he may easily perplex his judgment by a multitude of considerations foreign to the matter," and so "turn aside from the right way."

Thus Kant is clear enough that not every moral philosopher is the better as a man for being a moral philosopher—although "so much the worse for his philosophy" is doubtless his unspoken comment. But having extolled the ethical equipment of the ordinary man so much, the question inevitably arises, Why then philosophise at all? What function is there for Commentary.

Commentary.

philosophy, if philosophy has any other function than simply that of collecting the moral rules, arranging them conveniently for use, and making them into a kind of system? Particularly, what point is there in pursuing such an inquiry as we have undertaken here, an inquiry as to how the clear convictions of the moral consciousness are to be defended? Having seen how the uncorrupted moral mind construes its own situation, why not leave it to go on construing it so, in its happy simplicity? Why trouble it raising the question, How can such a construction possibly be correct? Kant, however, is in no kind of doubt as to his answer to this.

Argument.

Paragraph 20.—"Innocence is indeed a glorious thing, only, on the other hand, it is very sad that it cannot well maintain itself, and is so easily seduced." There is a point at which the ordinary mind, if it would achieve wisdom—even the wisdom which comes out more in conduct than in knowledge—had better come to the philosopher. He should come in order, not to obtain his moral convictions, but to understand them; and so to give them security of hold upon his mind and character. There is little security in a very firm conviction if it cannot be felt to be a reasonable conviction; especially if the conviction is of an essentially heroic character. It is so in this case. The conviction is that duty is best. But "against all the commands of duty, which reason represents as so deserving of respect, a man feels in himself a powerful counterpoise, in the shape of his wants and inclinations, whose total satisfaction he sums up as happiness. Now Reason issues its commands unyieldingly, without promising anything to the inclinations. . . . Hence there arises a natural *dialectic—i.e.*, a disposition to argue against these strict laws of duty, and to question

. . . their purity and strictness, and if possible to make them more accordant with our wishes and inclinations; that is to say, to corrupt them at their very source."

Argument.

Paragraph 21.—Thus does the transition become necessary, from common rational knowledge to the philosophical. Thus is the common reason set seeking a philosophy, not out of the exigencies of its activity of knowing, but from the sheer necessities of living. It is entirely parallel, however, to what happens in the case of knowing. A cultivated intellect will arrive at the point in knowledge where it finds itself arguing in endless dialectical circles about things which really transcend its comprehension—such as the objects dealt with in Rational Psychology, Cosmology, or Theology; for which the only cure is a radical criticism of man's powers of knowing such as was attempted in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. A cultivated—that is a rationalising and questioning—will, will similarly arrive at a point in conduct where it finds itself asking whether duty can possibly have this transcendent prestige which it claims, and dialectically arguing these claims away in favour of desires and inclinations; from which the only escape lies in really considering its claims in the course of such a *Critique of Practical Reason* as we are, in this work, preparing the way for.

Commentary.

Thus the doubt which Kant had suggested, and so far mitigated, returns upon him. He had indicated the prestige which the moral mind accords to the idea of duty. He had noted that the attitude taken up in doing so was a heroic one. He had suggested the possibility that it might be founded on nothing except some mere foolish notion. Such a suspicion might, he allows, arise upon the mind. He had paused to show us that there are limits to the poignancy of this suggestion. The hypothesis that the moral attitude is correct is at least not unthinkable in

Commentary.

view of the general economy of Nature. Nature had given us reason, and the moral attitude was at least one for which reason was required. But the suspicion is not laid. Man, the child of reason, is yet also a creature of sense. And when the path of reason and duty takes its toll of him, or threatens to cost him dear, there is a natural dialectic in him which would fain evade the cost by arguing their prestige away. Whereupon the question how well that prestige is founded becomes pressing, and the initial doubt returns.

In closing our review of the first Section we may profitably take further note of the principle on which Kant appears to proceed; especially as in the beginning of the second Section he conceives himself to be in some danger of being taken to task for it.

These two Sections together constitute, as we have said, an account of what the ordinary moral consciousness takes itself to be. It is apparently a matter of obvious principle, to Kant, that if we are going to make a study of morality, we should begin our attempt to know about it by asking first what it is for itself. And the position is clearly not unreasonable. It is a conscious attitude, after all, that we are trying to understand; and we are asked to begin by treating it as a conscious attitude. We are to call it to witness about itself, as well as take the evidence of other witnesses about it.

We shall not be gravely mistaken if we take

Commentary.

it that we have here the feature exposed which characterises every idealistic, as distinct from realistic or empirical, interpretation, properly so called, of the phenomena connected with the higher life of the mind. The former position requires us to emphasise a certain distinction between minds and other phenomena, as regards the kind of hypothesis called for, in the interpretation of their behaviour. So long as we are dealing with inanimate objects, the question how they behave or what they do is comparatively straightforward. It is a question of observation. We have simply to look and see—when once we have assembled the right things to look at. But when we are asking what a mind does, the matter is complicated by the question *what it thinks* it does. And from the idealistic standpoint it is held that this complication has to be reckoned with. You may, of course, reply with Karl Marx and many others, that what men think they are doing has nothing to do with the matter, and quote the long array of recent psychological discoveries in support of the view that the purposes we think we have are one thing, while those we really have are quite another; and this is the realistic position. From the latter point of view men are moved by forces observable to the spectator. The labour of getting the right things under observation is the only labour required to understand them. The sheer lift of inward reflection is not needed. To which, however, the reply is,

Commentary.

"For some purposes, no; but for others, yes." If all you want is science cold and accurate, if you are only out for an anatomy of man's mind and a dynamics of it, which by showing you what levers to move and springs to touch and nerves to tickle will enable you to handle the mind's higher life without being in it, then no. No inner lift at yourself is required. But yes, if besides handling it you want to be in this thing which you are handling. Only then is there contact with the reality. And in this region knowledge is by contact. That which gives contact with the life of the mind cannot be observed. Apart from the apriori approach, without something originated from within yourself, you can reach the manifestations of the mind, but not its reality. And Kant's is the apriori approach.

CHAPTER IV

GRUNDLEGUNG: SECOND SECTION

Commentary.

In the first Section of the *Grundlegung* Kant has been interrogating the ordinary man. In the second Section he is still doing the same thing, although, as would appear from the forecast at the end of the Preface, intending to take him at a higher level now. In Section I. we saw the common man conducted up to the point where he becomes aware of his need for a philosophy of his practice. In Section II., apparently, we are to see him make due pilgrimage from one philosophy to another; to wit, from an unsatisfactory utilitarian interpretation of conduct to a satisfactory metaphysical one; or at least to a point whence the necessity for such can be seen. The "transition" this time, in the words of the Preface, is to be "from popular moral philosophy to a metaphysic of morals."

The second Section is the longest of the three. But to a reader who has made his way through the first, it presents no insuperable difficulties, provided only that he sees where the argument is going. We propose, therefore, as the most helpful way of treating it, simply to present the argument in rapid outline; and, except at one

Commentary.

or two points where it is specially obscure, leave it to the student himself to fill in the detail.

The whole work, as we have seen, is Kant's attempt to show how the native view of the moral life is to be defended. He will show how the ordinary mind is to be given a philosophy of its practice. Making use of terms Kant uses in this Section, we can put his general problem in a very direct way. Morality as the unspoilt mind conceives it, speaks in tones categorically imperative. But are its imperatives really imperative? How can they be? How is it possible? How can a course of conduct be genuinely imperative for us which promises us nothing? For to the moralised mind goodness is not a best policy. Being good means being good, just for nothing.

The question how a categorical imperative can be imperative is a question not confronted in Section II. The business of this Section is only to raise it.

In the first five paragraphs Kant is defending himself against the charge of having adopted the very method, in morals, which he has so vigorously condemned—the empirical method. In order to show what that ethical attitude is which he wishes to defend he has had to interrogate the ordinary man, and thus has seemed to be settling moral questions by collecting opinions.

In paragraphs 6 to 10 Kant still has not pro-

Commentary.

ceeded to the proper labours of this Section, but pauses to tilt once again at those popular theorists who put the wrong thing first in ethics. They mean well, he says in effect, but they stultify their own case.

In the next two paragraphs, 11 and 12, the main business of the Section begins to emerge. Kant would set forth what he regards as the compelling considerations which lead a normal moralised mind, which has become enlightened to the point of having a utilitarian philosophy of life, to feel himself under necessity of making a "transition" to a better—namely, a metaphysical. Briefly, he will show what the moral consciousness holds; and where it is led, by holding what it holds.

But the author feels the difficulty of the point he wants to make, and that is why he has to pause—great definer as he is—to make his definitions clear before he can get forward with his story. He has to explain will or practical reason; and he has to explain the actual state of mind which he thinks must be indicated when anyone speaks of being under obligation or conscious of obligation. It all follows from the view of will as practical reason. He begins with the cardinal point, about the relation of a mind to any law which it may be under.

Argument.

Paragraph 12.—Every being in Nature behaves according to law; but only a rational being *conceives* the law. He alone therefore can act according to principles. A being who not only acts but acts on principle is said to

Argument.

have a will. It is reason, in that case, that is having its way; so that the will is nothing but reason being practical.

We can now see what obligation is. Should there be any being in whom reason determines the will in an infallible way, then, what that being sees to be (*a*) necessary, he sees also to be (*b*) a necessity for him. The objective necessity is, in his case, a subjective necessity at the same time. But if, as is the way with men, reason does not always determine the will; if the will is subject to other influences such as the impulses, which do not always make for the fulfilment of that which is objectively necessary; then we have to say that the objective necessity is here a subjective contingency. Of such a will, and of such alone, can the term obligation be used. The will which is under obligation to follow principles of reason is one which does not of its own nature necessarily follow them.

Paragraph 15*a*.—We are committed, therefore, to the view that a perfectly good will, while subject to objective laws, could not be conceived as obliged to act lawfully; because to act so would be already a necessity of its constitution.

Commentary.

The main ideas here are of obligation and of the will. The will is reason being practical; in other words, reason, instead of merely thinking, entering the arena and acting, moving the body, initiating events in the sensible realm. What distinguishes such events from all others is that they take place, not according to law *simpliciter*, but according to a law conceived. They are cases of behaviour determined by conception. The true good involves that that which constrains us and towards which we are obliged, be something not felt but conceived, something which appeals not to our sensuous nature but

Commentary.

to the reason in us. But obligation is where this conception of law is not acting freely but against inner resistances. So that, if we were perfectly holy, and had no inner resistance of the sensuous nature to overcome, there would be no imperatives for us at all (paragraph 15).

Will, then, is the acting according to a law conceived, and obligation is where this conception of law withstands inner resistance. The next point is (paragraph 13) that any objective principle which appeals to a will as something obligatory upon it, is a command; and a command formulates itself as an imperative.

We now come to the distinction of imperatives which are categorical from such as are hypothetical (paragraphs 16-18). With this we are launched into the main path of the argument. Hypothetical imperatives express the necessity of something as a means. Categorical imperatives simply express the necessity of something. The one takes the shape, "Do this if you want that." The other simply says, "Do this"; and stops there. The question is, how can an imperative like this latter be imperative? The difficulty, of course, is that it promises nothing. It does not deign to render any reasons for its demands.

From this point to the end of the Section it will be seen that Kant keeps coming up to this question, repeatedly, but always turning aside to attend first to something else. He is really preparing the ground for confronting it in Section III. To get the hang of the argument

Commentary.

of Section II. we have simply to seize and remember this fact.

The first of these digressions is in the paragraphs now before us (19-23). Kant here pauses to note first how the three traditional classes into which logical propositions fall when we divide them according to modality are reflected in the imperatives. We have assertoric, problematic, and apodictic imperatives. The first is the hypothetical imperative of skill (paragraph 20); the second is the hypothetical imperative of prudence (paragraph 21); and the third is the categorical imperative (paragraph 22).

Paragraphs 24-26 lead us round to the main problem again.

Argument.

Paragraphs 24-26.—The only problem, really, is as to how the moral imperative is possible. It represents something as just necessary—objectively. It cannot fall back on something else, presupposed to be necessary, to which this thing leads, which it is prescribing.

Only, we must remember here again that this imperative is not to be dismissed by the challenge, "Who ever acts on it anyway?" To that, the only answer is, "We do not know that it is ever acted on at all, even in the most estimable of the deeds of men." It is hardihood to say, ever, that no obscure fear or ambition or any other thing of the sort went to the production of a man's action on any particular occasion. Can we argue to the non-existence of a cause merely because we do not perceive it?

Commentary.

By the end of paragraph 28 we have got the problem once more clearly formulated, How is a categorical imperative possible? If exercise is conducive to health, there is no difficulty

about the hypothetical imperative, "Take exercise." Your desire for health provides the warrant. But the categorical imperative says, "Do this," and adds no "if." So how can it be binding? Commentary.

Kant proposes, in paragraph 29, to proceed by settling first another preliminary matter. He lays aside the question of the possibility, to attend to the question of the content of the categorical imperative. And the content is what engages him right up almost to the end of the Section. What will a categorical imperative enjoin? What must it enjoin, if it is to be categorical? For, he says, if it is categorical, we can see from its very nature what it must command. This is one of the features of a categorical imperative.

Paragraphs 30-31.—May not the mere conception of an imperative as categorical be enough to show us how it must formulate itself? It would seem that the categorical imperative has an advantage here. By merely conceiving the hypothetical imperative, I get no hint of what it commands. But what a categorical imperative must contain follows from the mere conception of it. What such an imperative commands is conformity of the maxims on which one acts, to law—*i.e.*, to what never has any exceptions under any special conditions. The imperative, therefore, is always one and the same—Let there be law. "Follow your maxim if you can will it a universal law." That is the formula. Argument.

It is well to recall here what Kant found concerning the ordinary moral consciousness before, because he is finding it all again, only more Commentary.

Commentary.

fully and explicitly. We already (Section I., paragraph 17) came across the question, What sort of a law must that be, our obedience to which was prompted by sheer respect and not at all by desire? It was, we found, a law which did not refer to any object of desire; but which only said, Let there be law. This finding we reached, proceeding from the assumption that the moral law must be something we could regard with pure respect. Proceeding now on the assumption that the moral law must be a categorical imperative, we arrive at an essentially similar conclusion. There are many things which ought to be, acts of mercy, words of truth, deeds of valour and honour; but the one thing which ultimately ought to be, that which they all promote, is simply the prevalence of law.

Here for the second time Kant takes his stand upon that to him central conviction of the ordinary moral consciousness, that to act perfectly is to act out of a pure sense of duty, aiming at nothing, ultimately, except there-being-law. And he never moves from this interpretation of the moral life. He believes, and he devotes the remainder of this Section to showing it, that in all the multifarious ways in which men do right in preference to wrong, this is what they are doing. They are actively letting universal law prevail. They are being rational. What is involved in this letting of law prevail—the inner meaning of it—is not always realised; as it is one of his great objects

Commentary.

to show. But this is what they are doing. They are doing many and various things. But in all that they rightly do their principle is either this or a variation of this. They are never at bottom doing anything else. What is wrong, where anything is wrong, is the lack of this rationality; and what is right, where anything is right, is the presence of it. The supreme duty is the duty of confining our action to the fulfilment of those maxims only which are consistent with the prevalence of universal law; which are themselves, in fact, possible elements in a system of universal legislation. This—although it needs further elucidation—is the test of right conduct; and, pausing again for a moment to put on one side the ultimate problem, Kant proceeds next to show how truly he has here represented the way in which the moral consciousness judges of right and wrong in actual cases, so far as it judges correctly. Putting the ultimate problem duly on one side, he proceeds to take instances of all the various main kinds of duties, and show how always, in the breach of them, this supreme law is also being broken. And he seems to conclude that their breaking this supreme law constitutes what is wrong about them.

Argument.

Paragraph 32.—We have now found *what* we ought, in *all* that we ought, if we absolutely ought at all. Whether we absolutely ought at all, is of course the question. But in any case it is something to see what it is that is obligatory if anything is. It is that we should be capable

Argument. of willing our maxim to be a universal law. And we can confirm our finding by examining all the imperatives of duty, and seeing whether we may not deduce them from this supreme one.

Commentary. Kant has now found a test of right actions, and he is about to test his test, and show us that it works. He will show wherein the wrong consists of actions admittedly wrong. He will show wherein the rightness lies of actions admittedly right. He proceeds (paragraphs 35-38) to give an analysis of typical transgressions, transgressions of duties of perfect obligation and transgressions of duties of imperfect obligation, in order to show that what is wrong with wrong is that in committing it we are failing to follow maxims which are universalisable. Now, there is no doubt that maxims which contradict themselves are wrong. But Kant does not seem to have reckoned with the possibility that perhaps many which don't are wrong too. This is one of the criticisms we shall have to make of his theory.

Having found now what a categorical imperative must say, he returns once more to the question how it is possible; only once again, however, to advert to another important preliminary matter.

He has found that the categorical imperative says "Let there be law." It is exactly what he had already found the essential utterance of the conscience of the ordinary good man to be (see

pp. 61-63). But Kant does not feel that he has done justice to the supreme moral attitude if he lets it stand at that. He has left it, so far, a mere will-that-law-should-prevail. But there is another aspect of the matter. This will that law should prevail is itself a will-to-prevail. And he has not yet given due expression to this all-important fact. To do so requires one further formulation of the law. Commentary.

In speaking at an earlier stage about the moral attitude, we alluded to the point in ethical development where the individual rises to the conception of a Lawgiver outside of him and over him, and thereupon, far from behaving as if there were no one but himself to consider, resolves to make it a principle ever to act "as in the great Taskmaster's eye." Kant, we said, would never admit, however noble a thing this be, that it fully squares with the true moral attitude. It is better than selfishness; but it is not morality. It is not morality until the Master's will is also fully and originally our own. This is the point that is being signalised here. Morality is not the mere abnegation of ourselves. What is to prevail when it is said that law is to prevail is a law which is the subject's own voice; and which is not a whit the less a universal law for being that. This is what it is meant must be, when it is said that law must be. The necessity for law is *ipso facto* a necessity for autonomy; and this, too, must be made clear if we are to apprehend what the

Commentary.

categorical imperative really enjoins. In paragraphs 46-59 Kant endeavours to effect this translation; thereafter, and till the end of the Section, he is engaged amplifying and further articulating the same conception—namely, of a goodness which is law, but without at the same time being anything but the autonomous expression of one who is an end in himself; in other words, the conception of a law which is not abstract but concrete.

But first, he distinguishes once more between the kind of questions he is confronting and the crucial problem with which, in the present Section, he is not dealing.

Argument.

Paragraph 41.—We have now found, supposing there be an authentic categorical imperative, what it must command (see paragraph 29 above). And duty, as we have seen, is not duty unless it speak categorically. But that there is a valid categorical imperative, that the one which our moral consciousness ever seems to hear really is imperative, is as yet only our supposition. We have not yet found or proved that there is such a thing.

Commentary.

He continues to dwell a little further here upon the crucial problem itself, that of defending the moral attitude; and in all that he says in this place seems rather to suggest that what has made him be so full and explicit in his present analysis of what the moral attitude is, is not the hope of rendering the answer to that ultimate question any easier, but rather the necessity he feels that we should realise to the full the difficulties of it. The main problem

is, as we have seen, How can a categorical imperative really be imperative for man? He continues: Commentary.

Paragraph 42.—To prove or show its imperativeness must mean to deduce its imperativeness from some kind of considerations. But they cannot be considerations founded on anything which we suppose ourselves to know about the particular attributes of human nature. We must never forget that. It is to be imperative for man, as being imperative for all who are rational, whether equipped with the particular attributes of human nature or not. Not even its suitability to reason itself can show the imperative imperative, if this mean only a suitability for tendencies peculiar to human reason. We may take the suiting of our human needs as a maxim, but no such maxim can ever be that practical law, whose bindingness we are trying to show genuine. In fact, we are very much likelier to be on the track of the thing whose imperativeness we really want to be convinced of, if we look for something whose dignity is the more evident the less the subjective impulses favour it and the more they oppose it. Argument.

This bold sharpening of the difficulties involved in the enterprise of philosophically defending the moral attitude is characteristic of Kant, and is symptomatic of his confidence in his system. But it is also symptomatic to some degree of that bitterness between relatives which one finds among the adherents of consanguineous philosophic systems. "Not by its suitability to the particular attributes of our human nature," declares Kant, "nay, not even by its suitability to the due fulfilment of any particular tendency proper to human reason," is the moral attitude to be justified. Rationalist as he is himself, Commentary.

Commentary. Kant is determined to find the Wolffian rationalists as much wrong in ethics as they were in theory of knowledge. And thus he refines his demands upon a true philosophy of morals to such a pitch as to come near to setting a standard to which no system, even his own, could possibly come up. And yet he is confident. The somewhat apostrophic language of the following paragraphs is surely the language of confidence.

Argument. *Paragraph* 43.—Here, then, we find that the good man who would also be a philosopher, the man of virtue who would also be a man of enlightened virtue, who would be really convinced of the imperativeness of duty and not merely forced by habit to assume that it is imperative, is brought into a critical position. *Qua* good, the reason in him acts in perfect purity; entirely of itself; can justify itself by nothing in heaven or earth; not even by reference to some divine voice or tutelary nature within, whose whispered behests, as some would persuade us, the moral reason carries out. How can such wholly apriori principles really have the authority we usually see in them?

Paragraph 44.—Not only can we not found their authority on the allegation that they are somehow good for the creature on account of the fact that we can never be sure that such an allegation is true. To found their authority on it would be to defeat our end even if it were true. It would no longer be moral principles whose authority we were finding genuine. We cannot too often repeat our warning that this is a false pillow to put under our head. The illusion which we here set up and find worthy is not anything in the least like virtue.

Commentary. This severe insistence on the strict purity of attitude native to the unwarped moral con-

sciousness, however, is not to be allowed to prevent Kant from doing justice to its position. He is to vindicate its position; he is to defend the good will. But he can do nothing towards a defence of a good will which (as is the case, so far) he has only explained to be a will-that-law-should-prevail. He must explain in what sense this will-that-law-should-prevail is also, on the part of the man of virtue, a will-to-prevail. In other words, he has to find this abstract concrete. He has to redeem the idea of law from its abstractness by finding it identically the idea of end. As realising his end in following the law, the man of virtue does not need to be baited into following the narrow way. There is no need, in other words, that he be given some extraneous interest to keep him in the way; a point, their failure to notice which, has been in Kant's opinion the rock on which most previous efforts properly to understand the moral life have split. Commentary.

In perceiving that the good man, by being good, is pursuing "rational nature" as his end—he being himself rational—Kant has not come any nearer seeing how the categorical imperative can be imperative. But he is put upon the track of a few further points which are of value in that they serve to articulate still more our conception of what the good life is. They serve, that is to say, to articulate our conception of what a valid imperative would imply, supposing

Commentary.

that there is one. It does not merely imply that we should do what we could will universal. This implication must be expressible in terms of end. In willing the universal, we now say, the rational nature in us is following an end in that it is treating itself as an end in itself (paragraphs 46-49). Here is a new way, which is yet the old way, of saying what goodness is. It is the treating of every being in whom reason lives as an end. And when we test it out by reference to admitted examples of goodness, we find once more that our account of what goodness is is correct. (See paragraphs 50-53.) Kant has now, he thinks, without compromising the rigour of the good in any way at all, shown it to be in its own nature an end; to be its own reward, therefore; and thus to stand in no need of having any "interest" attached to it; a most important point, as he now proceeds to explain.

He does not advance quite at once to the question as to what interest we have in the good life, and whether any interest needs to be attached to the living of it. In course of a parenthesis, where he returns once again to rebut the charge of having himself been following an empirical method in all these matters, he finds occasion to turn his second formula for the moral life over into still a third (paragraphs 54-55). And it is from this that he advances to the discussion of interest.

Argument.

Paragraph 54.—My duty is to recognise man, and, generally, every rational being, as an end in himself.

Argument.

Although now bringing the notion of end into my conception of duty, in this way, I am still not in the least deriving a notion of what my duty is, from an appeal to experience.

For one thing, I recognise it as binding upon me to regard all rational beings whatever in this way. Now these include much more than I have or can have experience of, since there are rational beings into whose nature my experience as a mere human being does not at all help me to enter. And for another thing, I am not acknowledging this as my duty because of any assumption that humanity is, in point of fact, a universally recognised subjective end on the part of human kind. This that I am acknowledging as a necessary end for me is not a subjective end which, owing to the peculiar constitution of human nature, every man does actually set before himself; but an objective end, with which all subjective ends whatever ought to be consistent, and which must therefore spring from pure reason.

In fact, to be precise—and here we come upon a third suitable formulation of the moral law—there is for all genuine practical law-giving the objective and the subjective side to its validity. Objectively, the ground lies in the rule and its form of universality which makes it fit to be law (*e.g.*, a law of nature—witness our first principle). Subjectively, on the other hand, it lies in the end. But every rational being is subject of all ends, as being end in himself (which is the meaning of our second principle). From all of which follows, as our third practical principle of the will, and as the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.

Paragraph 55.—Hence what we are doing, in doing our recognised duty to ourselves or others, is expressible by saying that we are acting consistently with the will being itself universal legislator. This makes the will not simply subject to that law, but so subject that it may be regarded as itself giving the law; subject to the law, but only on this ground.

Argument.

Paragraphs 56-57.—The virtue of this third formulation of the categorical imperative is the clear way in which the notion of an interest becomes superfluous in it. You need no interest to attach you to the law if you are the law-*giver*. The previous forms of the imperative did indeed exclude all admixture of interest, as a spring of action assisting them to have their authority respected. They did so, simply because this was the presupposition, namely that they were categorical. And even yet, of course, we cannot make this more than a presupposition. But by putting the imperative into a form which, so to speak, expressly makes the moral subject also sovereign there is this advantage, that we make it almost say in so many words that in duty the being actuated by interest has fallen away. That an individual is actuated by interest means precisely that he is not sovereign. The law which only some extraneous interest can make him obey, is confessed thereby to be not his own law, not one which he gives. A will which is itself a supreme lawgiver, so far as it is such, cannot possibly depend on any interest.

Paragraph 58.—But if we should be able at any time to see that the supposition of there being a categorical imperative is more than merely an unsupported supposition, we shall at least be able to say that we have now found something which on the face of it is very well adapted to be the purport of such an imperative. It says "Let every human will be, and be regarded as being, one which in all its maxims acts as a giver of universal laws." The will, as universal-law-*giving*, cannot be acting out of any interest. This alone, therefore, of all possible imperatives, can be unconditional. We may claim to have made out, then, that if there is a genuine unconditional imperative, it can only enjoin upon our wills that they take, as object, just themselves as at once subject and sovereign or, in other words, as universal-law-giving.

Paragraph 59.—Our discovery in all this, or rather the principle we are recognising in all this, is that man is

autonomous. This is what previous attempts to discover the principle of morality failed for want of being able to recognise. All that they could get was a law *plus* an external sanction. Here the law is its own sanction. Man only obeys his own will; but then his will is rational, that is, it is a will to give universal laws. All other attempts to discover the principle of morality inevitably make man heteronomous. Argument.

Kant now proceeds to another conception, important, he says, and very fruitful, to which, as he tells us, autonomy, or the notion of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will, leads. This is the conception of the whole assembly of such wills, working together, in a way which would constitute what he denominates a kingdom of ends (paragraphs 60-65); and the conception of the kingdom of ends, together with the conception of autonomy itself and the counter-principle of heteronomy, furnish between them the ever-recurring themes of all his discourse, from this point till the end of the section, and indeed till the end of the treatise. Commentary.

In his further development of the conception of a kingdom of ends, Kant is partly engaged luxuriating in the internal connections of his system. But before we leave the second and third formulations of the moral law, we may just recall and reapply the criticism suggested above, of Kant's moral criterion.

What are we to say, especially, to this last of Kant's formulæ for the Categorical Imperative?

Commentary.

It amounts to this: Act consistently with the idea of your maxim prevailing as a law in a kingdom of ends; that is to say, Act only on such maxims as could so prevail. Certainly, we cannot but reflect, if one's maxim is to be worthy of being acted upon it must be fit for a place in the legislation of a kingdom of ends. But the question returns, Any possible such kingdom? Is that all? It is not a question of whether a kingdom of ends could be realised in fact at the expense of the ten commandments. It cannot be realised in fact at all. The question is, Is it clearly more approximable along the lines of the moral law than along any other lines? Have the states which have come nearest to allowing their members to realise themselves as ends been the most moral states; or would a state's resting on the evils of slavery or conquest be as compatible with that condition of affairs as the refusal to rest on such things? A state wholly ethical no doubt would realise this ideal. But surely there may also be many other ways of realising it.

Kant is still pursuing the programme of paragraph 29. He is still construing for us how he thinks the moral consciousness reads the moral life. It sees in the moral life an acting according to universal law, which is a treating of humanity as an end, which again is a regarding of the will of every rational being as a universal-law-giving will and so a potential member of a

kingdom of ends. The four paragraphs 71-74 reveal how Kant conceives the relation of these three alternative formulations of the moral law to one another. Commentary.

It should be very clear to us now, upon what general principle Kant has sought to outflank the hedonistic position. Hedonism, except in its grosser shapes, had always wanted to show how the moral life was worth while. Acknowledging that it involves many sacrifices, this theory would always lay its finger on this or that consideration calculated to show how the good life made up to us again more than it cost us. With Kant it is all radically different. To him there is no costing in the matter. The being moral is you. The being strictly moral, and the being it for nothing, is just you—if, with the Stoic of old, you but realise who you are. And so he says boldly, follow your own end—although, as he here notes, this way of expressing the moral imperative is most in place when your aim is to give the moral law an entrance into the mind.

From this point down almost, but not quite, to the end of the Section, Kant is practically doing nothing but knitting up his argument. This continues, however, not quite to the end of the Section. Towards the end he introduces considerations very important for the concluding Section. We shall endeavour to give the gist of his peroration as rapidly as possible. What

Commentary.

follows is not, of course, offered as a translation of Kant's words, but as an expansion of his argument. This commentary does not at any point set itself in competition with any, and particularly not with Mr. Abbott's faithful and scholarly translation.

Argument.

Paragraph 75.—We can now end where we began. We can say we have completed the explication of that idea of a will good in itself which we set out to explicate at the beginning of our first Section.[1] That will is really good which cannot be bad; and such is the will whose maxims can never contradict themselves though taken as universal laws. Such a will takes as its supreme law, to act only on maxims of this kind. This imperative is categorical. And by analogy it can be expressed: Act according to maxims such that they could (at the same time that they prescribe this or that course of conduct for you) also have as their object themselves as universal laws of nature.

Paragraph 76.—Having given the formula of an absolutely good will in this shape, we can at once pass to another. Rational nature is distinguished (see paragraph 12 above) by this; that it follows ends of its own setting. These ends are the matter of which a good will is the form. But since it violates the moral consciousness' idea of goodness of will, to make such goodness at all dependent on one's skill to reach this or that positive end, the end of the will *qua* good (the end which to seek constitutes it good) must be thought of negatively. It must be thought of as an end just not constituted of any or all of the positive external things which we can see awaiting achievement in the world; but as an end whose realisation is independent of the achievement of these; that is, an end which merely must not be violated by any achievement of anything positive which we may undertake in the world; an end, consequently, which we cannot under any circum-

[1] Section 1, paragraph 8.

stances regard merely as a means to anything else. Which end can be none other than that embodied in the subject of all ends himself; for it is also he who is the subject of a possible absolutely good will; a good will being that which cannot be postponed to anything else without contradiction. Thus the second and the first formulations of the moral law are in principle one. That I should regulate my use of means for any and all of my ends by the first test, namely: Are they universally valid as laws for every subject? is exactly the same thing as to recognise that the subject of ends, the rational being himself, is never to be used as means only, but as the ultimate limiting condition in the use of all means; is, in other words, to be regarded every time as end also. Argument.

Paragraph 77.—From all of which there follows the conclusion, that whatsoever be the laws to which the rational being is subject, he must be able, at the same time as he is subject to them, to look on himself as also giving them. The very fitness of his maxims for universal law-giving is what marks him out as end-in-himself. We are also warranted in saying that what brings him his prerogative over all mere natural beings is the fact of his having to select his maxims every time from the point of view of himself (but also of all others) as law-giving—the others, as we may remark, being persons just because, like him, they are thus law-giving.

In this fashion is there possible a world of rational beings (an intelligible world) as a kingdom of ends; and this through the proper law-giving of all persons as members? Hence comes the idea of a kingdom of ends into our series of tests of right conduct. As the formal principle here is that we so act that our maxim should be capable of being universalised, we can see that it is only on the analogy of the universal laws which obtain in the kingdom of nature, that we frame the idea of a possible kingdom of ends. The difference is that in the latter the laws are self-imposed rules, while in the former they are the laws of efficient causes acting under necessitation from without. (And yet one does give, even to nature, though

Argument. *prima facie* a mechanism, the name of a kingdom, in so far as it has reference to rational beings as its ends.) Such a kingdom of ends could only actually come to be (through maxims whose rule the categorical imperative prescribes) if such maxims were universally followed. Yet, though the rational being cannot count on others following them merely because he does; though he cannot count upon the kingdom of nature and its economy harmonising with him to the point of bringing about a kingdom of ends rendered possible by his means, and fulfilling his expectation of happiness; still the law remains binding, that he act as becomes a member of a—however invisible—kingdom of ends; because that law is categorical. This, indeed, is just the paradox; that respect for a mere idea should serve as an inflexible precept of the will; that a maxim's independence of sensible reward should constitute its very sublimity, and should warrant the rational being who follows it to be worthy of a place as law-giver in a kingdom of ends. (Otherwise he would have to be conceived merely as subject to the physical law of his wants.) Even if we conceive the kingdom of ends united with the kingdom of nature under one sovereign, and thus no longer a mere idea but a reality, there can be no doubt that it would thereby acquire the advantage of a strong additional recommendation to our human nature, but no enhancement of its worth. For in spite of it, the sovereign must always be so conceived that the rational being shall have worth in his eyes only according to the disinterestedness of his conduct. The essence of things is not changed as their external relations change. And it is by the essence of him that a man must be judged, even by the Supreme Being himself. It is the relation of deeds to the autonomy of the will that matters, their relation to possible universal-law-giving. That is morality. The permitted is what is compatible with this autonomy; the forbidden is what is not compatible therewith. The will whose maxims harmonise with this necessarily and always is a holy will, absolutely good. The dependence of (the moral necessitation experienced by) a will not absolutely

good, in relation to the principle of autonomy, is obligation; and the objective necessity of acting from obligation is duty. Argument.

Paragraph 78.—From what has just been said it is easily seen how it comes that although a certain subjection is associated with duty a very great dignity is associated with it too. There is no sublimity specially about a man *qua* subjecting himself; but there is, when it is seen that this to which he does subject himself is a law he also gives, and that only as self-given does he thus subject himself to it. We have also shown that neither fear nor inclination but solely respect for the law is the spring which can confer moral worth on actions. It is our own will as autonomous that is the proper object of respect, and the dignity of man precisely consists in his capacity to be giver of universal laws albeit under the condition that he is himself at the same time subject to them.

Commentary.

Having given this concentrated if lengthy peroration to his argument, Kant rounds off the Section by three separate discourses, (*a*) on the autonomy of the will as the supreme principle of morality, (*b*) on the heteronomy of the will as the source of all spurious principles of morality, and (*c*) on the classification of all the principles of morality which can be founded on the conception of heteronomy. The interesting feature of the last is the effort Kant makes in it to distinguish himself from the Wolff school even in ethics.

It is something of a difficulty that Kant should speak of one of the brands of spurious principles in the field of ethics as the rationalistic at all. It is easy enough to understand why the rationalistic and the erroneous should have been associated together in his mind. When Kant

Commentary.

arose as a philosophical teacher, the reigning school amidst which he found himself, and which formed the first target for his shafts of criticism, was, of course, the rationalistic school of Wolff and Baumgarten. Its rationalism on the one hand, and, as he came to see, the empiricism of Locke and Hume on the other, were the outstanding monuments of what to him were the two wrong views of the pure use of reason, from which human enlightenment had to be delivered if it was ever really to prosper. Rationalism and empiricism, accordingly, were the Scylla and Charybdis between which *The Critique of Pure Reason* had to steer. But this was rationalism and empiricism in the epistemological field. It is hard to see how Kant can use the same two terms to denote twin errors in ethics.

In knowledge, the error of rationalism was its having reduced all universal truth to analytic statements. That of empiricism had been the virtual denial of the possibility of universal and necessary truth; its reduction of all knowledge to contingent matters of fact. Kant had endeavoured to vindicate the existence of necessary truth as against the latter school, and as against the former, he had endeavoured to show that such truth was of consequence to us, that it really added to our knowledge, that it was synthetic and not analytic merely.

Such was his general programme. But by the same stroke wherewith he showed (*a*) that

there were apriori judgments and (*b*) that they could be synthetic, he also confined such apriori synthetic knowledge to our knowledge of our own world. This was the limitation which the rationalists had forgotten. Our faculty of apprehending necessary truth could synthesise, Kant said, and so become important and yield us real knowledge. But it could only synthesise when it had data of sense whereon to operate. It had to keep close to sense if it was to yield us knowledge. There could be no knowledge, therefore, of those exalted objects of which we were incapable of having any sense-intuition. In all the disciplines of rational theology, cosmology, etc., reason was only winging in empty space. This was Kant's objection to these disciplines. Commentary.

But why should Kant, although condemning rationalism in knowledge for trying to know apart from sense, continue, as here, to condemn it in ethics? In ethics his own endeavour has been in this very direction. His own aim has precisely been to get away from sense. The spheres of knowledge and practice differ, according to him, in just this respect. No true knowledge, he would say, unless reason keep close to sense; but no true morality unless reason get away from sense. Two things are impossible with Kant, knowledge which is independent of sense impressions, and morality which is *not* independent of sense-impulses. It would seem then that while a rationalistic theoretical philosophy was, from his point of view, a clear error,

Commentary.

a rationalistic practical philosophy was what was wanted and was precisely his own. It is interesting to note in this connection, though it does not help us any, that in the very next paragraph (85) he proceeds to tell us that as between the two errors in the field of ethics he prefers the rationalistic one.

It is not any solution to our difficulty to learn from Kant that the rationalistic error is in his opinion the lesser of the two. The question is how he should be able to regard rationalism in ethics as an error of the sort he thinks it is at all; how, in other words, it should come to strike him as belonging properly to the ethics of heteronomy. His own story of how he comes to view it so is given in the next paragraph, the last but one of this Section. It amounts simply to this—and again it hardly answers our questions. As he construes the matter, all these theories alike name an object to which the doing of right is to be a means. All that they really can do is to fasten upon some object, taken either from the sense world or from some refinement or extension of the sense world, and tell us that the moral law is obligatory upon us because it gets us that. So that they split upon the old rock. Morality is not strictly our will any longer. We are not autonomous in it. It is a way of life which we have to be decoyed or baited into adopting. He argues somewhat as follows:

Argument.

Paragraph 87.—Heteronomy is where advantage is taken of some wish for an object, in order to compel the

Argument.

will into a right course, but one not its own. The imperative which prescribes the course can never in that case be the moral imperative. It is not categorical. Whether the object be an object of inclination, as in the principle of private happiness; or whether it is reason which discloses the object, selecting it because it promises to contribute to our perfection, makes no difference; the will is not really out for the action, but for the effect. The course is not categorically imperative. If anything is categorically imperative it must be the compassing of the effect. And this cannot be, because as an object or effect to be gained it merely functions as an attraction to some part of our human nature, either our sensibility or our understanding and reason, the employment of either or both of which is attended with satisfaction. It follows that in that case the law would properly speaking be given by nature, and thus (*a*) be known and proved only on the evidence of experiences, and consequently be incapable of the necessary or apodictic character which we require in the moral law, and (*b*) remain inevitably only heteronomy, in the sense that the will does not give itself the law. Hence an absolutely good will must be seen to be such, by considering the pure form of the will itself, and seeing it to be autonomous. In other words, the suitability of the maxim of every good will for making itself into a universal law is itself the only law which the will of every rational being imposes on itself apart altogether from the help of any adventitious springs or interests.

Commentary.

For the reasons we have stated, we cannot get away from the position that rationalism, the operation of pure reason not any longer dependent on sense, was what Kant wanted in ethics, as clearly as he mistrusted it in knowledge. And his plea here—that the Wolffian ethics was wrong because, though it set an object

Commentary

of reason before the will, an object of reason was still an object—has inevitably something of the note of special pleading about it. He was on safer ground in the Preface, where he made it his complaint precisely that Wolff was not rationalistic, but mixed together all kinds of incongruous considerations into his ethics. Whatever Kant may say, heteronomy, if an error, is the empirical error. And his laying of an empirical error at the door of rationalism has inevitably somewhat the aspect of a *tour de force*. And yet, if we ask sympathetically, How could he do it? it is not altogether necessary, perhaps, to say that he was arbitrary; that he merely succumbed to his schematic predilections, sacrificing consistency for the sake of keeping the two plans in the two *Critiques* parallel. We can perhaps conjecture what he thought he was seeing.

His criticism of pure reason in knowledge was, briefly, that we cannot know anything about another world. Now, it is only putting this finding the other way round if we say that anything which (*per impossibile*) we did come to know after the fashion of the famous rationalistic disciplines, would be, not really another world at all, but only an extension of this one. Now, Kant is simply assuming that the rationalistic moralists are working within that outlying periphery; that they are furnishing us with an object to justify morality out of a certain repertoire, the intelligible sphere; that repertoire

Commentary.

being what alone it could be if (*per impossibile*) their rationalistic speculations about it were knowledge. It is, namely, an extension or a refinement of this world of positive objects of sense. If so, the objects they offer are open to the same criticism as objects of sense would be, the criticism he urges. In other words, he is assuming that the rationalistic moralists produce an object of the moral life from out a sphere they know; which, because they know it, must be empirical. He takes their ethics to be simply empirical ethics at a further remove, therefore, and is proceeding to show that no sort of empirical principle in ethics will do. It inevitably leaves morality heteronomous. The will does not itself give the law. It only submits to it because of something else of superior desirability, which it is bent on attaining.

In the closing paragraph of the Section Kant returns once more to a statement of the fundamental problem; the problem to which throughout the Section he has been leading the ordinary consciousness forward, and the same problem, of course, to which he has just been saying the empirical and rationalistic solutions are no solution.

Argument.

Paragraph 88.—Our whole procedure in this Section has been analytical. We have taken the universally received notion of morality and shown what was in it. We have found that it presumes an autonomy of the will as its foundation. This, in fact, is what it is; it is the

Argument.

will being autonomous. Whoever wants an interpretation of morality which shall be faithful to the thing as it actually appears, which shall not be fantastic in the sense of having no discernible likeness to what morality says of itself when it speaks in characteristic tones through the unsophisticated conscience of man, must admit the principle of it that is here assigned. And if morality is ever to be shown a valid attitude and no mere figment of the brain, then it is about morality as we have here exhibited it that this must be shown. Morality as here exhibited shows the will rising to duty; thereby effecting a synthesis with the sheer good, with something not contained in it in the sense of being the gratification of any of the impulses or inclinations which as an imperfect will it contains. This synthesis must be shown competent. This autonomy must be shown possible. In our concluding Section we shall outline, as far as our purposes require, the lines along which such a vindication of the central principle of morality may be undertaken.

Commentary.

The above we believe to be Kant's argument in this final paragraph of the Section. He is pointing us to the place where alone the main philosophical problem of ethics could be properly treated. This is not in a *Metaphysic of Ethics;* whose business, really, would simply be to give a systematic presentation of the principles which ought to guide conduct, and which is consequently, despite its portentous title, a very simple affair, as he said in the Preface. It is to a *Critique of Practical Reason* that we must look, he tells us, for a full answer to the master doubt, the doubt as to whether the prestige of this moral law which we have been defining may not, perhaps, after all be a mere fancy or figment of the brain.

Commentary.

But there is no getting past the fact, and it is needful here expressly to admit it, that in this last paragraph, if not also elsewhere, Kant at least appears to commit that confusion which, if the reader commits it, contributes more than any other to make *The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics* an obscure and confused book for him. This is the confusion between the interpretation of the moral attitude and its defence. No doubt the two things are connected. No doubt a due interpretation is itself a defence, as we have been suggesting. But the book is built on the assumption that the two problems are distinct. Kant does not always keep them distinct, and it is the main source of confusion in this work. A treacherous ambiguity is apt to becloud his words whenever he is coasting around what we are calling the master doubt which his ethical philosophy seeks to face. He is apt to speak of the problem as a question of whether or not morality may be a mere *Hirngespinnst*. But that may be taken in two senses. It may be taken as referring to the problem of the *Grundlegung* or as referring to the problem of the practical *Critique*. There are in fact two possible *Hirngespinnster;* one which the former work is intended to dispel, and one which the latter is intended to dispel. The first would be any view of the moral attitude which quite made nonsense of the report which that attitude gives of itself when it appears in any ordinary man and speaks through his

Commentary.

conscience; a phantom which the *Grundlegung* seeks to lay, its aim being to determine properly what the moral attitude is. The second is any view to the effect that the moral attitude, thus properly interpreted, is, for beings like us, fantastic, absurd and so *ungereimt* and of no possible authority. Kant recognises the distinctness of these two, and their relation, in the planning of his two works as two. But that does not prevent him from sometimes, instead of keeping them distinct and related, appearing merely to confuse them together, to the great detriment of lucidity in his writing.

When discussing Kant's findings in the field of knowledge, in our introduction, reference was made to the point where considerations of ethics come in. There is a point, we said, at which the moral life becomes a metaphysical consideration. It was as follows: The ideas of God, freedom and immortality are found by Kant to be beyond the scope of our knowledge; but for that very reason they are also beyond our scepticism. Belief in them is therefore left standing, if there be any warrant in our nature for having faith in them. Now, there is such a warrant. We are so made as to be compelled to regard the moral life as worthy of us. And without the practical validity of these ideas, a moral life is unmeaning.

That was represented as the constructive issue of the Kantian philosophy. But are we

"compelled to regard the moral life as worthy of us"? The reader will notice that that is precisely the question we are now asking. We are now engaged in discussing whether or not we must listen to the dialectic of the passions when they would persuade us that the prestige of the moral law is chimerical, a mere figment of the brain, a *Hirngespinnst*; or whether, on the other hand, another view is really possible. What was assumed before is being tested now. It is with this fact in view that we can most profitably embark on the difficult discussions of the concluding Section.

Commentary.

CHAPTER V

GRUNDLEGUNG: THIRD SECTION

Commentary.

THE object of the third Section is to offer, so far as the purposes of the treatise require, an apologia for the moral attitude, a defence or justification of it, as distinct from a mere finding as to what that attitude is. Its task, in other words, is to do something to enable the good man to render a reason for the hope that is in him, when in perfect freedom, and without either fear of punishment or expectation of reward, he gives his entire allegiance to the moral law.

And an attentive reader of *The Critique of Pure Reason* will hardly fail to observe a similarity between the task here and the one undertaken there. The deduction of the categories was the heart of the first *Critique*. As there the theoretical categories represented the apriori in knowledge, so here the categorical imperative represents the apriori right. And here, as Kant eventually comes to say, we are undertaking a vindication of the latter just as in the theoretical *Critique* we were offering a vindication of the former.

The apologia to be sketched in this third Section is the same, Kant implies, as will have

Commentary.

to be undertaken in a fuller way in the future *Critique of Practical Reason;* an anticipation which is eventually fulfilled. For the real subject of the practical *Critique* as we now have it is the pure categorical *ought*. Its task, stated briefly, is to prove this *ought* valid; and then to show what in particular its validity entails as regards our conceptions of God and immortality.

If we ask how the validity of the *ought* is established in the practical *Critique*, the reply is that it is established, essentially, by the assertion that human freedom is a reality and no mere "phantom of the brain." This assertion is made on the strength of the *ought* itself. The deduction of the categorical *ought* lies here. We disclose a certain credential which it possesses. Its credential is that it enables us to assert, as a reality, that freedom which *The Critique of Pure Reason* had left with us as a mere possibility. This is its justification. There is, Kant eventually comes to say, no other deduction of the validity of the categorical imperative possible. On the other hand, this is enough. Assuming the *ought* valid, we may know that man is free; whereas without doing so we should know nothing of freedom. This constitutes a credential sufficient, since without freedom the opening with which *The Critique of Pure Reason* provided us, whereby to escape the results of the cosmological antinomies in knowledge, would be left unused. The negative suggestion there made, as to a possible freedom

Commentary.

in which these antinomies would be reconciled, could never be bodied forth in positive shape or given a positive meaning.

The third Section of the *Grundlegung* is thus a forecast of the practical *Critique*. Its opening paragraphs indicate the difference between a negative conception of freedom and a freedom which would be positive and actual. These paragraphs are mainly occupied with a discussion of causality. Freedom is, of course, a matter which concerns causality.

Argument.

Paragraph 1.—We can picture causality as holding both within nature and as between man and nature. If we apply a spark and start a fire, we may say that the spark caused the blaze; and also we may say that our will caused the spark. Our causality, here named will, is free if it could be efficient independently of foreign causes determining it. The spark is not in this position. It is a cause which has itself to be determined to activity. We express this by saying that it is under physical necessity.

Paragraph 2.—From this negative conception of freedom as the property, in a cause, of not needing to be set into action by something else, we are led to the positive conception of freedom which reveals its real essence.

Free causality is still causality. It therefore implies laws. A free will which were a lawless will would be an absurdity.

But freedom is not a quality a will possesses according to physical laws. These laws, we saw, were a heteronomy of efficient causes. Each effect was only possible on condition that something else set the cause of it into operation. Freedom must be a property possessed by the will in virtue of laws of another order.

What, then, can that other order of laws be but autonomy, the state of affairs in which something is a

law to itself? The freedom of the will, then, is its property of being a law to itself. But the proposition that the will is in every action a law to itself only expresses the principle to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as an object, itself as a universal law. Now this is precisely the formula of a categorical imperative, and is the principle of morality. So that a free will and one subject to moral laws would be one and the same. Argument.

Kant here has clearly reached the result that freedom, if real, would carry the validity of the moral law with it. But equally clearly he is left with the question, What is the warrant for freedom itself? Commentary.

The equating of freedom and morality is done through the conception of law. It is because they are both law that they fall together. It has always been clear that freedom in some way implies law, that there is a difference between freedom and lawlessness. There is no freedom, we may put it, which is not also power of some kind. And there is no power in any creature unless in its actions it is acting out the law of its being. Otherwise, it is merely being used as the instrument of a power seated somewhere else.

Accordingly, man is free, for Kant, if he is able to carry out the supreme law of his being; and that means if he is able to be moral, or if the categorical imperative is possible. But clearly, to put it this way, and say "free, if moral," is to rest freedom on morality; whereas it was morality we were defending.

Commentary. Are not we assured of freedom independently? To express this difficulty is more or less the purport of Kant's own thought in the next following paragraph.

Argument. *Paragraph* 3.—When freedom is presupposed, morality follows through mere analysis of the conception. But the latter is still a synthetic proposition. To say that a good will is one which wills the universal is to make a synthetic judgment. Now a valid synthetic judgment is only possible when the two terms can be united. That wherein the two are united is furnished in this case by the positive conception of freedom. What it is that the positive conception of freedom thus furnishes we are not yet in a position to say; we are not ready to give a deduction of the conception of freedom from pure practical reason, and therewith to settle the question of the possibility of a categorical imperative satisfactorily; but some further preparation is required.

Commentary. Kant seems to say that we do not want to defend the categorical imperative merely by presupposing that man is free. We wish to show that he is free.

He puts this, however, in the form of a demand that we shall really see how the synthetic judgment, which morality is, is possible. He compares it with the parallel apriori synthetic theoretical judgment which says that every effect has a cause. For vindication of the latter we can fall back upon the nature of the sensible world. The theoretical synthesis is a proposition true universally in the world of phenomena, because it is part of the structure of our minds to which the world of

Commentary.

our knowledge must conform. But this apriori necessity has as a result that every cause has in turn been determined as the effect of something else. We are seeking evidence for a cause which is the original source of its effects. Only then shall we be able to make use of freedom to unlock the problem of morality, or, what is the same thing, of the autonomy of the will.

Argument.

Paragraph 4.—The independent warrant for freedom is this: that he who can only act as free is free. Now this is the situation of a rational being, whether he be a human being or any other. Such a being has a will. He cannot have a will, the reason in him cannot be practical or act, and yet he not act under the idea of freedom. Briefly, to act is to be consciously free; and being consciously free is the same thing as consciousness being free. If you are consciously free, you are free *qua* consciousness. And that means that you are free, since consciousness is you.

Commentary.

Here we have a kind of independent warrant for freedom; though to put Kant's thought in the way we have just put it is to draw out into an argument what he appears to wish to leave as something less than an argument.

In a footnote at this place he speaks as if he entertained the idea that some other independent source of assurance about freedom were in contemplation, though he was content with this as being good enough for present purposes.

But that suggestion is not really implemented. Beyond the line of thought here taken, and we do not think we have misrepresented it in the expansion we have given, there is no argument

Commentary.

for freedom except the one referred to above on pp. 109-110, based on the validity of morality itself. That argument was that if we regard the moral imperative as valid, then the full positive significance of the freedom which *The Critique of Pure Reason* had left as a mere negative hint and possibility is released to us. We can in that case say positively that we are free; and its helping us to this is just the "credential" which the moral law carries with it, and which sets it right in our critical eyes. As moral beings we take our stand on the moral law; and our assurance that we are right is derived from the fact that this attitude presupposes, as a positive conception, what a critique of knowledge had merely suggested. But the only basis for the positive conception of freedom itself, other than the moral law, is the one given, namely, that to be conscious of freedom, or be consciously free, is to *be* free, *qua* consciousness.

The next eleven paragraphs are devoted to the strengthening of this latter argument. Kant extends to it—*i.e.*, to this assurance of positive freedom which we have in the moment of action—exactly the "credential" which he elsewhere gives to the moral law. And this is as we should have expected. Being the same thing at bottom, they must have the same credentials.

He goes about the matter in the following way. What is in question is this conviction which we have in the moment of action of being free. He offers his conjecture as to what this conviction

Commentary.

may really be. He refers to the distinction elaborated in *The Critique of Pure Reason* between things in themselves and phenomena, and shows it to be a distinction which we have got to make. He reminds us that the distinction holds quite as much of the ego as of outer objects. And he indicates that in this inward conviction or sense of freedom it may be not the phenomenal, but the noumenal ego that is speaking; not the ego as it appears, but the ego as it really is. This is but to adduce in favour of the truth of our conviction of freedom, what he afterwards (in the practical *Critique*) calls the credential of the moral law. Its credential, as there reported, is that it calls for freedom, and so bids us take advantage of this distinction, and of the possibilities which lie on the farther side of it; the possibilities of there being a law of freedom in the region of the real, different from and underlying the law which holds in the phenomenal sphere.

He entitles the eleven paragraphs "Of the Interest attaching to the Ideas of Morality." The title is quite germane to the matter. It merely indicates that he is upon the crucial question of all moral philosophy now, namely, What is the right of right? or Why should the moral man be moral? He may answer this question by showing that it cannot intelligibly be asked. But that he answers it in that way (if he does so) is not the only point worth noting. Another point equally important is that, accord-

Commentary.

ing to his conception of the problem before him as a moral philosopher, he must endeavour to confront and answer the question in one way or another.

Argument.

Paragraph 5.—We have seen that the validity of the categorical imperative is a matter of the reality or otherwise of human freedom, but we have not proved freedom; we have only shown that the rational being must presuppose it in being active, and added that that was all the proof the case admitted of or required.

Paragraph 6.—Presupposing this freedom involved recognising as binding upon us the law of autonomy, the categorical imperative. But the question returns, Why *should* we subject ourselves to this principle? I do not say that some interest or other must urge us to it. I know full well that if an interest drove men to be moral, they would just for that very reason not really be moral. But we must at least be able to *take* some interest *in* the enterprise.[1] I am moral. It costs me something. And I must be able to make some sort of a defence of my attitude. If reason determined my actions without any hindrance the case would be different. I would have no such need. Goodness would cost me nothing. I should have a holy will, and be at peace. But I am not, in fact, so happily constituted. In me, the subjective necessity is different from the objective. We cannot leave freedom a mere unsupported presupposition, then.

Paragraph 7.—It would appear, so far, as if our only evidence for the reality of freedom lay simply in the necessity that right must be right, that morality must be worthy of us, that the categorical imperative must really be imperative. It would seem we cannot show the reality of freedom independently. Even then, of course, we should certainly have gained something by the reflections we have been pursuing. We have at least articulated the true principle of morality. But we have not got all we

[1] Compare pp. 81-85 above.

wanted; not the grounds *why* the universal validity of our maxim as a law must be the condition restricting our actions; or why we should assign the worth we do assign to this particular attitude in conduct. Argument.

Paragraph 8.—It is not indeed impossible for a human being to take an interest in a thing in the absence of any visible reason why he should. We are not in any way forgetting this. In the matter of happiness, for example, I may be interested just in seeing that I remain worthy of it, even though there should be no visible likelihood of its ever coming my way. But this does not touch the difficulty. It is so, simply because of the interest a human being can take in goodness; and how the latter is possible is the question. We are not helped by this reflection to see any the more clearly whence the moral law itself derives its obligation.

Paragraph 9.—It must be freely admitted, in fact, that our argument has moved round in a certain circle from which it seems impossible to escape. We have, in a manner of speaking, verified that we are free. We have at least found that we have got to assume it to be so in the moment of action. As we put it, a rational being can only act under the idea of freedom. But beyond this, we have only the necessity that the imperative be imperative, as ground for a belief in freedom. It is necessary, we say, that we should be rightfully subject to moral law; and so we assume ourselves free in the order of efficient causes. But, anon, we ask whether in fact we are or ever can be as rational beings rightfully subject to a moral law which speaks in sheer categorical imperatives and promises nothing. And then we say yes, this is perfectly possible, for in point of fact we possess freedom of will. It is a circular argument. Morality, as we found, is autonomy. Freedom, too, is autonomy. Morality and freedom are therefore the same thing; and we cannot say, "because the one, therefore the other," whichever one we may take as our reason for believing in the other. Here are two different notions of the same object; we can reduce them to this common denominator, autonomy;

Argument. but that logical exercise is all we are entitled to carry out in the matter.

Commentary. Kant is here virtually setting aside the evidence of freedom adduced in paragraph 4, assuming that it is not a valid argument in itself; and in support of it he is going out along another line. He chooses to take it that the argument of paragraph 4 has only yielded us the validity of the moral law by presupposing freedom, not by showing it. He makes a slight change, however, which, if we may put it so, is very unjust to paragraph 4. He takes it that the argument there only assumes freedom in order to get the moral law valid. That was not so. It assumed freedom because it could not help it. However, taking the argument as if this were all the purport it could have, he goes on, as we shall see, to strengthen it indirectly by considerations adduced in the first instance in order to show that there is a good deal more in the other argument—the apparent circle-argument—than at first sight seemed to be the case.

His immediate business is with the apparent circle. He is anxious to show that this is not a sheer unrelieved case of first saying "B, if A," and then, on being challenged as to "whether A?" replying calmly, "yes—at any rate, if B!" It is not purely that. All that that argument would leave us with would be, of course, a "both, or neither." No reason would be given why one might not say "neither." Kant adduces a reason. He reminds us that this

world, after all, cannot be the only world; that behind the seen there is and must be an unseen. And while the alternative "We are neither free, nor morally obliged" may not seem very absurd when we confine our view to the phenomenal and visible world alone, it may begin to look different when we reflect on the fact that even for knowledge — leaving out of account our practical faculty altogether—there must be a noumenal and invisible, however it may be constituted. This necessity that we should *think* a realm of things in themselves beyond what we see and know, is the theme of the next six paragraphs. Commentary.

Paragraph 10.—So far the validity of the moral law has not been shown. The freedom which would have shown it has only been presupposed, and that on the strength of the validity of the moral law itself—which validity, unfortunately, was precisely the matter in dispute. One resource remains to us. How if the assuming freedom just gave us the opportunity needed to recognise a new significance in that distinction of the two worlds which we found we had to make in *The Critique of Pure Reason*? How if assuming freedom made us recognise *two standpoints* which we may occupy: the one, one in which we are to ourselves causes efficient apriori; and the other, one in which we are to ourselves merely a series of actions and effects which are observed, found before us, or seen before our eyes? We could then see how it was perfectly feasible for us to be both free and determined; really free and phenomenally determined; free *qua* occupying the former standpoint, and determined *qua* occupying the latter. Argument.

Paragraph 11*a*.—*The Critique of Pure Reason* was striving after no forced or far-fetched point, but one

Argument. plain even to the simplest mind, when it pointed to an unseen world beyond the seen. It is a remark which needs no subtle reflection to make, that in all our knowledge of the external world what we know directly are appearances, not things in themselves. The impressions we get of objects around us, through our senses, do not enable us to know things as they are, or otherwise than simply as they affect us. What they may be in themselves remains unknown. We have here a distinction which even the crudest mind can make between a world apparent to sense, varying with different people's different sense apparatus, and a world which we *understand* really to exist, the unchanging original of which these are the varying appearances.

Commentary. So far, Kant has adduced the distinction between phenomena and reality. He has not yet made use of it. We must not forget about this particular aspect of the case, he says, in our difficulties concerning freedom. We are perplexed over not being able to get freedom established without finding an apparent circle in the argument. But what is here may greatly strengthen our title to break through the circle; to deny the "neither free nor moral" alternative, and say "nay, but rather both free *and* moral." At least, we must not ignore the possibility.

Merely to adduce the distinction (*a*) between things as they are in themselves and their appearances, and (*b*) between the ego as it is in itself and its appearances, as an obvious and necessary distinction which the simplest mind can make, is not, we have said, to utilise the distinction. Even as regards the ego or subject, it is not yet utilising the distinction, merely to

Commentary.

say that "beyond these characteristics of his own subject, made up of mere appearances" a man "must necessarily suppose something else as their basis, namely his *ego*, whatever its characteristics in itself may be."

But in the last fifteen lines of the paragraph Kant begins to disclose a positive significance in the statement that the real ego is not merely these given appearances. That it is not these data-passively-given, is put positively, by saying that it is the activity reading or apprehending them. *Qua* active, now runs the assumption, the ego really is; *qua* appearing as a given set of data before inner sense, the ego is merely represented through the medium of appearances. Thus, "in respect to mere perception and receptivity of sensations," a man "must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense." But "in respect of whatever there may be of pure activity in him (that which reaches consciousness immediately and not through affecting the senses) he must reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world, of which, however, he has no further knowledge."

Argument.

Paragraph 11*b*.—If, beyond the characteristics of his own subject, which appear to a man's inner sense, he is compelled, exactly as in the case of the characteristics of outer objects which appear to his outer senses, to suppose something else as their basis, there is yet this difference between the reality behind outer phenomena and that behind inner: that the latter obtains an insertion into consciousness, though not in such a way as to provide us with any knowledge about itself. In respect to recep-

Argument. tivity of sensations, man must reckon himself as belonging to the world of sense; but in respect to whatever there is in him of that activity which reaches consciousness directly, he must reckon himself as belonging to the intellectual world. We are led to all this by reflections which the commonest understanding can make—except that the common understanding doesn't realise that it cannot know the thing-in-itself, and thus inadvertently makes this world of things in themselves into a further world of knowledge; a mere extension of the world it has already got; no true other world at all, therefore; and so it leaves itself as much in need of the latter as ever.

Commentary. It will be noted how, for Kant in this passage, to be intellectual is really to be. *Qua* intellectual or *qua* reason, I am. As active, as reacting in a certain way upon the data of experience, we are intellectual; to be intellectual is to be in the intellectual world; and that means to be in the world of understanding, to be part of that reality which is for the understanding behind the veil of sense. We can see how we are now on the point where ethics, as we put it before, becomes a metaphysical consideration. It is in moral conduct, pre-eminently, that pure reason is practical or active. So that in being pure reason practical, in putting pure reason into practice, or rising to the categorical imperative, we are literally inserting ourselves into the world of reality; we are acting as members of the invisible but ultimately real order of things.

In the next four paragraphs Kant becomes more explicit about this breach which he has made in the circle of the argument. He dwells

Commentary.

on this activity which is in man, in contrast to all that is given to our inner or outer knowledge, in empirical psychology or physics. But he does not give his reflections either the epistemological or the ethical turn, specially. He holds the balance, speaking just of active reason, the central activity which is man, dwelling first on its theoretical expression in knowledge and then on its ethical expression in conduct.

Argument.

Paragraph 12.—Now *there is* this in man which distinguishes itself as activity, not only from the given objects of outer sense, but even from those linkages of cause and effect which inner sense beholds as the effects of objects on our desires and passions. This is reason. It is in our knowledge and in our practice. In knowledge it is more, even, than that understanding whose activity we traced in the first *Critique* as bringing sense data under its categories. For though the latter is a spontaneity as compared with our faculties of sense, which are by comparison passive in their reception of the impressions which come to them, still the spontaneity of understanding is limited to the production only of those conceptions through which there can be for us a world of knowledge. It is limited to those conceptions which serve to bring the intuitions of sense under rules, and thereby unite them in one consciousness. It is tied to sensibility. Apart from that, it cannot think at all. It only gets into the insuperable perplexities from which a *Critique of Pure Reason* was designed to extricate it. The activity we are speaking of is reason, that same faculty in virtue of whose spontaneity there are those ideas of reason, which did not indeed enable us to know anything of objects corresponding to them, God, the soul, or the like, but which operated as ideals for knowledge which it pursued, and in pursuing which it broadened and enriched itself as knowledge. That faculty was not tied to sensibility. Its

Argument. ideals, though pursued by the understanding in its work of reading the data of sense, were never overtaken. They could not be, by a faculty which was confined in its operation to interpreting what sense gave. For this faculty far transcends everything that sensibility can give, and exhibits its most important function in distinguishing the world of sense from that real world which we *understand* to exist beyond it; at the same time that it keeps the actual understanding from seeking its knowledge outwith the limits of the sense field itself.

Paragraph 13.—On this account, we may take it that a difference of standpoint has to be recognised which would render possible two different exercises of the rational being's faculties; namely, as active in his exercise of his faculties, and as passive in it. "As passive" will then signify as belonging to the world of sense and under the laws of nature (heteronomy). "As active" will mean as belonging to the intelligible world, and under the laws of that world, laws which concern what ought to be, and which have their source in reason alone.

Commentary. From what follows in the next paragraph we can see that Kant intends the considerations he has adduced to strengthen both the arguments for freedom. They are to strengthen the argument that a being who can only act under the idea of freedom is on that very account shown to be free; and they are to do away with the appearance of circularity in the moral argument for freedom. In fact, he writes as if he had been addressing himself simply to both and hardly distinguishing them.

Argument. *Paragraph* 14.—Thus we gain our point. As we saw, the rational being, when he acts, acts as independent of the determining causes of the sense world. It is his nature to do this. He cannot otherwise. Now, it is as

belonging to the intelligible or real world that he finds himself in this situation. Argument.

Thus we have freedom, autonomy, and morality. Freedom, for independence of the determining causes of the sense world is freedom; with freedom the idea of autonomy, which is indissolubly bound up therewith; and with the latter the moral law, which holds, in idea, for the world of rational behaviour, just as natural law holds for the behaviour of phenomena.

Paragraph 15.—Thus do we find an exit from the circle in which our argument had seemed to be caught. It seemed that we had begged the question, merely assuming the freedom which would have made morality intelligible, and then saying that the latter was therefore intelligible. We are not merely assuming freedom. Remembering that there is a world beyond what we see, we are but recognising that in being actively rational, we are transferring ourselves into that intelligible world. Here we recognise the autonomy of the will and its consequence, morality. In so far as we modify our pure rationality, which in itself would be sheer freedom, by letting in the sense of duty and of being under obligation, we are recognising our place as in both worlds, that of sense and that of understanding.

Paragraph 16.—How, then, is a categorical imperative possible? For we are now in a position to confront the issue and register our findings.

As an intelligence, the rational being reckons himself as belonging to the world of the understanding; and in calling that causality of his by which he effects changes in his sensible sphere a will, he locates it as an efficient causality in that same intelligible sphere.

From the other side, the rational being is conscious of himself as part of the world of sense. So viewed, the causality just mentioned registers itself in changes—the individual's actions—which cannot be known or understood by reference to this causality. For we do not, in the strict sense, know it itself. We cannot know a causality which has its seat in the intelligible world. In

Argument. place of that, therefore, these actions have to be presented to knowledge as determined through other phenomena—namely, desires and inclinations. They have to be presented to knowledge as belonging to the sensible sphere.

Hence, if I were a member of the world of the understanding and nothing else, all my actions would follow the law of that world perfectly. They would be in perfect accord with the principle of the autonomy of the pure will. Were I, on the other hand, part of the world of sense and nothing else, they would follow entirely the natural law of desires and inclinations, the heteronomy of nature. In the former case my acts would follow, as supreme principle, morality; in the latter case, happiness.

But the world of the understanding contains the ground of the world of sense. The laws also, therefore, of the latter sphere are grounded in the world of the understanding. But my will belongs to the world of the understanding. It is the latter, therefore, which, for my will, is law. Hence, as intelligence—even though I am on the other side a creature of sense—I reckon myself as subject to the law of reason; which, in the idea of freedom, contains the law of the intelligible world. I must reckon myself as subject, then, to the law of the autonomy of the will. The imperatives of the intelligible world must be regarded by me as imperative, and the duties they prescribe as duty.

Paragraph 17.—And so categorical imperatives are possible because of this: that the idea of freedom makes me a member of the intelligible world; whereby, were I that only, my actions *really would* all conform to the autonomy of the will, in actual fact. Since, however, I belong to the sensible world also, my being made a member of the intelligible world through freedom only effects this much: that my actions *really ought* all to conform to the autonomy of the will. This categorical *ought* sets forth a synthetic apriori proposition, and it is vindicated. My imperfect and sense-laden will *ought*, categorically. There need be no question about it any more. There is synthesis. To this will there comes the

idea of it—of it itself, but yet of it as different, of it as belonging to the world of the understanding, as a pure will, practical of itself—and there is synthesis of them in the *ought*. To the imperfect will comes this pure will, as containing the ultimate condition of it according to reason; in somewhat the same way as to the intuitions of sense, in the sphere of knowledge, there come the conceptions of the pure understanding, pure conceptions, signifying nothing but just the form of law in general under which the intuitions are to come, and through which, as a consequence, those apriori synthetic judgments are rendered possible, upon which all knowledge of nature rests. Argument.

Paragraph 18.—Thus, as we deduced the categories in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, so have we given a deduction of the categorical imperative, so far as the nature of the case admitted of such a thing. Even the practical use of common human reason confirms this deduction. It confirms the finding that with a will that is free from the impulses of sense, we set ourselves into an entirely different order of things to that of our desires in the sphere of sense. Is there anyone, be he the very worst of men, who does not secretly admire virtue when he really sees it, or who does not at these moments wish himself free of the impulses which keep him from it? Is it not clear that that fugitive wish betrays the presence in him of a will which is a will for the fulfilment of none of the impulses, but is a will just for the good, for a higher inner personal worth? *Qua* taking up the standpoint of a member of the world of the understanding, he believes himself this better person; a step to which he is compelled by the idea of being rid of his impulses; that is, of being undetermined by causes belonging to the world of sense, or in other words, of being free. In this step he shows himself conscious of a good will, and confesses it to furnish the law for the bad will (which he possesses as member of the world of sense) a law whose authority he recognises while transgressing it. The moral *ought*, therefore, is the member of the intelligible world's *would*; and is only thought

Argument. by him as an *ought* in so far as he is at the same time a member of the sensible realm.

Commentary. In these arguments Kant may be said to be closing his system, or sketching to us in outline how he hopes to close it. His is by all intention a system reared in opposition to the principle of determinism. Freedom is the keystone of his arch. And the warrant for freedom, in the last resort, is just that it forms the keystone for such an arch as his.

In the last resort he does not give us any other grounds for freedom than this. He does not offer a literal demonstration of what is not by its nature open to demonstration. He does not radically alter either of the two arguments for freedom sketched above, in which he is conscious at least of a certain appearance of defect. He neither breaks the circle of the moral argument, nor rids the other one—the argument from our necessary assumption of freedom in the moment of action—of its character as assumption. But if he doesn't break the circle he thinks he immensely widens it. If he leaves the assumption still assumption, he yet thinks he makes it an infinitely broader and more reasonable one. By reminding us of the unseen real beyond the seen appearance, he opens the full perspective upon us, and so enables us to see how easily this freedom which was consciousness and consciousness which was freedom may be no anomaly, such as from the point of view of the phenomenal alone it was bound to

Commentary.

seem, but simply and literally the reality of us showing through the appearances, though not in such a way as to be known.

One way in which we might attempt to express the essential meaning of Kant's position would be the following, although there is much in Kant's own expression which is incompatible with this way of putting it—an aspect of the matter to which we shall return.

We might say that this rationality in me, this consciousness in the moment of acting which is a consciousness of freedom, is, from another point of view, the earnest of all in me that is beyond what is seen as phenomenal.

I do this act, whatever it may be, good deed or bad. What means it to say I am consciously free in doing the thing, except that I am conscious there is a great deal more that I *could* do? I am free, then, in that I am conscious of the infinite periphery, representing what *else* this action might be. There are infinitely other alternatives potentially in my purview. It is no difficult thing, then, to regard this sense of freedom, this sense of *all I could*, as the voice of the entirety of me; and this does not seem very far from saying after Kant that it is the reality speaking, whereof the phenomenal is but the visible fragment.

Our difficulty—of which more anon—is only that if so, there can hardly be the clean cut which Kant makes between the visible and the invisible, between this world and the other.

Commentary.

This world, to put it comprehensively, must be extensible into the other without the other's thereby ceasing to be other. This world must become other; it must begin to show other, as we grasp more of it and understand it more deeply. As, indeed, Kant himself assumes when he assumes the ideas of reason as ideals which knowledge approaches as it extends itself, and which conduct approaches as it improves itself. We shall develop this criticism a little further in our concluding chapter.

We come next to what is practically the closing discussion of the *Grundlegung*, that entitled "On the extreme limits of all practical philosophy." It gets the title because in it Kant is endeavouring to show what argument can and what it cannot do, when such conceptions as freedom and morality are in question. He shows what exactly we have done in the matter of freedom. We have not demonstrated it. We have shown that it can be, and further (on practical grounds) that it must be; and have gone on the principle that what can be, and also must be, really is. But this is all that needs to be said. To go on and demonstrate *how* it is, would be to profess knowledge of what cannot be known, and pass beyond the limits of all practical philosophy. It would be to offer knowledge of objects in the intelligible sphere, from which knowledge as such is precisely excluded, as it was the burden of *The Critique of Pure Reason* to show.

He first indicates the task which moral consciousness prescribes to theoretical. Commentary.

Paragraph 19.—All men attribute to themselves freedom of will, in saying of this or that, that it ought to have been done though it was not. This conception is not derived from experience. For the mere fact that experience offers few or no examples of acts carried out according to the law of freedom, never alters the necessity with which we conceive that law to hold. On the other side, experience when we look at it displays to us not freedom but the reverse, a march of events proceeding under a rigid law of necessity. Argument.

This necessity of nature which obtains within the whole field of our experience is itself not a notion derived from experience. It is apriori, just for the very reason that it is a notion of necessity. Only, this conception of a system of nature is unlike the conception of morally necessary law in this, that it is confirmed by experience. It is a necessary condition of experience itself being possible. Freedom, then, is only an idea of reason, while nature or the natural order is a concept of the understanding necessarily ratified in the course of experience.

Paragraph 20.—Here we come upon a contradiction: at one and the same time we are compelled to say that there is freedom and that there cannot be. Reason finds it necessary to adopt both notions. For purposes of speculation or knowledge it naturally proceeds on the assumption that physical necessity is universal. Yet if reason will be practical, it can only be so by assuming itself free, uncompelled by solicitations of sense. It can neither accommodate freedom nor even with the subtlest skill argue it away. The presumption which philosophy must make is that in some way or other two such inevitable notions are reconcilable.

Paragraph 21.—This seeming contradiction must be removed in some convincing manner, so that even if we should never be able to comprehend how freedom is possible, we shall at least find no real contradiction in the assump-

Argument.

tion of freedom. Otherwise we should have to give it up. It would have to yield its place to the theoretically indispensable conception of physical necessity.

Paragraph 22.—If the thinking subject which seems to itself free, conceived itself both as free and as subject to the law of nature, in the same sense or in exactly the same relation, the impasse would be hopeless. This circumstance leaves it obligatory upon speculative philosophy to investigate the case for holding that it is not so, that "we think of man in a different sense and relation when we call him free and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature, as being part and parcel of nature." And further, speculative philosophy must, if it is to be successful, show "that not only *can* both of these very well coexist, but that both must be thought *as necessarily united* in the same subject." For it is asking a great deal, if any less than this is demonstrated, to ask reason to burden itself with an idea which embarrasses it so much in its theoretic employment as this idea of freedom does. This duty, however, theoretical philosophy does not exactly need to perform on its own behoof, but only in order to afford practical philosophy free scope.

The situation is, then, that the philosopher cannot leave this apparent contradiction standing. If he does, the hypothesis of determinism will naturally close the question in its own fashion, and leave morality an entirely unsupported attitude.

Paragraph 23.—We cannot, however, as yet say that we have crossed the line at which the work of practical philosophy begins. The settlement of this difficulty is not its business. It merely prescribes to speculative reason as a task, that the latter shall put an end to the discord which entangles it in connection with its own theoretical questions, so that practical reason shall be able to proceed unmolested in its peculiar sphere.

Commentary.

Having shown thus where the problem lies, and in how far it is a theoretical problem, Kant proceeds to indicate once again how the task

may be accomplished, how the contradiction may be got round. Commentary.

Paragraph 24.—The claims to freedom made even by common reason presuppose that practical reason is independent of sensibility. In considering himself in this way man places himself in a different order of things to that in which he perceives himself as being, or to which he perceives himself as belonging, when he phenomenally perceives himself. In the former case he is being what he is. In the latter case he is perceiving himself as he phenomenally appears. Now there is not the smallest contradiction in saying that a thing in appearance is subject to certain laws, of which the very same thing as a thing in itself is independent. Now man must of necessity consider himself in both these ways—in the former way because of his consciousness of himself as an object affected through the senses, in the latter way as an intelligence—*i.e.*, an active reason, independent of sensible impressions. Argument.

Paragraph 25.—Hence comes it that man claims possession of a will which, so far from paying any attention to desires and inclinations, conceives actions as possible, nay, as necessarily binding, which presuppose the disregarding of all such. The causality of these actions lies in the agent *qua* intelligence; it lies in the laws of effects and of actions according to the principles of an intelligible world. The agent, indeed, *knows* nothing more of the intelligible world than that there pure reason alone gives the law. And since it is only as in the intelligible world—since it is only as intelligence—that he is his proper self (as man, he is only the appearance of himself), those laws apply to him directly and categorically; so that that to which inclinations and appetites and the whole world of sense incite, cannot impair the laws of his volition as an intelligence. Nay, he does not even hold himself responsible for the existence of these or ascribe them to his proper self, *i.e.*, to his will; clearly as he does, however, ascribe to his will any indulgence he might yield them.

Commentary.

And now Kant can proceed to show the extreme limits of all practical philosophy; that is to say, the limits within which an argument in justification of the moral life is by the nature of the case confined.

Argument.

Paragraph 26.—Practical reason does not, in that it merely *thinks* itself into a world of the understanding, transcend its due limits. To try to enter that world by *intuition or sensation* would be another matter.

For to think itself into the world of understanding is merely to think the world of sense away. It is merely a negative attitude. The attitude is positive only in this single point, that the freedom *from* sense is united with a causality of reason which we designate a will. It is only positive in that the reason which thus thinks sense away is of itself practical and acts. In other words, there is in us the faculty of acting from reason, as opposed to acting from sense; which simply means refusing to follow such maxims as do not have universal validity as laws.

Our attitude is not positive in any further sense. We have no intuition for objects which belong to the supersensible sphere. We have no sense for anything that is there. Hence it would be going beyond our warrant altogether to pretend, for instance, that we have from practical reason a commission to pursue any particular tangible object which might appeal to our desires. We are, of course, always actually pursuing and realising such objects. But they are all derived from the sensible sphere. What we derive from practical reason, what we obtain in our capacity as practical reason or as members of the intelligible world, is only a point of view; the point of view necessary if reason is to be practical at all; the point of view in which we operate independently of the influences of sensibility.

This thought, whereby reason thinks itself into a world of understanding, does, it is true, involve the idea of an order and a system of laws; and that order is another one than the nature-mechanism which the senses have to do

with. The thought is that of a *world* of understanding; that is, of a whole which is constituted of rational beings as things in themselves. But the thought is formal purely. It is no thought of any sensible or intuitable world of the understanding; which, indeed, were a contradiction. The thought is of an intelligible world, but the intelligible world is only thought as to its formal condition—namely, as to its compatibility with the universality of the maxims of the wills which play within it, as laws; its compatibility with autonomy on the part of these wills, which alone spells freedom for them. Any other kind of laws, any which had reference to definite objects, would only yield heteronomy, such as belongs to laws of nature and can only apply to the world of sense. Argument.

Paragraph 27.—But this thought by which reason inserts itself into the intelligible world and becomes practical, is not an *explaining how* pure reason can be practical. Reason would overstep all its bounds if it undertook this. It would be exactly the same problem as to explain how freedom is possible.

Paragraph 28.—And this would be a contradiction in terms. We cannot explain anything except it belongs to the world of things given in some possible experience. But freedom is no such thing. Freedom is a mere idea, the objective reality of which can in no wise be shown according to laws of nature; and consequently it cannot enter as a datum into any possible experience. It cannot, therefore, be comprehended or understood. It has no analogue or counterpart among the data of knowledge. It is only valid as a necessary presupposition of reason in a being who believes himself conscious of a will, *i.e.*, of a faculty of acting as an intelligence, as opposed to acting in obedience to the impulses of sense or nature. And where determination according to laws of nature ceases, there also does explanation cease; and nothing remains possible except defence. We can only defend freedom, therefore: we can only remove the objections of any who may pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things, and to be able in consequence to declare roundly that

Argument. freedom is impossible. What one can do is to point out to such people that the contradiction they supposed they had discovered in it arises only from this, that having had to deal with man in his appearances in order to construe him according to laws of nature, they cannot recognise the difference, when anyone demands of them to think him as intelligence or as he really is. They go on still considering only appearances, when of course the withdrawing of his causality (the causality of his will) from following the laws of nature, to which yet all his being is supposed to be subject, seems a contradiction. The contradiction would fall away if they would only be reasonable and bethink themselves that appearances are not just the things whereof they are the appearances.

Commentary. In the old third edition of *The Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Ethics*, printed at Riga, a space occurs here between paragraphs 28 and 29, as occasionally elsewhere. In all likelihood, therefore, we are warranted in thinking it was Kant himself who, in course of reading the proofs, indicated that a little gap should occur here in the printed page, to mark some kind of a break in the thought. If so, it suggests that what follows is meant as a fresh presentation of the contention, throwing up other aspects of it. The subject is the same—namely, the nature of an argument in vindication of freedom and morality.

Argument. *Paragraph* 29.—The situation is that we must assume freedom though we cannot explain it, precisely as we in fact take an interest in the moral law although we can never, theoretically, see what interest we can have in it. The two impossibilities are the same. We enjoy a freedom we cannot explain, and we take an interest in doing right

Argument.

which we cannot explain. The basis of this interest is what we call the moral feeling. But the latter is not the standard of our moral judgment, as some have thought. Right actions call forth this feeling because they are right. We cannot say that they are right because they call forth this feeling.

Commentary.

In a footnote here Kant explains that it is only rational beings who can properly be said to take an interest in a thing at all. Sensible beings merely feel an impulse towards it. The difference he is explaining is that between merely feeling a drive from behind towards something and taking an intelligent interest in it. The latter, he says, is just reason in the act of being practical, or being "a cause determining the will." It is reason in the act of rising superior to sense and going out into practice, so to say, on its own. But Kant here tries to distinguish between the case where that interest is direct and where it is only indirect. And as he works it out, the interest is direct only in the limiting case where one should perfectly rise to one's duty. If "another object of desire" or "the suggestion of a particular feeling of the subject" has to enter in as part-determining-factor, then the interest of reason in the good act is only indirect. The latter interest is then empirical. It is no purely rational interest. For reason pure and by itself cannot disclose either objects of the will or feelings for them. Kant adds that the logical interest of reason in extending its insights is never direct, but pre-

Commentary.

supposes purposes for which reason is employed. He seems to mean the remark to cover those "explanations" which we are at present discussing, and which we are seeking to understand the impossibility of; *i.e.*, theoretical explanations of freedom, of our interest in the moral law, or the like. It is not in the nature of those things to be explained, since they do not belong to the sphere of knowledge. To grasp this fact is to explain them, in the only proper sense. It is to defend them. And defence is all they require. A freedom "explained" in any other way would be a freedom necessitated. A morality explained in any other sense would be a morality demoralised. He illustrates by reference to pleasure—the pleasure of doing right.

Argument.

Paragraph 30.—For one who is affected by sense there must be a pleasure in the good if he is to will it; but how that comes cannot be known, understood, or explained. All we see is this: it is pleasant because it is morally valid for us; it is not morally valid because it is pleasant.

Pure reason, in other words, must have a causality by which it determines the sensibility according to its own principles. It can only do that, however—it can only reach sense—by somehow infusing a feeling of pleasure or satisfaction into the fulfilment of duty. But it is quite impossible to discern—*i.e.*, to make it apriori intelligible—how a mere thought, which itself contains nothing sensible, can produce a sensation of pleasure and pain. We could only do this by taking the cause and the effect as both observable. We should have to take them as phenomena. But this would just be precisely to miss one term in the relation, which is no phenomenon but a piece of reality, a thing in itself. It follows that for us men it is quite impossible to explain why morality interests. When I am

Argument.

asked why I should be interested in morality, the true reply is that the question "why" here is not one that can intelligently be put. It is a demand for an explanation of something whereof the questioner himself is presupposing (and whereof he would see, if he were only clear about his presuppositions, that he is presupposing) that it belongs beyond the range of theoretical explanations. In asking, Why should I be moral? he is asking, Why should I really be at all?—a question which can be raised about appearances, but has no meaning when raised about my being. What is clear is only that morality interests because it is valid, and not vice versa. In other words, the moral law is the voice of our reality as intelligences, and in letting our sensible nature be governed by it, we are only conforming the appearance to the nature of the thing itself.

Commentary.

"Out of the eater came forth meat, and out of the strong came forth sweetness."

Kant's final word is on the limitations of knowledge, and how from these very limitations we draw assurance as to the validity of morality.

Argument.

Paragraph 31.—A categorical imperative is possible, then, because freedom is postulated. We can see how freedom must and may be postulated. And this is enough for the practical exercise of reason. It is enough for the validity of the moral imperative. But we cannot explain freedom. We cannot theoretically explain how pure reason can be practical.

Paragraphs 32-33.—To attempt to show how pure reason can be practical would be the same as to take something out of the intelligible world (which world I have no knowledge of, but do only as a noumenon think myself into), and make it a spring of action of the ordinary kind. In the intelligible world there lies the source of interest for the pure moral will. But how it operates we cannot know. If we could, we should be reducing it to

Argument.

the status of a sensible spring of action. Any motive which we can know belongs to sense, and so cannot be the supreme moral motive. Any motive fit to be the supreme moral motive must transcend the world of knowledge. Up to this the practical reason can carry us. Past this, it would be pretending to yield us knowledge of things in themselves. Here, therefore, lies the extreme limit of all moral inquiry. And it is of great importance to determine it, even on this account: that reason may not either seek the supreme moral motive in the mere things of sense to the detriment of morals; nor yet, while soundly holding to the other-world character of the true moral motive, still seek to comprehend it, and so once more impotently flap its wings in empty space trying to know where knowledge is neither possible nor requisite. For the rest, the idea of an intelligible world, a world of the pure understanding, to which we really belong, sense-laden though we be upon the other side of our nature, this remains always valuable as an idea (though we must not mistake our idea for knowledge), furnishing us with the noble ideal of a kingdom of ends in themselves, "to which we can only then belong as members—when we carefully conduct ourselves according to the maxims of freedom as if they were laws of nature."

But it is also a limitation of reason, that it can find necessity only by assigning some condition upon which what happens, necessarily happens; or upon which what ought to be, necessarily ought to be. But when it finds the condition the trouble breaks out again, for it must have the condition of the condition. Hence it is caught in the endless pursuit of a necessity which it can never find, but must in the last resort simply assume without understanding, "happy enough if only it can get the conception disclosed which agrees with this assumption." No blame, therefore, to our deduction of the supreme moral principle, if we have but found what reason must have, in the only form in which it can have it. No blame to our effort to show that obedience to the moral principle on the part of man is really reasonable, if it stop short of

making an unconditional practical law (such as the categorical imperative has to be) comprehensible to theoretical knowledge. It cannot be blamed for refusing to offer an explanation of the necessity of the moral law, by referring it to a condition which would destroy its character as a moral law, *i.e.*, a supreme law of freedom. It could not be the latter, and yet be susceptible of the explanation demanded. We have done all that can be even demanded of the most rigorous philosophy, in the nature of the case. We have not led the moral man to comprehend the moral law to which he gives his allegiance; which would be a contradiction, if anything we have had to say about the moral law is true. But we have done what could alone be required of us, namely, enabled him *not to deny* its incomprehensibility, but *to understand why it should be* incomprehensible. Argument.

These closing paragraphs on the extreme limits of all practical philosophy are among the most important in the book. One may dispute Kant's version of what the moral attitude is. One may find difficulties in the metaphysic by which he justifies allegiance to it. But he has at least grasped what "justification of the moral attitude" must mean, if it is to have a meaning. And to have led the attentive reader gradually to apprehend this, is one of the most permanent services which this work renders to ethical philosophy. Commentary.

Aware as Kant is of the importance of the central question which is before him all through—namely, whether our duty really is our duty; conscious as he is of how sincerely the enlightened among mankind ask this, especially

Commentary.

when duty is hard; the course of his argument gradually makes clear the full peculiarity, if we may so express it, of a question which on its surface is so straightforward.

The question as it is asked suggests a demand for proof. It sounds as if the questioner wished to see the whole matter, as to whether the doing of right for its own sake were or were not the proper course for rational beings to follow, taken up and brought to a demonstration. But the course of Kant's discussion leads the reader to realise that a point like this cannot be proved. It can only be seen. To see it *is* the proof. Moreover, to see it is what the enlightened mind has really been wanting, in so far as it was clear about its own demands.

To vindicate duty is to see it to be duty, and this involves viewing the whole universe in a certain way. Kant's argument is directed to showing that when we view it in that way, the universe hangs together. The burden of his argument is that our taking the moral imperative to be really imperative, is compatible with all that knowledge shows us of our situation in the world. Nay, the assumption relieves knowledge itself of certain contradictions which it inevitably meets in the course of its work.

This circumstance—namely, that a vindication of duty is really a view of the universe—furnishes the answer to the objection urged against the argument by which duty is vindicated, that it inevitably fetches a circle. The statement is

quite true. Kant's argument does fetch a circle. As we have seen, he says so. If we are to be moral beings at all, he says, we must be free; and that, he holds, is strong presumption in favour of freedom. Equally, if we are to be free we must be moral; and he regards that as something in favour of the view that we are moral. He does not break this circle. He proposes, indeed, to do so, and thus leave it open to no one to suggest that we may be neither the one nor the other. But in fact he does not. He only widens it. He so widens it, however, as to take the universe in. The whole universe, for him, can be shown compatible with the view that we are both moral and free. To expand the view so as to take in the whole, is not to make it cease to be a circle. But it is, as he claims, to make a difference. For being now a construction of the universe as a whole, it could not cease to be a circle and remain adequate to the thing. A circle is just what the whole must be. As Emerson might have said, the horizon is a circle.

Commentary.

Here we see an aspect of Kant's essential strength as a moral thinker. He knows where he can safely leave the matter. It is still open to anyone who will, to say that we human beings are not free; and that we are not moral either. Kant will not argue on that. He is content to point out to those who make such an assumption that they are under no necessity of making it, that the universe does not demand it, and that there is no call upon us to accept it until we

Commentary.

have at least been shown that the other assumption cannot bear us.

The fact, therefore, that the good man's attitude, which needed philosophy for its defence, can be justified by philosophy, does not mean that it is thereby so mathematically demonstrated as to be entirely robbed of the element of adventure and to leave no room for faith. In a philosophy of practice, however, the ordinary man may find something which at least brings his helplessness to an end; which unlocks his tongue and gives him something to say when he is challenged by "those who pretend to have seen deeper into the nature of things" than he, to give some account of how he meets the difficulties to which, on a superficial view, his attitude lays him open.

If, beyond this, the idea of a demonstration which would end all need for faith should still retain a lingering attraction for the moral man, Kant would have him bethink himself what that would be (supposing he could have it) which were literally capable of such demonstration; what a literal quasi-mathematical proof of the proposition that duty is our duty would mean if it were given. It could only mean that "being our duty" had been translated into "being our interest." The demand would be, "Prove to me that the consistent doing of my duty is my interest." If it were met, the inquirer would have been shown his interest. Such a thing may be possible. There is no contradiction involved

Commentary.

in it. With sufficient knowledge you can bring the hypothetical imperative to a demonstration, and show that such and such courses lead to such and such desirable or undesirable results. It is hard, but it is conceivable. But it would all be beside the moral man's point. He did not want to be shown that it was his interest to be moral. He wanted some basis for his faith that it was right. We are thus led back to the point Kant has sought to make. The view that the moral life is worthy of us is a view of the universe; and it suffices us that we should see it possible. Whether we are aware of it or not, that is what we are really asking to be shown, in so far as it is about the moral life that we are raising our question.

CHAPTER VI

REVIEW OF KANT'S POSITION

We have already spoken of the view of the moral life presented in this work of Kant as one which stands to the modern world as Stoicism did to the ancient. It is, that is to say, a view which disparages the flesh and the world of sense, and puts its faith in reason.

But an important feature of Kant's presentation is the way in which the ethical doctrine is united with a theory of knowledge in which the emphasis is all the other way. Kant is no Malebranche. He will enthrone reason above the senses in the sphere of ethics; but it is assuredly not in any divorce from sense that safety lies for him in the sphere of knowledge. His whole theoretical philosophy sprang from a sense of the opposite; a sense of the futility of attempting any such divorce. And one of the tasks which has always claimed the attention of those critics who were ambitious to relieve the Kantian system of its difficulties, is that of placing these two sides of it upon a more intelligible footing. It is well to remember that this has never proved easy. The question which ensues upon any proposal to make a vital change in Kant's theory is always, What are the penalties and consequences?

His system is a piece of architecture; and the involuntary tribute which most criticism has to pay to it is simply this: that while to see defects is easy, to insert improvements that are wanted without losing something that is indispensable is extremely difficult. Yet it is a system which calls for criticism; and even from us, before we close our analysis of it, it seems to demand at least some indication of where we think criticism might feasibly essay to begin, if it hopes to be able to finish.

Of the three Sections the one which most clearly invites criticism of a fundamental kind is naturally the third, where the author's attention is at length full upon the ultimate issues and he is knitting up the web of his speculation. Criticism which begins there naturally spreads backwards through the remainder of the work; and if it has anything positive to suggest it gets opportunities to test the value of its suggestion in healing the other weaknesses of Kant's presentation as it meets them on the backward journey.

And it is not difficult to anticipate at what point in the third Section the need for criticism is likely first to be felt. It will be in connection with the doctrine of things in themselves.

It cannot have escaped notice how deep-rooted the distinction between phenomena and noumena is; the distinction between things as they affect our senses and the same things as they are

supposed really to be. Nor can it fail to have struck the reader as *prima facie* odd that Kant should be so constantly discussing certain "things" which are yet as constantly declared to be beyond reach of our knowledge.

There is no need to insist on the centrality of the doctrine for the author himself, however. His whole thought in this Section is clearly poised upon it, and the other Sections also lead up to it.

In order to obtain a clear view of the centrality of the doctrine, it will be convenient here to try to draw together as succinctly as possible a sketch of the course of the thought in the *Grundlegung*.

The motive of the book, as we saw, is to be an *apologia pro vita ethica*. But first Kant will indicate what he takes the ethical attitude to be. The first two Sections of the work constitute, accordingly, an elaborate interrogation of the moral consciousness. The view he eventually elicits is the one we saw hinted at in the Preface, the view which regards the moral life as consisting in doing what is apriori seen to be right without at all considering what calculation might show to be the useful or convenient course. The moral law recks not. It takes no account of anything but itself. No calculation of consequences enters into the question, after it is seen that something or other is right.

To do even so much as state a view so extreme is at once to feel its need of defence, and to

invite the question, Of what defence is it susceptible? This yields the theme of the book. Morality speaks in tones categorically imperative; but can its imperatives really be imperative? How is that possible?

It is in the third Section especially that this question is confronted. It turns out to be a matter of the possibility of autonomy. And Kant finds autonomy possible because man is free.

But it soon becomes evident that there is something circular in this argument. He had already relied on autonomy to establish man's freedom. He had in the past reckoned man's freedom reliably established, simply because only if man were free could the moral law possibly have any significance. But whether the moral law has actually any significance is now the very question that is being raised. It is being asked, But is autonomy possible? And this is the meaning of that question.

Kant has only one independent argument to bring forward for freedom, and it is not one on which he seems to lay much weight—not, at least, until it is strengthened by a reference to things in themselves. It is to the effect that since I can only act consciously as consciously free, I am therefore free in my consciousness, and so free; the presupposition being that my consciousness is myself.

Kant does not here seem to be explicit about this argument or to lay special stress upon it. He treats it, as we saw, not as an argument but as an

assumption. And he brings in a reference to the distinction of phenomenal and noumenal to strengthen it. He dwells on the vista which the existence of a world of things in themselves beyond the visible world opens up to us, in mitigation of the boldness of the assumption. And he strengthens the other argument—the moral argument for freedom—by the same stroke. It might be a bold, certainly an inconvenient thing, he says in effect, to assume freedom either in deference to our sense of the importance of the moral law or in deference to the vividness of our consciousness of freedom in the moment of action. It is certainly an assumption incompatible with anything which we scientifically know. But quite a different complexion comes upon the matter when we see how little we know; when we see that there must be another world, from which all our knowledge is necessarily cut off; and when in addition we reflect that that which lies beyond our knowledge must be the real. It then becomes in a new way feasible to assume, as the simple solution of the whole difficulty, that man is free in reality, although for knowledge, that is to say in a quite different relation, he is not free. This enlarging of the area which his assumption renders intelligible is Kant's defence of the assumption.

It is abundantly clear, then, that the distinction of the phenomenal and the noumenal is

central to Kant's position. It gives him an argument for freedom independent of the moral argument, and on freedom his whole system hinges. Yet it is clear that criticism will be tempted to begin here. For we must recognize also how very easy it is to subject the distinction to the brief and destructive type of argument we have already suggested. If the noumenon or thing in itself be really unknowable, then how comes Kant to know about it and devote so many pages to the discussion of it?

The penalty, however, of hastily applying a criticism like this, which savours so much more of acumen than balance, and of ingenuity than sanity, especially where the issues are so broad as they are here, is that the criticism, like Kant's own criticism of rationalistic ethics, is apt to recoil on the person who uses it. The criticism is apt to leave the critic himself with nothing he can consistently advocate. It is more judicious, as well as more just, instead of thus rushing in to wipe out the basic distinction of Kant's philosophy, to ask first why he set it up and what exactly he wanted of it.

An answer to the question is not hard to find. He wanted it to give him footing, by allowing him to distinguish between this world and another.

He cannot give up that distinction. That were to shake off his very substance. His whole philosophy is put forward as an alternative to the dogmatism of the old metaphysics. It is a

theory to the effect that all dogmatism crosses the forbidden line, and professes to know where it can not. If the distinction is obliterated, if there isn't any longer a line to cross, then *cadit quæstio*, so far as Kant is concerned. He has nothing to say. His occupation's gone.

But it is obvious to him that there is some such distinction. It is plainly disclosed, as he says in paragraph 11 of Section III., by reflections which even the commonest understanding can make. Everyone who thinks at all can see that behind all this veil of the sensible with which one's being sits surrounded, there is and must be another and a real world. The multifarious sights and sounds of nature which assail our senses cannot come from nowhere or from nothing. And equally clearly, as he thinks, that from which they come cannot be construed as simply a further sense-world.

Is this Kantian demand for a world which is not just this one, a thing which we are likely to be able to wipe out by the mere turn of the above argument? On the contrary, it is probably legitimate to say that if not this demand, then some such demand as this, is inseparable from any philosophy. It would seem to be a postulate of all reflective thought, that there is something other than what is just in our immediate possession; and yet that that other, without ceasing to be other, is somehow determinable by us. How to recognise and determine it subject to these conditions—that is to say, without its ceasing to be

other than anything just-ours, or just-we—this is one way of stating the eternal problem of human reflection. And a criticism of Kant which would be positive and would still face the philosophic task while it makes its observations, would have to consider, not whether any such distinction as that upon which he built his system is to be drawn at all, but *whether it need be drawn only in his way.* For that there are difficulties in his way of conceiving it, the easy criticism we have just cited is a sufficient proof.

Is it possible to obtain any answer, then, to the question, In what consists the weakness of *the way Kant drew* the distinction, cardinal to him, between the world of our experience and another? We would merely suggest for the present that he appears to have misread the distinction in a double manner. Reality, or that real world which is other than the fragment of things which we know, is placed by him at once too far from us and, as if by a sort of compensation, also much too near to us; and the weaknesses of his system, so far as they can be said to flow from any one point, may be said to be derived from this.

How does Kant determine the noumenal or real in relation to the phenomenal or apparent, when we take into consideration not any one side of his philosophy but his system as a whole?

At first the phenomenal is the appearance of

the real, so that in a manner of speaking he funds the phenomenal in the real, to begin with. The sights and sounds of nature, as we said, cannot come from nothing.

But he soon begins to emphasise the fact that that hidden reality is nothing to knowledge. Knowledge cannot determine for us anything concerning it except what is quite negative. There is knowledge only of what is in front of the curtain, so to speak. Of the real behind it, we can only make the negative point that it is not such as to be ever conceivably capable of having a place in front. We cannot know at all how it is constituted, further than merely to say that it is constituted quite otherwise than anything which is a possible object of knowledge. Consideration of the practical, however, yields more positive determination of the real. We ourselves are real. And if the practical or moral life is to have any meaning, we must be free. This leads us to postulate that a freedom in which we partake is the central nature of the reality which is behind the veil. Hence the position of Kant, that the whole visible and temporal sphere, the sphere of necessity and of natural law, is but the phenomenal manifestation of a freedom which is ours. The world of necessity is but the outward appearance of a free reality; and since we are co-operative factors in that reality, the world of necessity is the outward appearance of our freedom too; it is a garb in which the freedom which we enjoy manifests

itself. The difficulty about this construction of the real, we have said, is a double one. The real appears at once *too much we*, and too little. It is placed at once too far from us and too near to us; too far from our knowledge, it might be said, and too near to our freedom.

But wherever placed, it is divided from us. That is the fundamental point about the real. And Kant's critics have always felt that here lay a distinction which marked a cleavage in his system. Something is lacking between the seen and the unseen as he construes them. What he is construing as phenomenal versus noumenal is plainly something with which common sense is familiar, namely, the limitations of knowledge; the broad contrast between the visible fragment of things we know, and the infinite remainder which stays hidden from us. Kant in the last resort is building upon this distinction, he is giving us what he thinks the philosophical truth behind it, when he speaks of the phenomenal world and the noumenal. But it will not be satisfactory if he hardens the distinction into a complete solution of continuity. There must still be a way from the one to the other. An adequate philosophy of the situation would seem to require us (*a*) to find it an intelligible philosophical doctrine to hold in general that a distinction at once real and capable of being transcended is possible; and (*b*) to find between the unseen and the seen a distinction of this

order. Kant has not handled the relation of the two spheres in a way which satisfies the mind. The defect, as we have said, is that he either makes our road from the phenomenal to the real so short as not to be a road at all—places the real too near us—or else he leaves it so long that it can never be traversed—places reality too far away. And the initial, the obvious difficulty is, as just said, the latter—the unbridged cleft.

That there is something unsatisfactory here Kant himself is conscious, in various quite obvious ways. If we cast our eye down his pages, we shall soon find that despite his separation of phenomenon from thing in itself, some kind of continuity between the two points is continually being presupposed in his argumentation. Essential elements in his theory as set forth in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, for instance, rest on the recognition of a continuity between the phenomenal and the real; this equally whether his attention is primarily on the outer world, and he is thinking of the real which lies behind the screen of space and time; or whether, on the other hand, he is thinking primarily of the inner world, and the real which lies beneath the play of desire and emotion in our own minds.

Thus, (i.) to speak for a moment of the real without. Knowledge of nature is represented by him as a search for the causes of things. But this knowledge pursues an ideal. As in its search

for explanation of phenomena, it moves backwards perpetually from conditioned to explanatory condition; it has ever before it the thought of an unconditioned or absolute, a first or supreme cause of all things, which to find would mean complete explanation and complete satisfaction. Kant warns us that this idea of reason is never anything more than an idea. There is no object to it that knowledge can tell us of. Knowledge pursues an ideal satisfaction that it can never reach. But while no knowledge thus reaches satisfaction in an absolute object, is it feasible to say that all knowledge is equally unsatisfactory, that there is no progress in knowledge, that there is no such thing as learning to know more or to know better? Kant does not say so. There is such a thing as progress towards its ideal, on the part of knowledge. There must, then, be a way of getting nearer to the ideal; and if to grasp the unconditioned noumenon be the ideal of knowledge, there must be a way of getting nearer to that; there must be some road which leads from the phenomenal towards it, however great be the difference between them. We can never really get away from the fact from which Kant starts, namely, that what we know, even if it be a set of phenomenal appearances, is still the appearance of the real. That of itself presupposes some kind of connection or continuity between the one and the other.

And when (ii.) we come to consider the other separation, the separation of the phenomenal

from the real within us, the same situation discloses itself. The real within, which Kant would have quite as inaccessible to knowledge as the real without, is construed by him as the self-active in us. It is the autonomous or free. All that visible world of passions and desires which the eye of inner sense beholds when we look inwards upon ourselves, is also, like the panorama of outer sense, but phenomenal appearance. The unseen reality beneath is our self-active rational nature, that nature of ours which is free in that it is independent of all the play of these inner forces, can govern them and take its own course. That it should do so is, as we have seen, goodness. What constitutes morality is the rational nature in us getting out, which means our real nature getting out. To put it summarily: to be moral is the same thing as to be free, and to be what we really are is to be both of these at once.

But here, again, we cannot get away from the fact that if this spectacle within ourselves which inner sense can see is the phenomenal appearance of the pure autonomous activity which Kant speaks of; if this pure activity is the reality whereof the many-coloured life of passion and desire is the appearance; there must be some continuity thinkable between the one and the other. And we find the presupposition of such in Kant's discourse. As his theory occasionally demands some continuity between the phenomenal and the real in nature, so it also

—and much more constantly—demands the like in our own inner nature. As his theory of knowledge contemplates an ideal of knowledge wherein the knower reaches the real, so his theory of goodness implies an ideal wherein the individual achieves autonomy. Kant may insist that the ideal is unreachable by the imperfect and sense-laden human being. But he cannot deny that there are better and worse even among such beings. Just as there is progress in knowledge, so there is such a thing as progress in the ordering of our passional life. Some are nearer the ideal than others, however far from it even the best may be. This means that starting point and goal are not unreconcilable. Even a phenomenal being can travel towards the goal. In *The Critique of Practical Reason* Kant argues to immortality from this very fact. Immortality is morally necessary because ethical progress must continually go on. He therefore presupposes such a thing as progress; which is inconsistent with saying that the phenomenal and the perfect are logically incompatible with one another.

Wherever Kant gives his ethical theory any insertion into the concrete, this continuity is further and abundantly presupposed. In fact it is easy to see that all the value in it, and we have found plenty, presupposes that the phenomenal nature can approximate itself more or less to the ideal, and the impulses more or less become the vehicle of that autonomous activity

which according to him is goodness. It presupposes that autonomy is something of which the phenomenal nature itself is ideally capable.

Thus, (iii.) to take but one instance, he constantly breaks out into panegyrics on duty. And he is constantly ascribing to the idea of duty the power to stir the blood of others as it evidently stirred his own. But what is this? He is surely presupposing here that our whole passional make-up can on occasion reverberate to the call of duty, and recognise it as what it wants. That indeed is why the cardinal transition he makes from the idea of law to that of end in the second Section of his *Grundlegung* argument is significant.[1] End in that argument does not intentionally leave law just as it was. It takes it in a new way, else there was no point in the transition. What can that new way be, except that the law is now seen as something which can find an echo in the whole human heart of the good man? As we saw, the moral agent cannot say of the universal law as he submits to it, "I submit, but that is not me." It is he—if he is moral. Such is Kant's message to him. This has no meaning, however, unless in the law is now found the fulfilment and very destiny of his human nature. Otherwise it is simply the bare cold external law over again. It is he *qua* rational, Kant of course says. But this qualification cannot be meant to wipe out the advance made. It can never be meant to make us doubt,

[1] See pp. 81-85; cf. p. 62.

for instance, that the youth's senses will tingle if, in Emerson's words, duty whispers low "Thou must" and he replies "I can." Unless it be incidental to this transaction that the individual may wholly thrill to it, the transition from law to end is made of none effect.

(iv.) As moral, to pursue the point just a little further, the good man is engaged subjecting all the rest of his being to one part, to this still small voice of conscience within, this diminutive yet mysteriously authoritative fragment of himself. But he is not deserting his phenomenal being in doing this. As Kant insists, he can take an interest in it. He needs no bait to bring him to it. Which can only mean that he is still following himself, but in some fresher, fuller way; in other words, this fragment is no real fragment; it is really the whole; it has its authority as representative of the whole. Kant's command to be autonomous, therefore, although ostensibly a command to the phenomenal nature to obliterate itself, is translatable at will into a command to it to be what it at bottom wants to be, namely, integrated, harmonious or complete.

With all the insistence upon separation between phenomenal and real there is thus recognition of the need for continuity. Continuity is presupposed. What is the same thing, Kant is ready to take his principles in a concrete way.

It is not enough, however, if he merely takes

leave to regard his principles in this way, at will. And this is the weakness of Kant's system, especially upon its ethical side. The liberty of understanding his formulæ concretely is not legitimised or regulated in the light of any principle. It is merely taken, wherever necessary. Now, this circumstance may lead to no great mischief in our pursuit of knowledge. In knowledge it may do no great harm to take Kant's ideals concretely at will—to take his "intuitive understanding," for instance, as representing the goal towards which our concrete knowledge of fact is destined to progress; the safeguard here being simply the nature of the factual, the circumstance that in all the business of knowledge, the positive or given is more unalterably given than in practice; and our efforts overhastily to construe the world we know towards what we may think the ideal apprehension of truth cannot mislead us so far, since there is always the pull of fact to keep us in check. But to take Kant's version of the moral ideal concretely—what does that mean? It means that we take yonder honouring of law, which for him was goodness, as concrete autonomy; that is, as something to be realised by the simple integration of our nature; by the bringing of the given elements thereof into a whole, or at most by working for the realisation of a kingdom of such wholes. That, however, is an insufficient account of goodness. Goodness is that, no doubt; but on the other hand, that isn't necessarily goodness.

To allow us to construe the moral law this way at will; to let us look on the moral law as simply an injunction to make our beings whole, without any guidance as to what wholes to make of ourselves; this is to leave the absolute altogether too near to our freedom. This is to be left at a loose end. And Kant does not seem to have a principle to offer which can furnish the requisite guidance.

Does it appear that he could not have found a principle to furnish such guidance? Not quite obviously, we venture to think. We believe, however, that it would have involved his drawing the fundamental distinction of his system in a different way. This is the criticism of Kant's metaphysic of ethics which we would venture to make. To obtain concrete validity for his ethical principle he would have to conceive this world of things in themselves, this absolute of his, which is supposed to lie on the farther side of the line, differently. He would have to bring his two conceptions of the thing in itself closer together.

The world of things in themselves, it is true, being a world of which we are ignorant, cannot easily be spoken of as amenable to conception at all. But if Kant does not offer us literally a conception of that world he at least endeavours to show that we effect contact with it. We effect contact with it, according to him, in the field of practice. And what we say is that it would perhaps have made his ethical principles a

little less liable to mislead had he not in a manner of speaking forgotten, immediately he effected this contact with the beyond, what exactly he was effecting contact with, namely, the literal reality which subsists behind the phenomenal veil; in other words, if he had not kept his two conceptions of the real so much apart. This at least is the suggestion of our present chapter. It is quite a bare and formal suggestion; but it may appropriately conclude our analysis, if it can be explicated a little and made good.

Let us endeavour to state it again.

The problem confronting any criticism of Kant's ethics which aims to be constructive, is that of relieving his *metaphysical* system of defects which reverberate into his ethical theory and disturb it. The problem, in the particular shape in which we have here been finding it, is that of securing a valid concrete ethics. The difficulty is to find, shall we say, some shadow of a regulative principle to indicate how we do—or at least how we do not—rightly integrate ourselves into those autonomous or whole beings which Kant's theory when taken concretely contemplates as good men.

Kant has no effective concrete guidance to give us in the matter. It is not enough to say—and he feels it is not enough to say—that we become properly autonomous by deserting sense and following the bare universal law. He

begins by saying so. But he has presently to read the universal law as end, and leave us to pursue our end, as if that were the whole of goodness; which is, as we have seen, unsatisfactory. Is there, then, no way out of this? Is there no way of taking the law thus concretely, and yet being clear that most "ends" which we could round ourselves into are emphatically not goodness? We believe that there is. But—and this is our suggestion—it would involve that Kant should regard that real with which, in goodness, we establish relations and effect contact as being literally and genuinely the real. It would involve that while maintaining goodness to be our commerce with the real, he should still find himself able to accept what we must venture to call *the natural view of the real;* to accept it not spasmodically, as he already does, but consistently. What, then, is this natural view of the real?

We have in mind, in using the phrase, simply the naïve view that reality is the whole of what there is; that it is the fragment we know supplemented by all that we do not know. It is essentially the view which Kant blames the natural understanding for taking, in *paragraph 11*, Section III., where he declares that by taking this view it spoils all the commendable insight which it had achieved in penetrating momentarily to the distinction between appearance and reality.

The natural mind, according to Kant in that

passage, does penetrate to the distinction. Appearances, even for it, are not just things in themselves. It is, he says, a reflection which the commonest understanding can make, "that all 'ideas' which come to us involuntarily (as those of the senses) do not enable us to know objects otherwise than as they affect us; so that what they may be in themselves remains unknown to us, and consequently that as regards 'ideas' of this kind, even with the closest attention and clearness that understanding can apply to them, we can by them only attain to knowledge of *appearances*, never to that of *things in themselves*." "To such conclusion," he says, "the reflecting man must come with respect to all the things that can be presented to him: it [the view] is probably to be met with even in persons of the commonest understanding, who, as is well known, are very much inclined to suppose behind the objects of the senses something else invisible and acting of itself. But," he continues, "they spoil it by presently sensualising this invisible again; that is to say, wanting to make it an object of intuition, so that they do not become a whit the wiser."

The criticism urged by Kant here is that the ordinary mind is only finding more appearances, and imagines it is getting nearer to reality thereby. No such view, apparently, in Kant's opinion, can be entertained.

But the view that the real behind the appearance is still something one could know, *may well*

be regarded as the natural one even for a philosopher to take; and the consequence follows that reality is the continuation and completion of the world of appearance. To hold to such a view is but regarding what is unknown as continuous with what we know. It is but acknowledging that we already know in part; and that if we knew all the rest that there is to know, we should *ipso facto* be knowing the real. This is probably natural. It is probably natural to take the real simply as what we know already, together with all the remainder that there is to be known.

But however such a view might have affected Kant's general theory, it is in principle unacceptable to him, frequent as are the occasions on which he seems to be assuming it. It is unacceptable because it seems to him to obliterate the vital line between phenomenal and noumenal and leave him with nothing but this present world. Thus he must have the gulf. He must make a separation between the real and its appearances, and such a separation as forbids the real to be knowable at all. Things as they really are are not only other than we. They are more completely so even than their appearances to our senses are. They are in some way so totally other that no possible expansion of those appearances, or of our reading of the same, can ever amount to a knowledge of them. Kant is convinced that the phenomenal can never under any expansion be regarded as itself the real. So far as knowledge is concerned, the real

occupies a realm so completely other than any realm which is ours, that between it and our world there is no point of contact.

Nevertheless, as we have pointed out, Kant finds the real. And there is something in his manner of finding it which suggests the possibility of drawing the distinction in another way, of our recognising a distinction between this world and another, and yet being relieved of the embarrassment just dwelt upon, the embarrassment of regarding the latter as a sheer unknowable, separated from our minds by an impassable barrier.

For this, we must concentrate on Kant's approach to the real. His approach to the real is a profoundly significant one. In its light—to anticipate the conclusion we hope to establish—we seem to discern an essential line of distinction such as that on which his speculation is founded; but to discern it in another place, so to speak, than where Kant himself located it; lying, that is to say, not between the phenomenal and something else, but within the phenomenal itself, and yet retaining its virtue. In the light of Kant's approach to the real, we seem to see a genuine distinction to be possible between the phenomenal complete and the phenomenal fragmentarily known. This conclusion only requires that while we go along with Kant so far as to effect contact with the real in his way, we study also to remember that it is literally the real—the real as

naturally conceived—with which we are thus coming into touch.

As we have seen, Kant identifies reality with freedom. He finds reality in that free activity which is our being as minds; and which comes out in goodness and in the synthesising act in knowledge. This is effectually that identification of reality with spirit which is the ground for the so-called spiritual view of the world which later thinkers have extracted out of Kant. It is not about this approach to the real that we would make any question. It seems the only one.

Let us take, then, this theoretical-practical activity at Kant's hands as reality. Suppose, however, that we part with Kant so far as to try the other hypothesis with regard to the nature of this activity. Let us provisionally neglect the dualistic tendency. Let us decline to regard this activity as being on the ethical side something which appears in us only in so far as we have got away from sense impulses; or, on the theoretical side, something merely other than sense impressions. Let us take the activity concretely; admit sense into it and recognise the plain fact that neither does moral goodness simply abjure the whole sensuous side of our human nature nor theoretical insight dispense with the contributions of sense knowledge. If we can do this, if we can regard the activity which is the real, not as the activity of escaping from sense but as the literal energising of the

phenomenal material on both its sides towards its form ; then the distinction which in common with Kant we find so vital seems on a fair way to being made in a form which shall yet not condemn us to the impossible situation of remaining for ever incapable of seeing a glimmer of light beyond it.

The difficulty was that we seemed unable to regard the real quite simply and naturally as the whole of things. It seemed impossible to regard the real universe as simply the completion of this fragmentary phenomenal with which we are acquainted. The reason was that it would not complete itself into anything really different. This is the difficulty which arose out of the whole presupposition with which Kant addressed the problems of philosophy.

But if the phenomenal completes itself into *mental activity*, it does complete itself into something different. If that fragmentary phenomenal presenting itself to our knowledge does literally, when amplified, sum itself up as such activity as this which, thanks to Kant, we have found at the centre of our own being, then that phenomenal world is amplified and completed into another ; into something genuinely different from that dead "given," as which it presents itself to our imperfect knowledge. If we can take such a view, then, while we have saved the natural view of knowledge and of the real, we have not sacrificed the vital distinction signalised by saying that there is another world than that imme-

diately around us, one whose law we follow in rising to the good.

To restate the view very briefly. By rising to the good in preference to letting ourselves be led by inclination, and again by achieving our insights into facts in preference to letting ourselves be dominated by their plausible appearances, we are—are we not?—rising to something different; different with all the difference between passivity and activity.

But what, on the view we have taken, is that different thing into which we thus rise? It is our premonitory grasp of that as which the whole of what we rise from or rise above would sum itself up could we but get at it all; and in saying so we mean to include in what we rise above not our passions merely but the entirety of the phenomenal, both outer and inner. The whole of the given on the perceptual side of our nature is very vast and far from us. The whole of the given on the passional side is very narrow and near to us. We should read the one in the full light of the other. If this can be done we are in a fair way to overcome the defects of both.

If, now, it be possible thus to retain the natural view of reality, while accepting Kant's finding that reality is activity, the resulting position would seem also to relieve his ethical view to some degree of those defects which have occasioned our criticism.

For we have noted the subjectivism which is in Kant's ethics. It is the consequence of the overweening emphasis which he placed upon the apriori on the practical side. It is his main business, of course, to emphasise the apriori everywhere, in knowledge as well as in practice. But the reader of his ethical works cannot fail to note the peculiar constancy with which he fences off what he calls empirical considerations in this field. Even Wolff, rationalist as he was, is too empirical for him when it comes to questions of ethics. While, then, the rational or apriori is accentuated on both sides, Kant represents the relation of it to sense as practically reversed in the two cases. In knowledge he seeks to tie it to sense, and he forbids it all traffic with sense in practice. It is this that leads to the narrowness which prevents Kant's ethical principles from being adequate to the moral life when we take them in a concrete way.

For to take Kant's ethical principles in a concrete way is not, as has so often been supposed, to set them right. It is precisely to see them fail. There is a subjectivism in Kant's ethics, the result of his emphasis on autonomy and his tendency to let the whole moral law resolve itself into the demand that the moral agent be free and be himself; an injunction, between which and the demand for self-perfection which he objected to in Wolff, a difference is scarcely to be traced.

But if, as we have suggested, the Kantian

view that the real is activity be held without prejudice to the view that the real is yet the whole, there is in the combination at least the possibility of a working check to prevent our moral effort after concrete autonomy from running to seed, along egocentric lines. For after all, though I am activity I am clearly not the universe; and it is from activity as the form of the universe that the moral laws flow. It is the being active in the sense of moving with the universe, consequently, that constitutes moral activity.

To take morality thus as a moving with the universe is to give it a cast which is to some degree incisive in practice—nay, to a very considerable degree. If we are not to be subjectivists in knowledge, we cannot forget the vastness of the phenomenal order. The activity which we find in ourselves is to be the real. The real is to be that as which what we already know of the phenomenal order completes itself and sums itself up. If so, then the activity we find in ourselves, taken just as we find it, cannot surely be more than the minutest conceivable synopsis thereof. These reflections leave it clear that we are as little warranted in proceeding deductively from that activity to the whole compass of what is morally required of man—which it is the weakness of Kant to suggest we should do—as we should be in proceeding in a similar deductive way from the same activity on its theoretical side

to our knowledge of nature. We can now see that the moral order will not come straight out of the unaided "I will" any more than the natural order will come straight out of the "I think." On the contrary, just as our faculties of sense must be exposed to be played upon and released by a reality which is other than we before we can have knowledge; so our becoming moral involves exposure of our instinctive and impulsive powers to be legitimated or forbidden, released or repressed at the hands of another than we. We of course are active and free. But even on the ethical side of our nature, it is only in this medium, in the presence of the given, that we can travel towards a freedom in its ultimate nature presumably as unlike our whole self, or at any rate as unlike what unaided we should call our whole self, as the universe in its majesty is greater and other than we in our frailty and finitude.

Such a view has a point of incision in practice. Only within such an objective medium as it contemplates are we likely to be able to be sufficiently free of sophistication to let Kant's ideals of autonomy in conduct concretely interpreted bring us any light; but on the other hand, within such medium they probably will.

The condition upon which we can find it helpful to ask, as Kant bids us, whether our act is one which everybody could do, or whether in our behaviour towards our fellow-beings we are

treating them as ends, is on the one hand that we should be able to retain a certain simplicity, be able to say faithfully what we are really doing—what the manner of our action really is—on each occasion; and, on the other hand, that we should have minds trained towards the practical side of the moral life so as to be able to see the impossibility of the morally impossible and the absurdity of the absurd. Both these conditions are equally important. The second of them presupposes a moral order which has been grown into, on our part, and is quite as incapable of being subjectively generated as is the order of knowledge. And to realise that the activity which is we, is (and if completed would show itself to be) literally that as which the whole phenomenal universe sums itself up; this is to perceive with an ethically saving accuracy how abundantly incomplete such activity actually is, even in the most developed of us. Not much more seems to be required for the healthy subsistence of the ethical order among intelligent beings.

It would seem, then—to draw our points to a focus—that we may take from Kant the view that it is the nature of the moral life to represent attunement on the part of the moral man with the reality of things, for the source of the moral law and the source of the universe are one; and we may take from him also the evidence therefor; namely, that in the energising centre

of our own conscious being we touch the real at its source. But to escape the defects, especially of the ethical side of his system, it would seem we must take the whole burden of the view that it is literally *the real behind outer phenomena* that is being sketched here at the centre of ourselves. The fact that the authentic character of reality is indicated and crops out in this activity which is we, must not be taken to mean that you or I are entitled to stand up and say that what wells up in our own proper selves is all the reality that is appearing in the infinite phenomenal panorama which spreads out before our eyes. That were indeed to outdo *l'état c'est moi* with a *l'univers c'est moi*. Our finding that the universe is spiritual, in the sense that spirit—or what in ourselves we call our spirit—is an outcrop of the inmost reality of things, is capable of being more sanely and steadily taken than that. We must realise, when we are speaking of this activity, that it is of the reality manifesting itself in the whole quire of heaven and furniture of earth that we are speaking. Abiding by the natural view of knowledge, and meaning by the reality of the phenomenal its completion, and then looking inwards for a hint as to what in its completion it is like, we must remember that it is still the completion *of that* that is in question. So viewed, our own self-activity, though authentic reality, is seen to be necessarily but the faintest focal point of a reality reaching from the depths of utmost time to beyond the dog star. If my

own self were all that were behind that sublime spectacle, then of a surety the emblazonry were too magnificent for the garment—however much the advance of physico-mathematical theory may help us to tone down the disproportion between it and us.[1] We must not make such a mistake. And if we do not, if we are not subjectivists, then we shall not readily make the further mistake of thinking that this infinitesimal focus of reality can still go forth to complete itself at the nearest, and hope thus easily to arrive at goodness, when it is so plainly impossible to do so in the case of knowledge and arrive at truth; especially since truth and goodness are so much warp and woof of the one web, as it has been Kant's service to show. This, in words at least, is of course what Kant most clearly bids it not to do. We are to follow the universal law and not to heed our human nature, not to make our moral aim even the perfecting of it, *à la* Wolff. But this law, as we have sufficiently seen, is a pure form, for which the content of our human nature is the only suggested filling. Substantially and concretely interpreted, Kant's challenge to the moral man to be independent of the given must be taken as a challenge to recognize a far wider given; a given which morality can no more do without than knowledge; and the test of an ethical theory which has once glimpsed this fact, as Kant's has done—despite all his

[1] That recent theories of relativity may tend in this direction I make no doubt.

formalism—again and again and again, is to see to it that this wider given is wide enough; wide enough for morality to live; wide enough to permit of the moral individual's feeling when he devotes himself to it, that he is really and genuinely making himself over; that he is giving himself away to Another.

We have tried to find the metaphysical roots of the chief ethical weakness of Kant's system in the imperfection of his hold upon the concept of activity. It is impossible to attempt here to develop adequately a concept which, under various names—as process, activity or enjoyment—so largely marks the point to which the development of philosophical reflection generally may be said to have come; and which attracts to itself so much of contemporary discussion. It has seemed enough to bring our exposition of Kant's thinking clearly down to it; and to indicate, however summarily, by the help of this conception, the kind of completion which his philosophic position seems to invite in terms of present-day thought. Without saying whether such a doctrine as we have suggested could be ultimately maintained or not—a point which it is hardly our business here to go into—we have perhaps at least seen enough to enable us to say that taking Kant's envisagement of the moral life together with his metaphysic of knowledge, we have discerned the two-faceted doctrine towards which his theory as a whole seems to

point forward for completion, a doctrine which we can somewhat roughly express by saying (*a*) that reality is what we know as mental activity, and yet that (*b*) we have reached such reality when we have completed the tale of what we usually call its appearances.

INDEX

Abstract and concrete in the Kantian ethics. See Concrete and abstract
Activity, 176-7
Analogies of experience, 16, 21-22
Analytic and synthetic, 4 *ff.*
Analytic of conceptions as a division of transcendental logic, its theme, 14-15; its argument, 16 *ff.*
Analytic of principles, its theme, 14-15; its arguments, 20-22; why the principles hold, 17-18; the abuse of them, 22-23
Anticipations of perception, 16, 21-22
Apodictic imperatives. See Imperatives
Apperception, synthetic unity of, 18-20
Apriori and aposteriori, 4 *ff.*, 7 *ff.*
Apriori approach to ethics, 69-70
Apriori synthetic judgments, 5; mathematical judgments as instances of, 7; how the mathematical are possible, 13; morality as apriori synthesis compared with theoretical syntheses, 160
Apriori truth, Kant's interest in, 3 *ff.*
Assertoric imperatives. See Imperatives
Autonomy, 61-63, 80-83, 84-85, 88, 95 *ff.*, 108-9, 159; Wolff's ethics fail of it, 97-101; freedom as key to the a. of the will, 111 *ff.*
Axioms of intuition, 16, 21-22

Berkeley, Kant's refutation of his idealism, 16

Categorical imperative. See Imperatives
Categories, 3; deduction of, what it is, 20; aim of metaphysical deduction, 15, 16; aim of transcendental deduction, 15, 16; how metaphysical deduction conducted, 16 *ff.*; result of transcendental deduction, 17-20; parallel between problem of their deduction and Kant's ultimate ethical problem, 106
Causality, 13; schema of, 21; free c., 26-27, 108-9
Circular argument concerning morality and freedom, 115, 147; Kant's way out, 116 *ff.*, 147-8
Command, what it is, 75
Conceiving and judging the functions treated in the analytic, 14 *ff.*
Concrete and abstract in Kant's ethics, to "read K.'s principles concretely" not enough—we must know *what* concrete reading to take, 159-60; Kant gives no guidance here, 160, 162, 170-1; where he could have found a clue—viz., by recognising that inner and outer reality are one reality, 161-2; natural view of the real, 163-5; the real which K. finds within should be seen as completion of the real he finds without, 166-9; guidance then available as to *what* concrete to follow, 169-71; how so, 171-3; summary of this criticism, 173-6
Cosmology, rational, 23
Critique of Practical Reason, the need it was meant to meet,

12-13, 25; its subject, 34-35, 47, 107-8
Critique of Pure Reason, some of its divisions, 2, 7-8, 9, 12; its purpose, 4, 12-13, 95-97; its fundamental insight, 11; why more urgency for it than for a practical *Critique*, 39

Defence *v.* explanation of the moral attitude, 135 *ff.*, 147-8
Dialectic as a division of the first *Critique*, its content, 23
Duty, as throwing light on a will that is good, 51 *ff.*; necessity of doing *what* it requires *because* it requires it, 51-54; "whether this was duty?" never a question of "what objects were here in view?" 58 *ff.*, 77-78; K.'s panegyrics on duty and their significance, 158-9

Ego, as thing-in-itself, 112 *ff.*; *qua* active, 119, 120 *ff.*; and its appearances, 155-8
Emerson, 159
End and Law. See Law and End
Ethics, study of among the ancients, 29 *ff.*; as division of the general field of human knowledge, 33; pure *v.* empirical, 33, 36-37, 72; the two parts of it and K.'s separation of them, 35-37; confusion in most theories of, 36-37, 72-73; utilitarian *v.* metaphysical, 71, 73; Wolff's unsatisfactory ethics, 83-84; the difficulty about this and the explanation, 95-101
Explanation, *v.* defence (see Defence); limits of in field of ethics, 132 *ff.*

Formal logic, part it plays in deduction of the categories, 16 *ff.* See Logic
Formal *v.* material, 30-31
Freedom: as the credential of the categorical *ought*, 107; negative *v.* positive conceptions of it, 108-9; F. if real would carry the validity of the moral law with it, 109; F. based on the validity of morality, 107, 112; the independent argument for F., 111; Kant as treating the independent argument as reducible to the moral argument, 116; Kant strengthens the independent argument and, incidentally, both arguments, by reference to things-in-themselves, 112-126, 147-8; F. and necessity, their union, 117-8, 121-126, 129 *ff.*; F. as keystone to Kant's system, 126-8; Kant's essential view of, 127

God, Freedom, and Immortality, 6, 22-27, 104-5, 121-2
Good, natural *v.* moral, 43-46; only g. the good will, 43 *ff.*; g. is when sheer conception of law determines will, 59; g. as both letting law prevail and following end, see 85-86, and see Law and End
Grundlegung, its subject, 1, 34-35, 38-39, 43; its interest in the "limits of knowledge" question, 26-27; relation to *Critique of Practical Reason* and to *Metaphysic of Morals*, 39, 40, 106-7; plan of the book, 46 *ff.*; the "transition" of Sect. I. of, 47-48, 71; the proximate and the ultimate problem of the book, 46-49, 51, 61, 63-64, 72, 76, 82, 103-5, 106, 113 *ff.*, 139 *ff.*, 146 *ff.*; its principle that the moral consciousness should be let witness to itself, 68-70; K.'s digressions from the ultimate problem in Sect. III. of, 76, 77, 80; ultimate problem of stated in terms of "interest," 113 *ff.*; confusion of proximate with ultimate problem of, 103-5

Happiness, too indefinite an end to guide us, 53-54; as a

duty which is not usually done *because* of duty, 53
Hedonism, 53-54, 91
Heteronomy, 95 *ff.*; even Wolff does not rise above it, 97-101
Hypothetical imperatives. See Imperative

Ideas of reason, 6, 25 *ff.*, 154-5
Immortality, 157
Imperative, as formulation of a command, 75; categorical and hypothetical, 75 *ff.*; problematic assertoric and apodictic, 76; of prudence and of skill, 76; categorical i. has its content fixed by its form, 77 *ff.*; how a categorical i. is possible, 123 *ff.*
Inclination, as urging towards action which accords with duty, 52-54
Instinct, would be a better gift than reason if our end were happiness, 49. See Reason
Intelligible world, the, 119-126, 132 *ff.*
Intention, not what matters morally, 57
Interest, an extraneous not needed as sanction for moral conduct, 85, 88 *ff.*; "what is our i. in morality?" the fundamental question of K.'s ethics, 113-116, 135 *ff.*

Judging and conceiving as functions treated in K.'s analytic, 14 *ff.*
Judgment, K.'s interpretation of the, 18 *ff.*
Judgments, Kant's table of, 17

Kant, his partition of the field of human knowledge, 29 *ff.*; his theory of knowledge, 3 *ff.*; the motive of his philosophising, 3; as fountain-head of many streams of thought, 31; as putting old wine in new bottles, 32; his terminology, 32-33; the schematic type of his mind, 40-42; his ethical theory a gospel for the poor, 43-46; his habit of losing his thread, 54-56, 57-58; keystone of his system, 127-8; criticism of his teaching, 127-8, 144 *ff.*; the fundamental distinction of his philosophy, 148 *ff.*; the question for constructive criticism, 149-151, 153-4, 162 *ff.*
Kingdom of Ends, 89 *ff.*
Knowledge, the two sorts of, 4; and faith, 25-27; general field of human k., 29; ancients' division of this field and K.'s rectification, 30-40; k. and morality, 97-98; limits of k. in ethical sphere, 128 *ff.*; principal difference between k. and morality in Kant, 128

Law, the letting of law prevail the essence of all ways of doing right, 78 *ff.*; morality and freedom linked through conception of, 108-9
Law and End, 61-63, 80-83, 84 *ff.*, 162-3; to read law as end is to further articulate the law, 85-86. See Moral Law
Leibnitz, 34
Logic, formal *v.* transcendental, 18-20; study of, among the ancients, 29; and metaphysic, 30-31; as the formal sort of pure philosophy, 30, 34. See Formal Logic
Love, practical l. and not pathological enjoined by Scripture, 56

Marx, Karl, as representative of those who do not allow moral consciousness to testify of itself, 69, 70
Maxims, they and not intentions are what morally matter, 57-58
Metaphysic, and logic, 30-31; Kant really a believer in, 31

Metaphysic of morals, relation of a, to *Grundlegung*, 39-40, 101-3; relation to practical *Critique*, 101-3
Metaphysic of nature, 7, 15, 34
Metaphysic, the old, K.'s view of, 3 *ff.*; and synthetic apriori judgments, 5; its subject-matter, 6; its sins, 22 *ff.*; the sound impulse behind it, 23 *ff.*; the positive side of K.'s attitude to it, 25 *ff.*
Modality, categories of, 17
Moral consciousness of the ordinary good man, what is "good" to it, 46-47; Kant's elucidation of its content, 51 *ff.*, 60 *ff.*, 71 *ff.*, 73, 90; its strength, 64-65; its weakness, 65-68
Moral good *v.* other good, 43-46
Moral law, respect for it the true moral motive, 56-70; first formulation of its content, 60 *ff.*; second formulation, 80-86; third formulation, 86-89; criticism of second and third formulations, 89 *ff.*; ways of doing right reduced for so many ways of letting law prevail, 78 *ff.*
Morals themselves, in what sense the touchstone of moral theory, 36-38

Natural and moral good, 43-46
Nature, metaphysic of. See M. of nature
Nature, she made no mistake by giving man reason, 49-51, 59-60, 67-68
Necessity, physical n. and freedom, 108-9. See also Freedom

Obligation, 73-75; has no applicability to a perfect will, 74
Other-world, an, K.'s demand for it, 149 *ff.*

Perception, 9 *ff.* See Sense and thought
Phenomena *v.* reality in Kant, 117 *ff.*, 145 *ff.*, 163-4; weakness of the distinction, 148-9; why K. made the distinction, 149 *ff.*; his ways of virtually bridging the distinction, 154-9; his essential reading of it, 151-3; K. places the real both too near us and too far from us, 153; the natural view of the real as "the whole of the phenomenal," 163 *ff.*; to take the real in this way does not sacrifice Kant's distinction, 161 *ff.*; and it keeps his abstract ethics from misleading us when we read them concretely, 161 *ff.*
Physics, as division in general field of human knowledge, 33; the two parts of it, 35 *ff.*; study of, among ancients, 29
Positivists, 31
Postulates of empirical thought, 16, 21-22
Problematical imperative. See Imperative
Psycho-analysis, its principle contrasted with Kant's, 69-70
Psychology, rational, 23
Pure: "pure and formal," 5, 30-31; "pure and material," p. *v.* empirical, in physics and in ethics, 33; the kind of philosophy important to K. that which is pure and material, 34

Quality, categories of, 17
Quantity, categories of, 17; schema of, 21

Rationalism and empiricism, 95 *ff.*
"Rational knowledge," the term, 30, 33-34
Reason, *v.* instinct, 49-51, 59-60, 67-68; as the real in us, 121 *ff.*
Refutation of Berkeley's idealism, 16
Relation, categories of, 17
Respect, 57, 58; the nature and object of it, 59

Schemata of the understanding, 20-22
Sense and thought, 9 *ff.*, 13-14
Space and time, 3; metaphysical and transcendental expositions of, 11 *ff.*
Synthetic apriori judgments, 5; mathematical judgments as instances of, 7; problem of possibility of, 8 *ff.*; problem of how the mathematical ones are possible, 13
Synthetic and analytic, 4 *ff.*
Substance, schema of, 21

Terminology of Kant, 32-33
Theology, rational, 23. See God, freedom and immortality, Ideas of reason, Intelligible world
Thing-in-itself the, consideration of it is K.'s way of strengthening the independent (and also the moral) argument for freedom, 112 *ff.*; as the point in K.'s teaching which first invites criticism, 145 *ff.* See also Phenomena
Thought and sense. See Sense and thought
Time and space. See Space and time
Transcendental analytic, its theme and its results, 12
Transcendental dialectic, its theme and its results, 12
Transcendental logic, as a division of the first critique, 12 *ff.*; K.'s reinterpretation of the judgment as the point of transition to, 18 *ff.*
Transcendental philosophy, 7, 34

Understanding and sense, 13-14
Universality as test of right, 60 *ff.*, 64. *ff.*; Kant's way of testing the validity of this test, 79-80; his testing the validity of its second formulation, 86

Will, definition of, 73-75; if perfect, then not conscious of obligation, 74; goodness of, what it is, 43-46, *cf.* page 111; goodness of, does not altogether fly in the face of Nature, though in itself paradoxical and the master problem of ethics, 48 *ff.*; goodness of, the only good, reason necessary for goodness of, 59
Wolff, 34, 84, 170. See Heteronomy

BY THE SAME AUTHOR

SYNDICALISM AND PHILOSOPHICAL REALISM

PRICE 10/- NET

Demy 8vo., cloth. By post, 10/6.

SOME PRESS OPINIONS

"Full of illuminating thought and sound criticism."—*The Times.*

"His work is equally valuable in leading the student of social facts to become a philosopher and in leading the philosopher to become a student of social facts."—*Observer.*

"His style is trenchant; he hits hard, but he hits fairly; and it is permeated with a sense of humour as delightful in a work of this description as it is unexpected."—*Spectator.*

"Quite unusual powers of philosophical exposition."
Manchester Guardian.

KARL MARK ON VALUE

PRICE 3/6 NET

Demy 8vo., cloth. By post, 3/9.

SOME PRESS OPINIONS

"An acute and opportune criticism."—*The Times.*

"Readers who are interested in the Marxian theory of value, and are desirous of studying a minute and lucid examination thereof, will do well to consult Dr. Scott's volume named above."—*Tablet.*

"Few kinds of exposition are more useful in these times than the statement of economic truth in language which can be understood by all. . . We must give a particular welcome to Dr. J. W. Scott's treatise . . because it can be understood by everyone."—*Spectator.*

Published by
A. & C. BLACK, LTD., 4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE LONDON, W. 1

OTHER VOLUMES ON PHILOSOPHY

EARLY GREEK PHILOSOPHY. By Prof. JOHN BURNET, M.A. Second Edition. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 25s. net.

"So admirably done that it is certain to prove welcome to all students interested in the rich and subtle field of Hellenic philosophy."—*Standard.*

GOD WITH US. A Study in Religious Idealism. By W. R. BOYCE GIBSON, M.A. (Oxon). Crown 8vo., cloth, price 5s. net.

"Mr. Gibson's book is at once sane and marked by a high spirituality. It is an earnest attempt to solve the problem of religion in the light of the whole of human personality, and that personality as revealed in the revelation of Jesus Christ."—*Baptist Times.*

THE SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ORGANISM. By Dr. HANS DRIESCH.

Vol. I.—The Gifford Lectures delivered before the University of Aberdeen in the year 1907. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 12s. 6d. net.

Vol. II.—The Gifford Lectures, 1908. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 12s. 6d. net.

"The history of mankind, the only instance of an historical biological process actually known to us, is not a true evolution. Such is the position maintained with rare knowledge and acumen in these keenly reasoned discourses."—*Scotsman.*

LIFE'S BASIS AND LIFE'S IDEAL. The Fundamentals of a new Philosophy of Life. By RUDOLPH EUCKEN. Translated, with Introductory Note, by ALBAN G. WIDGERY. Second Edition. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 10s. 6d. net.

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE. By W. BOYCE GIBSON. Third Edition. Crown 8vo., cloth, price 5s. net.

"We are indebted to the author of this work for so ably introducing Professor Eucken to the English people. Indeed, for such a task it would be difficult to find one better qualified by knowledge and power of sympathetic criticism than Mr. Boyce Gibson."—*Hibbert Journal.*

RUDOLF EUCKEN'S MEANING AND VALUE OF LIFE. Translated by BOYCE and LUCY GIBSON. Second Edition. Crown 8vo., cloth, price 5s. net.

"The thinking of a man of clearest vision and loftiest outlook on the fabric of life as men are fashioning it to-day. . . . A volume for everyone who is seriously interested in the great business of life."—*Aberdeen Journal.*

CAN WE STILL BE CHRISTIANS? By RUDOLF EUCKEN. Translated by LUCY GIBSON. Crown 8vo., cloth, price 5s. net.

ENGLISH PHILOSOPHY. A Study of its Method and General Development. By THOMAS M. FORSYTH, M.A., D.Phil. (Edin.). Demy 8vo., cloth, price 6s. net.

"This able and well-reasoned treatise. . . . Concise, clearly thought out and logically expounded as it is, the work will well repay the attention of professed students of philosophy."—*Scotsman.*

PRAGMATISM AND IDEALISM. By WILLIAM CALDWELL, M.A., D.Sc. (Edin.). Demy 8vo., cloth, price 8s. 6d. net.

"One of the most significant contributions recently made to the literature of philosophy, and has reminded us that a theory of knowledge must become a theory of life."—*Aberdeen Free Press.*

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CIVILIZATION. Dale Memorial Lectures, 1922. By ALBERT SCHWEITZER, D.Theol., D.Phil., D.Med. (Strasbourg).

Part I.—**The Decay and the Restoration of Civilization.** Translated by C. T. CAMPION, M.A. (Oxon), sometime of Merton College, Oxford. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 5s. net.

Part II.—**Civilization and Ethics.** Translated by JOHN NAISH, B.Litt. (Oxon), D.D. (London). Demy 8vo., cloth, price 10s. 6d. net.

"His gospel may be summed up in a phrase, 'Back to Ethics,' and the power of such an appeal when the story of Civilization is surveyed is incontrovertible."—*Birmingham Post.*

NATURALISM AND AGNOSTICISM (the Gifford Lectures, 1896–98). By Prof. JAMES WARD. Third Edition, revised. In Two Vols. Demy 8vo., cloth, price 12s. 6d. net.

"It cannot be doubted that it will have a wide influence on the higher thought of the country, and may even do something to restore to philosophy the pre-eminent place it once occupied in English thought."—*Athenæum.*

SPINOZA'S SHORT TREATISE ON GOD, MAN, AND HIS WELLBEING. Translated for the first time into English, and edited, with Introduction and Commentary, by Prof. A. WOLF, M.A., D.Litt. Containing 13 Illustrations. Large crown 8vo., cloth, price 7s. 6d. net.

"Dr. A. Wolf deserves the gratitude of all students of the history of philosophy for his excellent edition of 'Spinoza's Short Treatise.' . . . He supplements his translation with a clear and scholarly commentary."—*Manchester Guardian.*

Published by A. & C. BLACK, LTD., 4, 5 & 6 SOHO SQUARE, LONDON, W.1

GTU Library
3 2400 00711 3362

LIBRARY RULES

1. **No book may be taken from the library without being charged to the borrower.** Borrowers are responsible for any damage done to the volumes while in their possession and are expected to make good all losses.
2. (a) **Reserve Books** may be borrowed for a period of two hours. In case no call has been made in the interval, books may be renewed for a second two hours. (Where there is only one copy, book must be used in the library.)

   (b) Reserve books taken at 10 p. m. Mondays to Fridays are due at 9 a. m. the next morning. A reserve book taken from the library at 12 m. Saturday is due at 9 a. m. the following Monday.
3. Books not on reserve may be drawn from the library for two weeks and may be renewed once for the same period, except one-day books.
4. A fine of two cents a day will be charged on each book which is not returned according to the above rule.
5. **MAGAZINES ARE NOT** to be taken from the library without the special permission of the librarian.

GTU Library
2400 Ridge Road
Berkeley, CA 94709
For renewals call (510) 649-2500
All items are subject to recall